Jul}^ 27, .1916 
LAND & WATER 
The Nation's Thanks 
By Arthur Pollen 
Ly\ST week a brief debate in the House of Lords 
arose out of the Duke of Rutland's sut^gestion 
that tlie tlianks of Parhament should be f^iven 
to the Admirals, Captains and men of the British 
fleet for their services in the battle of the 31st May. 
Lord Crewe replied for the Government, and spoke very 
nicely indeed about the seamen \\ho had brought about 
the victory, but he explained that in this war the Govern- 
ment liad not revived the practice of thanking successful 
commanders on land and sea for each victory as it was 
achieved, and that no exception was to be made in the 
present case. There would be time for this, he ex- 
plained, when the war was over. No doubt things will 
then be seen in their truer proportions, so that if politicians 
are not yet sure of their judgment as to the strategical 
value of this or that military or naval action, they do (by 
waiting) save themselves from the risk of premature and 
baseless i-ejoicings. But in this particular instance 
further hesitation to recognise the event of May 31st for 
what it is, and to act on such a recognition, seems an 
altogether mistaken policy. 
My readers may remember that before giving what 
proved to be the first connected account of the action, 
in the issue of Lajsd and Water of June 8th, I com- 
mented on the fact that, up to the time of writing, while 
the King had spoken noble words about the achieve- 
ments of the fleet, the nation had not yet been invited 
to share in the royal homage. A service commemorative 
of the day was indeed to be held at St. Paul's Cathedral, 
but why should the honours due to the living wait 
until this tribute was paid ? 
Reports — and the Truth 
All hesitation seemed then, and still seems, de- 
plorable, as will be obvious from a brief survey of 
the events. An unlucky chance led to the battle 
of |utla-.id being communicated to us in a form that 
made its true ' character quite unrecognisable by a 
large • section of the nation. What was, in fact 
a victory, was presented to the public as' a defeat. On 
Friday morning, therefore, when the news of a great 
German success was being announced in every news-sheet 
in the Fatherland and the neutral world, the unfortunate 
spectacle was' witnessed of the bulk of the British press 
being found in agreement with the vauntings of the 
German Higher Command. \\\\cn the Kaiser's boasts were 
criticised, our own endorsements could therefore be 
quoted to confirm them. For some time there was, 
unhappily, no authoritative contradiction. There was 
no official assertion of victory until the despatches were 
published, and then great pains were taken to give the 
victory an indecisive character. These things German 
writers have been quick to emphasise. 
The situation is- one \yhich so far the British 
Government has done nothing whatever to mitigate. 
Theori^^inal error of judgment having occurred, there 
was perhaps a certain dignit\- in leaving the position 
to take care of itself mitil the publication of the des- 
patches. Publication would afford the British Adniiralty 
their natural opportunity for expressing a considered 
judgment on the operations which these despatches at 
least partially described. It could haVe been pleaded 
that to pronounce a verdict and distribute rewards 
before there was material for forming a conclusive pro- 
fessional opinion, was to run the risk of taking action 
which further consideration might prove to be premature. 
When, accordingly, the despatches were published, those 
who felt strongly upon this particular aspect of the matter 
were more concerned to read the Board's judgment ot 
the event than the fuller details which the Gazette put 
before us. That judgment, as we all remember, lett 
nothing to be desired in the completeness of its approval 
of the proceedings of all concerned, from the Cominander- 
in-Chief to the humblest boy combatant. Ihe last 
obstacle seemed to be removed, the time had clearly 
come when the Govcmment might safely invite Parliament 
to take suitable action. When nothing was done, wc 
ho])ed that the delay would only endure until the second 
despatch, so eagerly expected, was made public. This is 
the document — not even yet published — which is to 
contain the names of the officers,, non-commissioned 
officers and men whom the two Commanders-in-Chief 
recommend to the Admiralty for promotion and reward. 
But if Lord Crewe's words are final this occasion, like 
the last, will be passed over. 
Press Opinion and the Fleet 
Politically, the thing is to be regretted, because the 
situation, as it appears to the outer world of .Allies, 
neutrals and belligerent enemies, differs much from 
that which we only see. Lord Crewe thinks that 
the fleet may well be satisfied with the eulogies 
it has received from the press. It is a pretty 
compliment to those who from the fust saw the 
events of the 31st May in their true perspective, and did 
not hesitate to write the word " victory " with no more 
information at their disposal than the .'\dmiralty com- 
munique of June 2nd. But it cannot be doubted that the 
fleet cioes not share this flattering view of.the naval side of 
British journalism. The attitude of most sailors toward 
naval writers is much the same as that of the children in 
Du Manner's picture of the mother singing and the 
children listening in horrified dismay : " Dear, darling 
mamma, do stop!" It is quite certain that outside of 
Great Britain the technical judgment of our press in 
the'se matters is not of the slightest moment. What 
newspapers say, then, is valueless to the Fleet, and fruitless 
abroad. 
Nor does the Admiralty's letter to the Commander-in- 
Chief meet the case. Note for instance, that Lord Crewe 
never even mentioned the Board's approval as being 
in any way a substitute for Parliamentary thanks. 
It is not what a department says — when it is on its 
defence — but what a Government does that will be 
accepted by the world as expressing the final judgment of 
Great Britain on this, incalculably the greatest, event 
in the sea war. The German press has no difficulty in 
developing the present position to the enemy's advantage. 
That the Admiralty should back up its Admirals is 
almost too obvious a departmental necessity to need 
either exposition or comment. Its true opinion, so 
these ingenious commentators assert, was shown by the 
department's inability to put any favourable int(M-preta- 
tion at all upon the bare recital of the events which it 
laid before the world on the morrow of the hght. Its 
change of conduct, so the story goes, has been imposed 
upon it by the unfortunate consequences of its first and 
candid reticence. Its hand had been forced by the 
eulogies of the King, by the second thoughts of the great 
London journals, by fear of political criticism of its 
brutal frankness. These are arguments that must leave 
neutrals — and even .Mlies — in^a questioning frame of mind. 
For it must not be forgotten that, lengthy as 
arc the despatches, they do not afford any final proof 
of victory. They necessarily leave many vital phases of 
the action unexplained. It is precisely of these phases 
that the German Government has issued full and pic- 
turesque, though entirely imaginary, accounts. Nor can 
all the excisions from the despatch be commended as 
verv obviously wise. It is no secret, for instance, that 
Indejati-^ablc and Queen Marv blew up and sank in the 
course of V^ice-Admiral Beatty's en.gagcnicnt with von 
Hipper, that Inriiicib'e was lost almost immediately 
after her junction with the Vice-.\dmiral between 6.30 
and 7, and that three ships of Sir Robert Arbuthnot's 
squadron were destroyed in a gallant attempt, pushed too 
far in the fog, to head off a light cruiser attack on the 
Grand Fleet. But these incidents are either ignored 
altogether in the despatches, or alluded to so briefly as to 
make the time or the manner, and the cause of their 
