June 22, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
13 
Germany's Mistakes 
2, — Political 
By Colonel Feyler 
[In the preceding article. Colonel Feyler, the well- 
known military critic of the "Journal dc Geneve." 
began an examination of the mistakes which, in his 
opinion, will lead to the defeat of Germany. He 
divided these mistakes into three classes — srategical, 
political and moral — and in his first article published 
two weeks ago, lie confined, himself to the strategical. 
He field it ivas a serious blunder for Germanv to cross 
to thi left bink of the Meuse, i.e., to im'ade Belgium. 
It wasted valuable time, unduly extended the front 
and increased the lines of communication through an 
enemy country. Another serious mistake was the blind- 
rush forward between Paris and Verdun that preceded 
ifie battle of the Marne. In this article Colonel 
Feyler passes on to Germany's political mistakes] 
HAVING in the preceding article discussed tlie 
strategical and tactical mistakes which have 
seemingly been committed by the German 
Armies, we may now amplify our conclusions 
by a study of the political mistakes committed by the 
German Government. 
Having to fight on two diametrically opposite fronts, 
Germany, for very good reasons, resolved at first to 
stand on the defensive in the East and to put forward 
all her effort in the West. Military and geographical 
conditions, to say notlnng of the help of Austria-Hungar3-, 
favoured such a course ; whilst the latter looked after 
the South, the Germans merely had to consider the 
northern part of the R^issian front, where territorial 
conclitions in East Prusna gave excellent defensive 
facilities to troops who had been thoroughly trained in 
that district. A very small proportion of the active 
forces sufficed to form the kernel of defence in the East, 
whilst almost the whole active army could be hurled at 
the French. 
Numerical Superiority 
Germany was thus in marked numerical superiority on 
the Western front. Of the twenty- two active corps of 
France, three at least were immobilised in watching Italy, 
namely the 14th and 15th in the Alps and the 19th in 
North Africa, for although not directly participating 
in the war, Germany could count on Italy's attitude 
having a hampering effect on France. Some troops 
also would have to be left for the policing of Paris and 
the army of occupation in Morocco could only be with- 
drawn slowly, if at all. Germany could count on a 
specially speedy advance, thanks to the faultless regu- 
larity of her railways and to the minutely organised 
perfection of those elements of her army that worked 
behind the actual firing line, both of which are factors of 
capital importance to a speedy mobilisation and con- 
centration. 
Whereas the Great General Staff was under no illu- 
sion as to the German power in these matters, it fell into 
a complete error as regards Italy, where German diplo- 
macy showed an unexampled failure. Italy was not 
long in realising that her partners in the Triple Alliance 
had not met their engagements towards her, and conse- . 
quently felt herself released from her engagements towards 
them. Italian public opinion, too, showed in no uncertain 
manner, not only its repugnance to fight on the side of 
Austria, but a distinct hope of the collapse of that Power, 
thus enabling the French General Staff to bring into 
use, without much hesitation, the army of the Alps as 
well as the African troops. This constituted a second 
blow to Germany's original plans. 
The passage to the left bank of the Meuse — in fact, the 
invasion of any part of Belgium — seems to have provided 
yet another blow. Its effects were threefold, namely, a 
decrease in the superiority of numbers, a loss of time, 
and an indication to the Allies of the enemy's plan. 
Notwithstanding, one is tempted to believe that this 
plaii was not too evident to the French ; of course, this 
is mere hypothesis, as we know too little of their initial 
concentration and subsequent movements to be able 
to form more than a vague impression. The impression 
remains, however, that the French attributed to this 
movement too little importance ; they seem to have 
anticipated the enemy's main attack cast of the Meuse. 
Furthermore, their offensives in Alsace and in Lorraine 
lead one to believe that their concentration and deploy- 
ment were not carried out against the enemy's principal 
effort. In consequence, the loss of time on the German 
side was of less advantage to the French than might have 
been the case, although this loss was immediately 
apparent in the delay to the armies of Lorraine and 
Luxembourg, which were obliged to wait for the arrival 
into line of their marching wing ; whereas more weight 
was given to the French oftcnsive in Lorraine which 
helped to attenuate the violence of the enemy's attack. 
The Belgian Army 
The damage done to the German plans through the 
upsetting of the balance of numbers was, on the other 
hand, immediate and marked. The German Staff had 
thrown the whole Belgium Army into the arms of the 
Allies, thus giving the latter 150,000 unexpected rein- 
forcements, and even incurring losses in that same act. 
The most signilicant point is the ignorance manifested 
by the German Staff of the technical and moral value 
of its new enemy : notwithstanding the undoubted 
superiority in military education of the German soldier 
as compared Mith the Belgian, it was necessary to detach 
considerable forces to deal with the latter, who even then 
succeeded finally in making good his escape. 
As a last consequence, and a consequence that proved 
the -third and most serious blow to the Austro-German 
plans, this act procured for France, over and above 
Italy's neutrality and Belgium's Army, the formidable 
assistance of Great Britain. The German Staff were 
highly indignant and poured forth all the vials of their 
wrath against the English. 
Surely this was puerile : they had better reserved 
their indignation for themselves, for all the evidence 
.goes to prove that they alone were responsible for throw- 
ing away, one after another, their best trump-cards. It 
was not upon England's advice that Italy gave France 
a free hand in the Alps. I venture to think 'that this 
result was rather due to the Emperor William's pro- 
clamation of his intention to establish a German world- 
hegemony ; and if the German generals resolved to 
violate Belgian neutrality without regard to the attitude 
of England, surely the fault lies not at England's door. 
Britain's Intervention 
In effect, Great Britain's intervention did not at the 
outset seriously disturb the numerical balance, for General 
French's Army was not strong in numbers and does not 
seem to have arrived in line until the last moment. It 
constituted none the less a heavy blow to Germany's 
plans. 
It will be observed that all these circumstances, which 
disturbed the original German plan of campaign by 
minimising their initial preponderance in numbers, were 
ultimately due to political blunders, that is so say to 
German diplomatic defeats, and that every political 
trump thrown away by Germany was a strategical 
trump gained by her enemies. 
The results can after all not be totally surprising. 
Germany's enemies blame her chiefly for hei: " militarist " 
government, upon which they throw the responsibility 
for the present world-conflict. History must be left 
to prove how much or how little this charge is founded, 
but it can be taken for granted that the diplomatic 
defeats as above enumerated were chiefly suffered as a 
result of subordinating diplomatic questions to the 
strategical necessities of the General Staff rather than to 
the dictates of Higher Policy. To this extent, therefore. 
Government was certainly under the guidance of the 
General Staff, and it' was an essentially defective guidance. 
