12 
LAND & WATER 
July 13. 1916 
lost sight of the enemy at 6.50. But the First Battle 
Squadron, that' is, the' rear of the Grand Fleet, was in 
action during intervals up to 7.30. for it was at that 
moment that Marlbnough fired fourteen salvoes in 
succession at the German battleships, and she had closed 
the range at this point to q.ooo yards. The Fourth 
Battle Squadron — the centre — got into action at 6.30, 
but the Commander-in-Chief does not say when they 
ceased fire. The Second Battle Squadron — the van — 
was intermittently in action till 7.20. But it is not to 
be supposed that any portion of the Grand Fleet was 
contimiouslv in action between 6.17 and 7.20, nor that 
all the ships in each squadron were able to engage at the 
same time. And unless a target is continually visible, 
the process of finding the range— which can only be done 
by the observation of the fall of salvoes — must be re- 
commenced every time the target comes into sight. And 
as the process of finding the range is by no means a rapid 
one— as is shown by the special attention the Commander- 
in-Chief draws to the exceptional case of the flag ship — it 
follows that where the sight of the target is intermittent, 
the period of effective gunfire may be a quite small pro- 
portion of the total period of good visibility. The fall 
of the mist gave the enemy many advantages. It not 
only imposed a natural veil which hid his movements 
from the Commander-in-Chief, it not only obscured 
and hid the targets, it gave an added efliciency to the arti- 
ficial screens which it is the policy of the retreatmg 
fleet to impose between itself and the enemy's guns. For 
in thick weather, smoke, instead of dissipating, clings to 
the surface of the sea, rises only slowly, and therefore 
constitutes a barrier to sight which remains an effective 
barrier while enemy ships can pass behind it. 
In considering the share of the Grand Fleet, then, it 
is essential to bear in mind the condition of utter un- 
certainty in which the Commander-in-Chief not only had 
to fight his ships but to dispose of them. It was a factor 
that^in all probability made it quite impossible to employ 
the fleet in any other formation than a single line, for 
to have worked by independent divisions would have 
been to risk British ships being taken by other British 
ships for enemies. And it is plain that, if the mainten- 
ance of a single line was imperative, the task of bringing 
the fleet once more into contact— once inability to detect 
7.14f 
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Sketch 3. 
cnemv 
This sketch shows the periods Irom 6.50 on when tto 
V could not be seen from Sir David Beativ's Meet 
Skstch 4 —This shows how from 6.15 to 7.30, the enemy wos somf- 
times visible to some of Sir John Jellicoe's ships but never entirely 
visible to all his ships After 7.30 the enemy was never seen again 
nor was contact regained. 
the enemy's retreating turn had led to its being broken- 
must have been a thing so extraordinarily difficult as to 
be impossible. In fact, the more this clement in the 
battle is considei-ed, the more baffling do the probleins 
presented appear to be. When, therefore, the Board of 
Admiralty, after considering far more facts than are 
available to us, express their unqualified approval of 
Sir John Jellicoe's proceedings, we may rest assured that 
the official fornmla, which sounds strangely unenthusi- 
astic to lay ears, has perhaps never been employed to 
express higher praise. For it is a tradition, on great 
occasions iike this, that approval is only bestowed on 
those who have done the utmost possible with their force. 
Speed and NaVal Tactics 
The despatches are not so long as they seem, because 
three-quarters of Sir David Beatty's despatch is included 
in Sir John Jellicoe's. The story of the doings of the 
Battle-Cruiser Fleet and the Fifth Battle Squadron are told 
in sufiicient detail for it to be possible to appreciate, not 
only the high complexities introduced into modern sea 
fighting by the jjossibility of torpedo attacks on the 
opposing line," but also certain general principles of the 
tactics that superior speed makes possible. As to the 
combined work of the light craft with the capital ships 
in the first engagement between the battle cruisers and 
von Hipper, and then in the critical hour and a quarter 
between the junction of von Hipper with the High Seas 
Fleet and Beatty's turn at 6 o'clock, space does not permit 
of their being reviewed in any detail. To realise the 
extraordinary brilliancy of these performances both in 
these direct attacks on the main forces, and in driving at 
the enemy's screen at 2.20, between 5 and 6, when the 
Grand Fleet's scouts got into contact with the Germans 
ahead of Hood, and during what Mr. Carlyon Bellairs 
well names " the epics of niglit fighting," it is I think 
only necessary to read the despatches, carefully mark out 
those passages which deal with the fast light forces, and 
rc-rcad those separately from, the rest. 
