10 
LAND & W A T E R 
July 13. 1916 
the Sommc was the best evidence of wisdom upon the part 
of the Allied Command, and the best proof that their 
object was in process of attainment, he would reuly. 
not b\' remarking the capture of those ruins once called 
Montauban, or Hardecourt, or the occupation of the 
ridge over Peronne, but by citing the example of the 
llird Division of the Prussian Guard. 
Last Friday, as we have all read, the British carried 
the ruins of Contalmaiison. They lost those ruins again.* 
But the characteristic of the operation was not the 
advance and the retirement over a few yards of sloping 
fields. Its characteristic was the necessity under whicli 
the enemy was of calling from the north the Ilird Division 
of the Prussian Guard, and throwing five battalions of its 
infantry upon the threatened spot. To quote the words 
of but one eye witness. " The losses inflicted upon the 
Ilird Division of the Guard were such that the remnant 
which escaped from the field cannot reappear for the 
moment as a unit in the fighting." 
Another account speaks of the effect of the field artillery 
and its shrapnel when these unfortunate -troops- were 
caught in the oix-n. Another of the complete break- 
down of the exposed companies. 
But what was the (luard doing there at all ? It was 
a reinforcement hurriedly summoned from the north 
to support the XlV'th Res'erve Corps, the Vlth Corps and 
the Bavarian Division (I believe these were the original 
units of the Ilnd (ierman Army opposed here to the 
Allies) because this Ilnd army alone was not equal to the 
task imposed upon it by the attack of the Allies along the 
Sommc valley. [We. must not forget ' that it was from 
this same Ilnd .Army that the unfortunate XVIIIth 
Corps was despatched long ago to be broken to pieces 
before Verdun in February) . 
The Ilird Division of the Guard, which the present 
offensive on the Somme has thus disposed of, is but one 
example of the way in which hurried concentrations are 
now imposed upon the enemy. There is the fact that 
the French noted not less than 16 battalions in the 
five days, separate from their normal organisation : 
thrown in hurriedly pell-mell into the struggle. 
The general offensive upon East and West will compel 
the enemy to many more such confusions and far 
worse before it is o\'er. 
Exactly the same thing happened at almost the same 
moment 2,500 miles away, between the Styr and the 
Stokhod. E\'en as the mixed Austrian and German 
battalions, or their remnants were surrendering between 
the StjT and the Stokhod, those troops in front of 
Gorokho\', two days' march to the south, who, in an 
earlier phase of the war would so easily have been mo\-ed 
up to aid their comrades, had themselves been stnick 
by the Cossack cavalry and 8,000 of them were passing 
through the concentration point upon the Lutsk road 
upon their way to captivity. 
In a word, the great war has produced in the enemy 
a phase of exhaustion in which his rapid and sufficient 
concentration upon the increasing number of points where 
he must suffer attack from now superior opponents 
has already become a matter of bewilderment and strain 
for him, and is about to become a matter of acute peril 
and anxiety. There Ues before him — perhaps at some 
distance of time still, but now inevitable- — a last phase 
in which it will become a matter of attempting the im- 
possible. H. Belloc 
* News of the recapture of Contalmaison has since been received. 
The Jutland Despatches 
By Arthur Pollen 
THE Jutland Despatches substantially confirm 
the account of the action which I was able to put 
before my readers in our issues of June 8th and 
15th. That account told, in general outline, 
how Sir David Beatty's light cruisers and destroyers 
found von Hipper 's scouts soon after two in the after- 
noon ; how, when the Germans got into touch with the 
British cruisers they fell back promptly on the German 
High Seas Fleet ; how the Battle Cruiser Fleet with the 
Fifth Battle Squadron then drew away to the northward, 
first enticing the Germans to follow by dangling before 
them a force that they might hope to overwhelm, and 
then — when, too late, the Germans discovered the Grand 
Fleet was upon them^prevented a premature retreat ; 
how Hood came in at the last moment anci helped to 
crush the head of the German line ; how Arbuthnot, in 
his gallant effort to head off torpedo attacks, found him- 
self too near the German line and was overwhelmed : how 
Beatty, having done his work, pulled off to the East and 
then to the South so as to leave the field dear for the 
Grand Fleet. This sequence of events and their general 
outline is shown by the dispatches to have been correct, 
almost indeed to the exact times at which the general 
main movements are given. There is, of course, a vast 
deal of new detail added — details as to the weather 
conditions, as to the performances of the light craft, 
btories of individual heroism and brilUancv which arc 
priceless, and all the more valuable for being told in the 
simple and unlaboured prose of the Vice-Admiral. 
These absorbing documents raise a host of interesting 
problems — but very few can be dealt with to-day. They 
also dispose of many false rumours and suppositions. 
The plan of disposition was^ Sir John Jellicoe's— was not 
imposed on him. The tactical division' of the fleet did 
not need precedent. It arose out of the novel character 
of naval force, and wasjustified by a complete success. It is 
obvious that the fast division never ran the risk of being 
overwhelmed, just because it was faster than the enemy 
battleships^, and more powerful than the enemy battle- 
cruisers. These are not new points. But ihey are 
proved finally. 
The Grand Fleet 
What is, however, for the most part new, is the glimpse 
we get of the share of the Grand Fleet in this great trans- 
action. I was not able to make out precisely what this 
share was from the accounts available immediately after 
the battle, and, for all its length, the despatch does not 
make it very clear now. But certain points, which 
are quite new to me, do come out. In the first place, Sit 
David Beatty was steering N.N.E. and not North, when 
at six o'clock he turned due East. He kept this course for 
about five and twenty minutes, and when Hood and the 
