July 13, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
marshes which strictly need the minimum of at least 
two men in the yard for their defence. 
Upon the southern half of the Une, there were perhaps 
altogether three-quarters of a million of men, mainly 
Austrian, to hold the dry ground between the marshes 
and the Roumanian frontier ; it was against these that 
the first blow fell upon June 4th with what result we know. 
Within a month, half of the enemy's forces on tljis 
southern half of the enemy's Eastern front, were out of 
action — killed and wounded or unwounded prisoners. 
What has been the fate of this section in the last few 
days ? I 
The Russian Victories 
In order to appreciate that we must first consider the 
southern half of the Eastern front as a whole, and remark 
its two main theatres of action, which may be called the 
" Volhynian " and the " Southern Galician " respec- 
tively, and when we have appreciated what has been 
done upon these two wings, we may turn to the novel 
and exceedingly important addition to the Russian 
offensive formed by this week's attack upon the junction 
of Baranovichi. 
It will be remembered that in the Volhynian or right 
wing of General Brussilov's great advance, a salient 
was formed round the town of Lutsk. That salient 
threatened, forward to the right, the important railway 
junction of Kovel and, forward to the left, the flank of 
the Austro-German centre which still stood along the 
Strypa, oply a few miles west of its original position. 
To meet the danger thus threatening both Kovel and 
the left flank of their advanced centre the enemy, -under 
German direction, largely with new German units and 
principally with accumulated heavy German artillery, 
struck at the northern side of the Lutsk salient all along 
the middle Styr and the upper Stokhod. For a month 
they maintained the pressure here, making every effort 
to cross the Styr from Chartoriisk right away past down 
Kolki to Godomichi. There was a moment when 
they seemed nearly to have succeeded. They could count 
for munitionment upon the excellent avenue of -supply 
afforded to them by the railway which runs east from 
Kovel to the bridge of Chartoriisk, and they had in the 
middle of their operation the good road which runs through 
the forest from the station of Manevitchi to Kolki. 
The news of this week is that this attempt has at last 
completely failed. It has not only failed ; it has been 
abandoned. And the German and Austrian forces have 
suddenly fallen back with the utmost rapidity from the 
Styr to the line of the Stokhod and were last Sunday, 
the gth, already crossing back over the latter stream. 
They have abandoned all the country within the great 
bend of the Styr and the Russian cavalry in pursuit was 
pressing their rearguard upon the railway, beyond 
Manevitchi station, as long ago as last Thursday, the 6th. 
The retirement was so hurried that the enemy lost at 
this point alone, although he had the railway to help 
him, a battery of his 'j'] laeld guns, and three heavy 
pieces, beside a large batch of prisoners. The total 
losses in the four days' battle between Styr and Stokhod 
is not less than 12,000 prisoners, mostly German, and 
45 guns. 
On the other side of the Lutsk salient it. has been the 
same story. The Austro-Germans had counter-attacked 
with all their strength and had pushed the Russians 
back from the neighbourhood of Gorokhov nearly to 
Ugrivo, but the enemy body thus thrust forward was 
taken in flank from the north, that is upon the left, in 
one of those operations (rare, so far, in the great war), 
which permitted the use of cavalry. It was a charge of 
cavalry in mass which seems to have decided the issue 
and' to have left over 8,000 prisoners, all the head of 
the advanced force, in Russian hands. The enemy's 
line after this action fell back to the neighbourhood of 
Gorokhov. 
At the moment of writing these lines (my article of this 
week has again to be composed abroad) there is no news of a 
further advance by our Russian Allies beyond or even up 
to Gorokhov, but it is clear that the enemy attempt to 
counteract in this region has failed. The whole of the 
Lutsk salient is now the scene of a continuous and ad- 
vancing Russian pressure. r- v ■ 
Meanwhile, upon the other wmg, in Southern Gahcla, 
there has come the very important news of the occupation 
of Kolomea. with all its conseaucncei 
It will be remembered that Kolomea was pointed out 
in-these columns as the test point upon the whole of this 
left wing. If Kolomea could be reached, and held, the 
situation of the Austro-German centre was thenceforward 
in jeopardy. 
This was not because the point of Koiomea geographi- 
cally lay at all far behind the ad\'anced Austro-(icrmun 
positions of the centre along the Strypa under Bothmer. 
Those positions lie cither along or close behind the line 
of the Strypa, as far south as the neighbourhood of 
Buczacz and, as will be seen from Sketch I, Kolomea 
itself is not a day's march behind, or to the westward, 
of these positions held by Bothmer. Merely to hold 
Kolomea then, does not turn the advanced Austro-German 
centre by its right nor compel it to the retreat 
But Kolomea is the key to the whole country side up as 
far as Stanislau, audit commands the main crossing of the 
Carpathians by road and by rail, over the Jablonitza pa:ss 
into Hungary. . No less than seven great' roads converge 
upon Kolomea, and when one has pushed a little further 
westward to Delatyn all communication between the 
Strypa line and the south is cut. The Russians entered 
Delatyn only last Saturday, but they had already cut 
the railway at Lanczyn, not a day's march away, while 
their occupation, of Kolomea road centre has had for 
its immediate effect the pushing of Bothmer's right 
wing back to Koropiecs. 
Observe the effect of all this upon Bothmer's com- 
munications. No provisionment can reach him from 
the south at all ; all the roads thence radiate from Kolomea 
and are blocked by the Russians. The line from Hun- 
gary over the Jablonitza and so to Buczacz is now cut 
at Delatyn. There remains for the provision of the 
Austro-German advanced centre nothing but the lines 
through Stryj and Lembcrg, and the salient occupied by 
that centre becomes more and more pronounced with every 
advance of the Russians westward towards Stanislau. 
The Russian occupation of Stanislau would quite cer- 
tainly provoke a retirement of the Austro-German centre, 
but if that did not take place, the further occupation of 
the road and railway junction and bridge of Halicz would 
be destructive of its further security. That the Austro- 
German centre is hanging on at all is only due to the 
general principle which the enemy has established for 
himself upon the whole eastern line of keeping evecy 
position to the very last, for the simple reason that the 
political effect of occupying territory here reacts imme^ 
diately and very powerfully upon the strategical situation. 
But whatever his political interest be, and however strong 
it is, Bothmer has already hung on to the very limit of 
safety. It may be that he will attempt once more a 
strong counter-offensive in front of Tarnopol (he has 
already failed in three such efforts) before the pressure 
upon his right wing becomes insupportable. But it i^ 
difficult to see with what troops or material he can under- 
take such a counter-offensive. If the enemy had had 
guns or men to lend to the south, they would have been 
lent before this, but so far he has found no reinforce- 
ment possible south of the Lutsk salient. 
Meanwhile, we must not lose sight of the spare body 
which the Austrians are in the act of withdrawing from 
Tyrol to bring it eastward. It cannot yet have come 
into play, but its first units— I mean its first complete 
units with their light and heavy guns, its first whde 
divisions — might conceivably be at work in Galicia during 
the course of the present week. There is a sort of race 
going on between this return of men from the West and 
the Russian advance up Galicia along the foot of the 
Carpathians. 
The Russian position in the Bukovina, and now in 
Southern Galicia, obviously permits them to undertake, 
if they so choose, an advance over the mountains towards 
Hungary. What would have been difficult or foolish 
as an attempt along the single line and road south -of 
Czernowitz and across the Borgo pass becomes feasible 
through the possession of two separate roads and railways 
now that the Russians are in possession of Delatyn and 
the road and railway leading to the Jablonitza pass as 
well. 
Attack on Baranovichi Junction 
While this continued advance upon the two wings fA 
Brussilov is occupying all the available strength of the 
enemy south of the Pinsk Marshes, the principle of 
continuous, simultaneous attack upon a more and more 
