August 3, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
5 
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these a considerable proportion of heavy guns ; most 
significant of all they laid hands upon vast stores of that 
head of shell which the Germans had been accumulatuig 
for their prepared offensive. And they witnessed or 
heard the destruction of very much more munitionment 
than the amount they captured. 
Upon the above Map I we can trace in detail the nature 
of this success so far as it can be represented graphically. 
Line i was the original defensive line upon the holding 
of which the enemy depended for all his plans this summer 
in the West as much as in the East : The defensive line 
but for the supposed strength of which he would not have 
perpetrated the blunder of Verdun, or its twin blunder of 
the Trentino. 
Line 2 is the line to which the salient, after it had been 
formed by the first Russian success was pressed back 
in the Austro-German coi mter-attack. 
Line 3 is approximateh jr the line reached by the new 
successes. There is, of « :ourse, nothing definite about 
this .line, which is. still in movement, for the enemy is 
still, especially to the sor rth, in retirement. 
Such is the largest am i most general aspect of what 
has happened. There has been a revolution. Two 
theories and two methods have met : the one, the enemy's, 
has failed for the first tii ne upon its Eastern front ; the 
other, that of our Ally,.] las succeeded. I repeat, it was 
a test, and the test has g one for us and against him. 
Now for other import ant considerations in connection 
with this matter, second only in importance to the maiin 
thesis. The first of the se, 1 think, is the failure on the 
