July 13, 1916 
LAND c\' WATER 
11 
Fleet were engaged simulteoeously 
'ith (Bi) 
three fresh battle-cruisers, having in obedience to signal 
taken station ahead of him, and closed down to within 
8,000 yards of the enemy, he himself altered course from 
East to E.S.E. and kept on this course for twenty-five 
minutes longer. 
How close an affair was the intervention of the Grand 
Fleet may be judged from the fact that in the process 
of deployment, the rear division was actually in action 
with one part of the German Fleet while Hood and Beatty 
were in action with the enemy's van- In the sketches 
appearing overleaf I have adopted the diagrammatic 
plan issued by the Press Bureau as if it were a track chart 
of the fleets, and attempted to put the different squadrons 
into position at different times, so as to show their rela- 
tionship to each other and to the enemy between ,:6.i5 
and 8.20. But to understand the course the action took, 
it is necessary to add a sketch to show the periods during 
which the enemy was invisible from the British forces. 
It is essential that wc should get these periods of invisi- 
bility clearly in our minds if we are to understand why 
it was that the Fleet was disappointed on not achieving 
that annihilation of the enemy which it had every reason 
to expect. 
The reader must not suppose, however, that these 
sketches in any way represent the actual courses steered 
by the forces engaged. For reasons that are obviously 
adequate, the details of the Grand Fleet's deployment and 
of its tactics during this highly important period, are 
not given to us, for they could not be published here 
without becoming available to the enemy. And the 
information they would give him is exactly the informa- 
tion that he most requires. If then we are tempted to 
complain that it is tantalising to be told so little, we must 
console ourselves with the reflection that it might be 
highly damaging if we were told more. And we are, 
after all, told the one fact that governs the situation. 
That fact is that between 6.15 and seven o'clock, when 
Beatty's turning movement had forced the Germans to 
-.he east, and so brought them under the guns of 
'he Grand Fleet, when, with Hood's division now 
leading, the battle-cruisers had closed to. 8^00 
>ards and " crumpled up the head of the German 
line," there fell over the enemy's fleet a ■ mist 
tliat did a great deal more than veil tlie targets from 
the British guns. For the mist might have been 
too thick for accurate gunnery, yet by no means so thick 
but that the forms of the enemy's ships ^ouid have been 
at least vaguely seen, their formation observed and 
recognised, and their movements consequently detected. 
Had such been the case, the ships of the Grand Fleet 
could quite easily have kept such close contact with the 
foe, that those brief periods in which there was good 
visibility, between half-past six and nine, would have 
sufficed for the destruction of the enemy's force. For 
it was a task that was well within the Grand Fleet's 
powers. The real service that the weather rendered to 
the enemy is that it made it impossible to keep the 
necessary contact. 
In the earlier afternoon the atmospheric conditions 
had been variable, at one time favourable to us, at an- 
other time to the enemy. Just when the move that 
should have been decisive was made — that is Beatty's 
turn at six o'clock until contact was finally lost — the 
light favoured the British. We hear of no period in 
which the enemy was altogether invisible until "at 
6.52," says Sir David Beatty^ " the visibility was very 
indifferent, not more ,than four miles. The enemy 
ships were temporarily lost sight of." Beatty did not 
see them again until 7.14, when he found them at a range 
of 15,000 yards. He increased the speed to 22 knots 
with probably two motives, first to shorten the range ; 
next to force the enemy back on to the Grand Fleet. 
The enemy, who suffered severely from this fire, sent 
out destroyers to make a smoke screen, and by 7.45 they 
had become once more invisible. At 8.20 the battle- 
cruisers picked up the enemy once more, and in twenty 
minutes, after some very effective gunnery — by Lion, 
Princess Royal, New Zealand, and Indomitable, they were 
lost once more in the mist, now steering on a due westerly 
course. But the Grand Fleet could not regain the lost 
touch. 
How local was the mist may be gathered froni the 
following facts. The battle-cruisers, as wc have seen, 
Sketch 2. — Shows the position of the Grand Fleet and the Germans 
at 7.30 when contact was lost 
