LAND & WATER 
July 27, 1916 
right aw-ay to the Argonne, and that is as good a proof as 
you could get of exhaustion. They have concentrated 
on the Sonime at the expense of heavier strain and 
fatigue to the/est of their Hne. They have taken from 
money in use as well as from reserves laid by.. We must 
be perfectly clear upon the matter. Exhaustion does 
not here mean ultimate exhaustion of man power. 
It means exhaustion of immediately available supple- 
ment. Class 1918 has not yet come into play, 
and the convalescents, as they are called upon, 
and become lit, can be drafted to the front. These 
two categories alone ultimately provide far more 
than half a million men and nearer three-quarters. 
There is further to be reckoned the recruits sent back as 
being as yet immature when class '17 was called out 
and even when class '16 was called out. These balances 
are continuallv being drawn upon. But of a true 
strategic reserve, that is of divisions fully trained and 
equipped and held right back from either front to be 
thrown in wherever the Higher Command may need it, 
there is none left, so far as available evidence can guide 
us. We may imagine it to exist. Imagination is un- 
trammelled. We may imagine to exist for that matter, 
if we like, the famous untouched army of two million 
fresh Germans of full military age and fitness. 
But folly of that kind is really borrowing ridicule against 
oneself. If we only consider the evidence to hand 
everything points to' the absence at the present moment 
of a true strategic German reserve. They are using. 
under Hindenburg, in the eleven divisions they lent the 
Austrians, against Verdun, to hold the quiet parts of 
the Western front, and against the great offensive on 
the Somme, every available complete unit they have got 
at the moment. And when I say " using," I include, 
of course, all immediate local reserves. 
Austrian Attempt at Re-Grouping 
\\'hile I am upon that point it may be of interest to 
my readers to know that the .\ustrian movements (where 
everyone is agreed there is no strategic reserve, available) 
have been in part identihed during the last ten days or 
fortnight. The number of divisions withdrawn from 
the Italian front is almost certainly eight or at least not 
more than eight. The " bottled up " Trenuno front, 
therefore, still absorbs ten. Of these eight four have 
been identified upon the Russian front. The position 
of the other four is still a mystery, or was, as late as 
Saturday last. One theory about them, and a plausible 
one is, that they were in process of transfer from the 
Trentino to the "Eastern front when they were recalled 
by the vigour of the present Italian counter-offensive 
between the Adige and the Brenta. Another is that for 
political reasons, the Austro-Hungarian Governments, 
after first deciding to send these four divisions to the 
East, thought better of it on account of local feeling. 
At any rate, we know that there were riots or at least 
popular demonstrations against the sending of Tyrolese 
troops to Galicia a full three weeks ago, as I pointed out 
last week. 
Of the II divisions which Germany has sent in aid of 
Austria, by the way, eight have been identified in the 
Lutsk salient, two are between Kolomea and Stanislau, 
and one has been added to the Austro-German forces in 
front of Baranovitchi. 
The Eastern Front 
The movement upon the Eastern front in the course of 
the week has not. up to the time of writing, been 
considerable. The Russians are still deliberately keep- 
ing the enemy in doubt as to whether they intend 
to put their "main effort in the south towards a 
march up Galicia or towards a crossing of the Car- 
pathians. They were not, if we are to trust official news 
alone, over the ridge of the Carpathians in any place as 
late as Monday last. The suggestion made in these 
colunms last week that the Austrian retirement behind 
the Lipa would be especially pronounced upon its right 
has turned out to be wt'll founded. Upon Thursday last 
the Austrians were withdrawing from Verben. and had 
fallen back upon, and were apparently even falling back 
bevond, Berestetchno. 
It will be remembered that I commented upon the 
length of the new line they would have to take up and 
upon the temptation they would be under to fall back 
upon their right in order to shorten that Hne. They 
have done so. 
French Glass of 1916 
The French class 1916 is now appearing at last in the 
field in considerable numbers and its appearance has 
been otticially announced by the French authorities. It 
\yas present ten days ago at the capture of Hem and 
Curlu upon the north bank of the Somme. It is 
always of the greatest importance to note, not only the 
moment when these new classes are summoned in each 
conscript country, but particularly the moment when 
they first appear in considerable numbers in the field, 
for it is the most accurate test of exhaustion which we 
possess. The German Class '16, it will be remembered, 
first appeared in considerable numbers in the actual 
fighting upon March ()th last. There is here, then, evidence 
of a difference of more than four months and nearly five 
between the same stage of relative depletion in the 
French and the German services. 
In connection with this all-important point, the 
rate of German exhaustion, we should note that the 
enemy is more than ever anxious to conceal it at 
this crisis. Hence the nonsense about the Branden- 
burgers at Longueval being the fragment of the 
24th that reached Douaumont five months ago. 
Hence also the official orders to the German press to 
insist particularly on supposed reserves of men and to 
allude continually to the "enemy's fable of our 
exhaustion." 
With the increasing magnitude of the new British 
offensive we are getting placed before the British authori- 
ties just that sort of evidence which the French authorities 
have long possessed upon the incompleteness of the Ger- 
man casualty lists. It is to be hoped that the matter 
will have a particular attention, because the Germans 
managed to deceive a considerable and important ])art 
of British opinion upon this point. There is an excellent 
example of what I mean in the official despatch of last 
Thursday. 
In this despatch we have documents quoted showing 
on the enemy's own testimony, that one regiment (the 
6th Bavarian Reserve), out of 3,500 men suffered 3,000 
casualties. We are further told that a single battalion 
of the 190th regiment out of 1,100 men suffered 980 
casualties. We have already had the example of the 3rd 
reserve division of the Guards, which, though we have 
not as yet, I believe, exact numbers to deal with, quite 
certainly lost more than half its effectives. 
Here are concrete tests to which we can turn in judging 
the casualty lists of the enemy. 'The enemy will, of 
course, in this particular case, know that we have the 
documents, and knowing the importance to himself of 
maintaining the deception which has worked so well, be 
at particular pains to get these units properly recorded 
in his official lists. But we can apply a system of checks 
as the French have, if we choose, which will be conclusive. 
As the offensive progresses, and as we capture more 
documentary evidence of his real losses, we can withdraw 
from publication and keep secret (as the French have), 
numerous test pieces and compare them, say, six weeks 
hence, with the published lists. It is earnestly to be 
hoped that this method will be pursued. If it is, one of 
two things will appear, and each will be equally con- 
clusive of the thesis constantly maintained in these 
columns, that the German official casualty lists were in- 
complete. 
For either the enemy will show quite disproportionately 
heavy losses in connection with this particular offensive 
(which will prove him to have been minimising liis losses 
in other equally expensive actions of the past, such as 
the prolonged fighting in front of Verdun), or he will 
continue his old incomplete returns, in which case wc can 
prove him, by the simple process of inspecting the lists, to 
be keeping back the truth. I think the authorities would 
do well to ])ublish before the end of the summer the 
conclusions to which such an examination will lead them. 
It will, of course, compel those who have been deceived 
by the enemy to admit their error, but the loss of face 
involved by this should not count against the advantage 
to opinion as a whole. It is of no advantage that opinion 
