[uly 27, iyi6 
LAiND & WATER 
tlircmgh the point marked X then through what the 
Enghsh call " The High Wood " or Wood of Foureaux, 
then just over the far corner of Dclville Wood, then just 
north of (iuinchy, and so on, be held — or if any ronsider- 
able part of it be held — the advantage of observation falls 
to the Allies. 
Not only does the advantage of observation so fall to 
the Allies but there is a certain configuration in the 
ground as a whole towards the north of the ridge down 
to Bapaume which must be noted for what it is worth. 
The ground to the south over which the English huxe 
so far been progressing offers continual examples of 
transverse contours where a defensive position may be 
taken up against an offensive progressing northward. 
To the north of the ridge this character of the ground 
largely disappears. I have not carried on the contours 
beyond the northern slope for fear of confusing so simple 
a sketch map, but we shall see when or if the offensive 
gains ground beyond the ridge (and I will then explain the 
matter in detail and with contours) the ground falling 
away towards Bapaume in what is roughly a series of 
shallow valleys lacking long transverse positions for 
defence and enfiladed by observation and fire from the 
south. One might illustrate the contrast between the 
northern and the southern side by some such diagram 
as the accompanying Diagram II, where the Southern 
1 r I 
~B 
B 
Rid^e 
/ 
\ / 
V 
/^ 
. / 
^ 
formation is in a series of broad " T " shapes as A — A — A 
as you go northwards, with long transverse positions to 
check an advance in the direction of the arrows, while 
north of the ridge as at B and B there are shorter and 
less tenable transverse positions. 
I must repeat what I said last week that it is an error 
to exaggerate position in the present war and especially 
on the ground of the present offensive. We have had 
ample opportunity to judge of the great modification 
introduced by the modern defensive into the older ideas 
of the value of position. But observation counts more 
than ever it did and position itself for the establishment 
of a defensive line still has its value. 
It is true, therefore, to say that the fight is at this 
moment essentiallv a fight to get possession of- the ridge 
line by the British and, on the part of the enemy, 
essentially a fight to prevent the British establishing 
themseh-es there. Not coincidently with this ridge, but 
dependent upon it, runs the third line (^f German 
trenches also. 
We can see clearly from the sketch how neaTy the Allied 
object is here achieved. At Thicpval in th.- gully at D the 
oftensive has still a bad slope in front of it, but in the 
village of Pozieres, which had been half carned_ by 
sheer hand to hand fighting before Monday evening, the 
highest point is at hand less than half a mile away and 
little more than a quarter. The old mill (succeeded I 
believe by a factory, and now anyhow a mass of rubbish) 
standing on the left-hand side of the road, from which 
one saw the whole landscape northwards, is only just 
outside the last northern houses of Pozieres village— two or 
three hundred yards beyond them— at the point marked 
X upon Map I. As you go east the ne.vt two miles of 
the line of highest points were still in German hands 
upon Monday evening, but the British line was here 
extremely close to the sumrutt and at E in the High Wood 
or Foureaux Wood positions were held— if 1 am not 
mistaken — which alone of those hitherto maintained 
actually capped the swell of ground and permitted a view 
over towards Bapaume. 
Enemy Concenlration on the Somme Front 
Fairly exact knowledge is obtainable with regard to 
the enemy concentration. He met the first shock (which 
he had long been expecting) with some nine divisions 
(more than double the force that met the shock at Verdun). 
They gave way, as we know, with a loss in prisoners 
alone of about a fifth of their total combatants. This 
original nine has been increased in the course of 
the month to more than 26. 
I believe it will appear, when we know all the facts, 
that the equivalent of as many as 30 German divisions 
have been brought up first and last against the new 
offensive between the ist and the 25th of July. 
These formations, hurried in their concentration and 
sometimes composed of singularly mixed units, came 
from no strategic reserve. 
They were summoned from Valenciennes, from Cam- 
brai, and from many other points just behind the line 
where whole divisions had been kept as a local reserve. 
Thus the 123rd division has appeared against the Somme 
offensive. It came from Bruges ; the 53rd and the 
117th from Lille and its neighbourhood; the 34th from 
Ghent ; the two divisions of the 22nd corps from Valen- 
ciennes, and at least one division of the Guard from the 
east of Cambrai. Further, what are called " The Third 
Battalions" were drawn upon luirriexlly and to the 
extreme limit of strain from all along the Champagne 
front to as far away as the Argonne. 
The meaning of such a move may be discovered from 
the following explanation : 
The Germans, like all other belligerents, in this trench 
warfare, have been compelled to establish a system of 
rotation. 
Take three connected battalions. The first will be 
actually in the trenches v.hile the second line is behind in 
the immediate neighbourhood suffering less strain, though 
within the zone of danger. It is a support. The third 
battalion lies right behind in complete repose. Now 
these three act as parts of a system of rotation, each in 
its turn being in the front line, just behind the front fine, 
and right behind it in full repose. .-Xfter such time 
as is judged the most which the men in the trenches 
can bear without deterioration, battalion 3 goes up 
and relieves battalion 1, battalion i falls back to the 
comparative repose battalion 2 had hitlierto en- 
joyed, and battalion 2 falls back to the positions of 
complete repose behind the lines hitherto filled by bat- 
talion 3. 
At the next shift, after 3 has suffered in the trenches 
the full time allowed it falls back to where i was ; i 
falls back to complete repose at the rear, and 2 takes 
its place in the trenches, and so on in rotation. According 
as the Command sees fit in conditions of a special strain 
or from any other causos, tlie order is reversed, and I 
beheve that the reverse order is the more common, where- 
ever there has been very heavy work, men passing from the" 
worst strain to complete repose immediately, especially 
throughout fhe northern part of the Western front. But 
that detail is unimportant. The point is that everywhere 
there is rotation. 
The Germans on the Western front, being now much 
harder hit in numbers than their opponents, are com- 
pelled to leave their men upon the average longer in the 
front trenches. This drawback is to some extent com- 
pensated for by their very deep digging, but this in its 
turn makes them lose much larger numbers of prisoners 
when a heavy blow is struck than would otherwise be 
the case ; or, when what the French call the "cleaning up" 
of captured trenches is thoroughly accomplished (and 
it is dangerous to neglect it) a much larger number in 
dead. 
The result of an insufficiency in numbers is in any 
case to make the presen(N? of the third battalions in 
reserve more essential than ever. 
Now the Germans, in rushing their concentration up 
against the new offensive, borrow these " third bat- 
talions " as T have said from all the way down the front 
