June 29, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
Have conditions so altered thinfjs that nowadays 
an inferior force never has a chance? Perhaps if I 
attempt to answer the second and third questions, the 
first will more or less answer itself. But before dealing 
with them, it should be remembered that the phrase 
" The Nelson touch," was invented by the Admiral's 
friends as a description of the tactical plan put into action 
at Trafalgar. It means the specific thing that Nelson 
once did — not the Nelsonian way of doing anything. 
The difficult}' of telling Mr. VVilson whence the legend 
comes " that Nelson simply taught to engage more 
closely," lies in his use of the word " simply." For sea 
war is infinitely various, and Nelson, the greatest of all 
exponents of sea fighting, is as complex in his teaching 
as were the conditions he had to meet. Nor can we get at 
Nelson's teachings just by quoting his chance phrases. 
Though his letters are wonderful, Nelson was not literarv, 
and he had neither a philosophic nor historical training. 
He was not acquainted with any code of sea strategy, 
no written system of tactics was available to him, and 
neither he nor any of his contemporaries produced one. 
The, navy of his day was indeed possessed of certain 
fighting principles, which, when exemplified in action, 
almost present a catena of warlike doctrine. But these 
principles existed only in the memories, the experiences 
and the accomplishments of the officers of that war 
trained generation. They were transmitted orally, they 
lived by virtue of being practised, and there is no other 
complete record of them. And they were to a great 
measure lost tothegeneration that succeeded, just because 
peace afforded no scope for exemplifying doctrine in action. 
The disengagement of the fundamental truths of strategy 
and tactics from their very partial expression and their 
often obscure exposition, has been the work of naval 
students in the century that is passed. It is they who 
have tried, but without convincing success, to set these 
out as immutable principles of sea war. The task is in- 
completely performed because it is incredibly difficult, 
and it is only eclipsed in difficulty by the attempt to 
apply doctrines deduced from the conditions of 100 years 
ago to the changed conditions of to-day. This being the 
case it would be very rash to dogmatise on any one aspect 
of Nelson's teaching. But it looks as if we could go a 
certain way towards an answer with safety. 
Teaching from \ction 
I have already suggested that we shall learn more of 
Nelson's teachings from his actions than from his words. 
Sometimes his words and his acts are at variance. " Do 
not imagine,"' said he, " that I am one of those hot- 
brained people who fight at an immense disadvantage 
without an adequate object." When the object was 
adequate, the disadvantages that Nelson would face are 
patently understated by the adjective immense. Nor 
is the adequacy always apparent. Take the two in- 
stances of February nth and 13th, 1797, set out in the first 
volume of Mahan's life, and note that in the first of these 
it is somewhat difficult to say that the object was im- 
portant enough for the risk that Nelson ran. 
On the nth Nelson left Gibraltar in the frigate Mincrvc. 
He was pursued by a Spanish ship of the line: It was 
exactly the disparity of forces Mr. Wilson discusses in his 
letter. A member of the Minervc's crew fell overboard, 
and Hardy, without a thought of the consequences, ordered 
a boat to be lowered, leapt into it and rowed off to look 
for him. The Spaniard was gaining ; was indeed, almost 
within gunshot. It was obvious that, if the frigate 
checked her way, Nelson would have to engage at almost 
hopeless odds, for the circumstances gave the slower ship 
of the line the advantage of the wind, and successful 
flight seemed improbable. But Nelson did not hesitate : 
He saw a way of fighting without surrendering ; but 
not without losing his ship. It is not improbable that 
he thought he could bluff his pursuers. " By God. I'll 
not lose Hardy," he exclaimed. " Back the mizzen 
topsail." " Singularly enough," savs Mahan, " the 
enemy, disconcerted by Nelson's action, stopped also to 
allow his consort to come up — a measure wholly inexcus- 
able, and only to be accounted for by that singular moral 
effect produced in many by a sudden and unexpected 
occurrence. The daring deed had therefore the happiest 
results of a strategem, and the frigate was troubled no 
furthcn ' " 
Off St. Vincent, two days later, the Spanish fleet was 
divided and was trying to re-unite across tlie British 
rear. Nelson's ship, the Captain,' was the third ship 
from the end of the line. He at once left his place and 
engaged the leading ships of the Spanish weather .division. 
The Conmiodore of course knew that other • Captains 
would act on his example. But he could not know how 
many would follow nor how soon support would come. 
What he did was to engage five first-rates and a 74 with 
the Captain only. The disjiarity of force, as measured 
by guns, was 600 on one side against 74 on the other- 
odds of nine to one ! Again at Trafalgar, Collingwood in 
the Royal Soi;emg«, carrying out Nelson's plan, -was 
■ engaged single-handed for twenty minutes against seven 
French ships of the Line, and the Victory was deliberately 
exposed to the broadside of four French ships for a full 
half hour before a shot was returned. \\'hen she broke 
through she was engaged for some time with three ships at 
least. If an unequal engagement is wrong, the whole 
procedure of Trafalgar is indefensible. 
It would be easy to multiply instances. It almost 
looks as if Nelson either thought little of his limiting con- 
ditions, or always saw an adequate object when the 
chance of fighting was offered. 
When on a famous occasion Hotham recalled his ships 
from action. Nelson at that time a Captain only, went 
on board the Admiral, and with what must have seemed 
great presump,tion, pressed him to revoke the order. 
At St. Vincent he was a mere Commodore, and there were 
• no less than foiu^ Admirals flying their flags in a fleet of 
16 ships. Any one of the four might have seen as clearly 
as he did what the situation was, but seeing it himself 
he did not hesitate to act without orders. And as we all 
know, at Copenhagen he disobeyed his C. in C.'s orders 
flatly. Each time his almost infallible judgment per- 
ceived a way to victory. When he could, it was . this 
judgment and not orders that he followed. It has been 
said of Nelson that the love of glory was the absorbing 
passion 'of his life. Certainly, notwithstanding the words 
of his I have quoted, far from there ever having been a 
recorded instance of his declining an opportunity of 
engaging, there is no case of his not having sought an 
action when it was possible. We do not need Mahan's 
authority to convince us that he " was inclined by nature 
and experience to take risks." How then is it, that 
with the possible exception of Tenneriffe, we look in vain 
for a case in which either the adequacy of the object 
did not justify his daring, or in which his manoeuvres, 
however daring, were not adequate to achieve his object ? 
The answer is I believe threefold. To begin with, his 
mihtary judgment of the position was, as has been said 
above, almost infallible. He possessed, that is to say, 
an order of mental perception seemingly unique. It 
was a quality of mind incredibly enhanced by actual 
experience of war, and one that in supreme danger could 
work to perfection, because the man was at all times 
aflame with the most ardent courage. For without the 
coolness that courage gives, there could not exist the 
clear and balanced judgment that is vital in the critical 
hour. 
Next Nelson's knowledge of war was not limited merely 
to the methods by which he could put the splendid 
instrument at his disposal to the best use on any occasion. 
He had a profound intuition of the psychology of his 
opponent. Like all the great masters he relied greatly 
on surprise, and he knew that the swift and astounding 
decisions that spring from intrepid daring were the most 
fruitful cause of surprise. When he backed the mizzen 
sail of the Minerve and startled the Spaniard into stopping, 
he as likely as not calculated on this very probable result 
of his action. Amongst the forces, then, on his own 
side with which he would reckon in a contingency, 
he would count his capacity to bewilder his enemy by 
his boldness as one of the greatest. It was as if he 
had said, "The more risk you take, the less risk you 
run ! " ■ . . 
But, manifestly true as all this seems to be, it affords 
a very incomplete account of Nelson's character, for 
much as we may admire his genius, his intuition, and his 
valour, we should admire him much more for his nobler 
characteristic, namely, his devotion to duty. Though 
he seems always to be for fighting at any cost, it was 
only one kind of figliting that he was looking for, viz., 
the lighting duty, not glory made obligatory. He n-£ver 
