July 13, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
13 
I see no reason for qualifying the judgment expressed 
in these columns within a week of tlie action, on the 
handling of the fast division between 2.20 and 6.30, when 
it left the German front clear for the Grand jpleet's 
attack. The report, however, supplies a straightforward 
and unanswerable reply to those who assumed that 
inordinate risks has been recklessly faced. Sir David 
Beatty shames his critics, and, no doubt quite uncon- 
sciously, throws a valuable light on his own personality. 
The day, he frankly confesses, was one of great anxiety 
and strain. He was throughout alive to the fact that 
his force could only hght at close quarters with great 
risk. " Caution," he says, " forbade me to close the 
range too' much with my inferior force." Yet despite 
caution, despite the strain and anxiety, great risks had to 
be faced, and it is a measure of this remarkable man's 
fortitude when the risks that he faced were realised, 
when, that is to say, in the first half hour of action, he 
had lost one-third of the force immediately with him, it 
did not in the least alter the tactics he had, in view of all 
the risks, from the first determined to pursue. 
Some Leading Questions 
A large number of people arc puzzled over the follow- 
ing questions. One expresses it in these words : "I 
see it stated that Sir David Beatty, when he turned 
north followed by the four Queen Elizabeths, drew the 
Germans on for an hour and a half towards the Grand 
Fleet. How does one fleet ' draw ' another ? Did 
the Germans know the Grand Fleet was approaching ? 
If they did they must have steered northwards with the 
deliberate intention of forcing an engagement with it. 
If ttiey did not, they must have gone north believing 
they were pursuing Beatty in the hopes of crippling his 
speed by gun fire or torpedo and then being able to 
overwhelm the damaged units. • But if the Germans had 
Zeppelins as Sir David seems to suppose from his despatch, 
they must certainly have known of the Grand Fleet's 
approach. Yet their conduct when they met the Grand 
Fleet seems to show that they had no intention of fighting 
against such odds. Judged by this act the presence 
of the Grand Fleet was a surprise burst upon them 
sometime just before six o'clock. Another thing that 
puzzles me is this. Why at this moment, instead of 
turning East and maintaining this course for half an hour, 
did not Admiral von Scheer either turn altogether, or turn 
his line in succession from North to South and retreat 
at once to Heligoland ? For by turning East he clearly 
ran the risk of being surrounded and crushed." 
The probabilities of the case, as I see them, seem to be 
as follows. First, it is very tuilikely that the Germans 
had any inkling that the Grand Fleet was coming to Sir 
David Beatty's assistance. They certainly had no idea 
of where the rendezvous would take place. I see no 
reason to doubt the statement in the German semi-official 
account of June 5th, that the weather conditions made 
the Zeppelins useless for scouting on May 31st. Their 
possible services from the first hours of daylight on the 
following day is another matter. The general plan then 
followed by the Germans at 4.45 seems to me on the whole 
to be in accordance with my correspondent's suggestion. 
It was a more or less voluntary movement carried out 
with the intention of picking up as many of Beatty's 
ships as possible. It is to be remembered that two of 
them had been sunk already, so that the prospects of 
further success may have seemed alluring. On the 
other hand, it must not be forgotten that there was a very 
great difference between the conditions when Sir David 
Beatty was pursuing von Hipper to the South and those 
when Admiral von Scheer was following Sir David to the 
North. In the first case, the British objective was to 
cut off the German admiral from his base. The battle 
cruisers would be going their fastest possible speed, and 
the Queen Elizabeths consequently left so considerably 
in the rear as to afford little or no support during the 
entire movement. When, however, after the junction 
of the forces. Sir David headed north, the Queen Eliza- 
beths formed the rear of his squadron, and as the whole 
squadron had a marked speed advantage over the German 
squadron, whose pace was regulated, not by the battle- 
cruisers but by battleships, there was no longer a tactical 
division of the English force. For its numbers it was, in 
offensive qualities, very much more powerful than any 
corresponding number of the German force. The effect 
of this speed and gun superiority was that, once having 
started on a parallel course in pursuit of the British, 
the German Fleet was no longer entirely independent 
of the English admiral's movements. For we being five 
knots faster, and on the bow of the enemy, the latter 
could not alter course, except on a very gradual curve, 
without exposing first the head of his line, and then all 
the ships that turned in succession at that point, to being 
overwhelmed by the greatly superior gun power which 
speed would enable the British Admiral to concentrate 
while the turning movement was in progress. Had he 
attempted to turn all his ships together, so that the ship 
in the van became the rear ship, and the last the leader, 
he would have been both attempting an exceedingly 
difficult movement that might have thrown the whole 
of his line into confusion, and certainly would 
have created a concUtion of gunnery impotence for a 
considerable period, say, 10 minutes to a quarter of an 
hour, during which not so great an impotence would have 
been imposed upon the British by a turning movement 
that would have brought them at a sharp angle across 
the end of the line.. 
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Sketch 5.— This sketch illustrates how a fast fleet (A) can control 
the movements of a slower fleet (B), even if (B) is a more numerous 
and more powerful force. For if (B) attempts to turn 16 points on 
a narrow arc, (A) will be able to attain a position at which he can 
concentrate all his broadsides on (B's) ships as they turn in succes- 
sion, whereby (B's) ships will be exposed in groups of two or three 
against the whole of (A's) Force. (B) to turn with safety, must 
turn on a flat arc so as to keep as far as possible an equal number 
of broadsides bearing on (A), which is what Admiral von Scheer was 
compelled to do. This forced him well to the eastward and brought 
him opposite the Grand Fleet 
To some extent' then, from the beginning, Sir David 
Beatty's superior speed, by negativing certain possibilities 
of the enemy, enabled him to retain the initiative and 
to impose his will upon the enemy. How he actually 
exercised this power is shown by what occurred at 
6 o'clock. At this time undoubtedly the Germans did 
know of the proximity of the Grand Fleet, for at 5.45 
Chester, who was ahead of Admiral Hood, engaged three 
of the enemy's light cruisers. Sir David, however, knew 
more than they. Although, as the Commander-in-Chief 
says, owing to an inevitable difference in estimating the 
rendezvous by reckoning, the exact point of junction was 
not known, yet within certain limits he could judge the 
area to which to steer so as just to clear the Grand Fleet's 
line. Ihe real point no doubt is, that knowing this, as 
he must have done for fully half an hour. Sir David 
timed his turn so as to force the head of the enemy's 
line to the point where the Grand Fleet coulj^ overwhelm 
him. He was able to impose this movement upon the 
Germans precisely because, had they followed any other 
direction than that which they did, his speed would have 
