July 20, igi6 
LAND 5: W A T E R 
11 
A New Situation 
By Arthur Pollen 
THAT a new position has been created by the 
battle of Jutland is abundantly proved to us by 
many evidences. We hear repeatedly of Russian 
activities in the Baltic, and there is no sign of 
the threatened assistance of the German fleet to von 
Hindenberg's left wing at Riga. Whatever else it has done, 
the battle of Jutlancl has made it quite impossible for 
the German Admiralty to risk adventures against the 
Russian navy. Indeed, the situation in the sea that is 
almost closed by the territorial waters of Denmark and 
Sweden is one that is extraordinarily tantalising at the 
present moment. If the passage of the Sound could 
be made reasonably safe ; if the island of Gothland were 
only Russian, instead of Swedish ; if even Libau could 
be regained ; if it were possible for AlUed navies to co- 
operate under one command, as Allied land forces have 
co-operated in the Dardanelles, at Salonica, and, if not 
under one command, at least with perfect unity and 
for a common purpose as to-day on the Som.me — what 
might not be made of the naval position in the Baltic ? 
It can hardly be doubted that the troops on the last 120 
miles north of Hindenberg's front must, to a great extent, 
be relying upon sea supplies. Now, if ever, would ha\e 
been the time when active naval operations would ha\e 
affected the campaign in Russia just as seriously as did 
our naval help at the beginning of the last century. 
Napoleon's position at Moscow was indeed something 
more than emb; rr issed by the operations of the British 
ships off the Prussian and Polish ports. 
The possibilities of the situation to-day are no doubt 
far different. The everyday requirements of a 
naval force — in the way of ports, docks and repair shops, 
not to mention the immense demand which active opera- 
tions create for stores — are such that even if they stood 
alone, if mines and submarines did not almost literally 
block the entrance, and if a suitable base at a suitable geo- 
graphical position could be had for the asking, they would 
go far to making any joiht naval campaign in the Baltic 
so dithcult as to be almost impossible. But now that 
the German navy has suffered so heavily that we could 
afford to red\ice our preponderance in the North Sea, 
at least to the extent of areinforcement that would make, 
with the Russian fleet, a imit capable of exercising the 
command of the Baltic, there is something tantalising 
in its being apparently impossible for the Allies to use 
their sea strength to such decisive purpose. As "it 
is, it seems as if we could give the Russians little 
assistance beyond that which may be afforded by our 
submarines. 
Breaking the Blockade 
As was fullv to be expected after an engagement that 
for many months nnist leave the enemy quite powerless 
to fight at sea, the only naval de\elopments have been 
along the lines of strengthening the Allied effort to cut 
Germany off from sea-borne supplies, and of a German 
effort to try to escape from our tightening hold. The 
enemy's last activit\- is not without a certain ingenuity, and 
has, from the news" point of view, the merit of a surprise. 
That submarine craft can evade the vigilance of surface 
ships is a very obvious truth. It is indeed the justification 
of their existence. Nine-tenths of the incidents of the 
present war at sea have arisen solely from what our or 
the enemy submarines have made out of this faculty 
for evasion. It marks the one novelty in naval war. . 
That a country can possess a command of the sea more 
absolute than "history has ever recorded, and yet that 
this command can be made to appear almost nugatory by 
one form of naval unit, so far as the activities that such 
units allow, is or was a new thing altogether. But its 
interest is limited by the capacity of the insurgent unit. 
The real element of surprise in a German submarine 
calling itself a liner and making its way to America- 
if there were any justification for real surprise in the 
matter -should be found in the fact that, with every other 
form of sea communication denied to her, Germany should 
have waited so long before using this. 
But the explanation is obvious. It is that this par- 
ticular form of sea communication is for practical pur- - 
poses almost valueless. Once more the very restricted 
capacity of under water craft is demonstrated. To a 
country in Germany's position to-day, there may ob- 
viously be a certain small relief in being able to transmit 
tiny cargoes of high value to the United States, if only 
to relieve, in some modest manner, a financial position 
of soiTi(> stringency. But finance is not our enemy's most 
disagreeable preoccupation at the present moment. 
That preoccupation is want — the unappeas(>d and 
seemingly unappeasable appetites, not of the rich nor 
of the prosperous middle class, nor of the food-producing 
section of the population, imt of some 20,000,000 or so 
jXTsons who compose the families of artisans, labourers 
and small traders, all to-day the impatient and ex- 
asperated \ictims of short commons. All the submarines 
in the world, put together could not in one journey bring 
to this mass of hungry folk one square meal apiece. 
This being the situation, it surely must need some 
courage to say, as (lerinan publicists have said, that the 
safe arrival of a few hundred tons of dye-stuffs in 
America is a demonstration that the British blockade 
is at an end ! I think if I were a German, and anxious 
to believe that British sea power had ceased to exist, I 
should prefer to suppose that it had been terminated, 
as that honest fellow the Kaiser assured his subjects, 
by the devastating victory which Scheer and Von 
Hipper won on the 31st May. But really both boasts 
tell the same story — especically when we remember that 
the acts that provoked the boasts were undertaken with 
no other object. That a great concerted movement 
was in contemplation by the Allies, everyone in the 
(ierman higher command must long since have known. 
Jutland was a despei ate effort on the eve of the blow, to, 
effect something to give the Germans the courage required 
for bearing it in its successive and cumulating stages. 
The sequence of events is noteworthy. On the 31st of 
May came the very courageous sortie of the German fleet. 
Within a few hours of its return there followed the ]jro- 
clamation of a decisive victory and the passing of a 
600,000,000 sterling credit. Within a few hours of that, 
and before the truth could be realised, the Reichstag 
was prorogued. And when the trutli came to those; 
who could not be deceived, it came with other truths not 
less unwelcome, of Brussilloff's advance, of the shiver sent 
■right down the enemy eastern line, of the loss by the 
Austrian ally of at least ten army corps. Then followed 
first— inevitably— the retreat from the Trentino and 
next — relentlessly — the .advance upon the Somme. They 
must be clutching at straws in Berlin if, in the face of 
naval defeat, and of a strangely menacing position on 
land, the successful voyage of a single submarine can 
be saluted as proving that the sea chains of Germany 
arc broken ! 
Ethics of Submarine Commerce 
The American authorities have decided that this par- 
ticular submarine is a merchantman. We ha\e not 
details enough about her equipment to judge whether, 
on legal grounds, the decision is right. But I have seen 
it stated in some accounts that the boat was armed with 
3-inch guns. If she was so armed, her peaceful character 
would seem to me to be hopelessly compromised. And 
this for the \'ery obvious reason that there is no analogy 
whatever between the arming of a surface boat against 
submarines and the arming of submarines against sur- 
face boats. The historical justification for arming 
merchantmen is simple. It prevents the enemy sending 
what may be called contemptible forces on the job of 
commerce raiding. Unless the raider has superior speed, 
the merchantman has obvious means of escajie; unless it 
carries an armament such as no merchantman could 
