LAND & WATER 
August 3, 1916 
defensive of the side that pins itself too much to the heavy 
gun. It is, after all, only a matter of common sense, one 
would think, for a great superiority in the calibre and 
munitionment of what used to be called one's siege 
artillery is almost self-evidently designed for offensive 
success. It has its effect, of course, and a very great 
effect, even, on the defensive. It breaks up one's enemy's 
reinforcing columns ; its long range threatens his con- 
centrations immediately behind his line, and all the rest 
of it. But of two armies, one of which has sacrificed 
the main value of infantry to the mechanical support of 
the heavy piece, while the other, weaker in large guns 
and their munitionment, has still emphasised the action 
of infantry and of field artillery, its support, the latter 
will have the advantage in an offensive. 
It is a very important lesson to be drawn from the 
recent events in Volhynia, because it covers the whole 
held of war. The enemy thesis as it were has always 
been that what was until recently even in the West his 
superiority in heavy gun power would be his salvation. 
It has failed him in this critical test. 
Another very important point is that the enemy has 
failed here, at "the one point where he might really hope 
to succeed, to turn what is now everywhere defensive 
action upon his part into offensive. The whole thing 
is Ukea man trying to rise from the ground in a wrestling 
match, almost doing so and failing to do so on the tirst 
occasion when he really had a chance. 
There are factors in the future of which we know 
nothing. We do not know, for instance, at what rate the 
continued munitionment of our Ally will proceed, but if 
we estimate the future upon the lines of the past weha\e 
a right to say that this critical week has probably deter- 
mined the course of the war upon the eastern front. 
I would, before concluding this week's survey of what 
has happened between the Roumanian border and the 
marshes, ask my readers to consider the position of 
Bothmer in the centre. 
This commander stands, as we all know, either upon or 
very close to the original lines. His forces, originally 
10 Divisions in all (9 Austrian and i German)* therefore, 
form a sahent thrust forward beyond the Russian 
successes in the district of Lutsk and the corresponding 
Russian successes in the south. That salient has not 
hitherto been very pronounced, but it was clear that if 
the Russian advance to the north and to the south of 
Bothmer continued, he wo\ild ultimately be compelled to 
fallback. 
It has been continually pointed out in these pages that 
Bothmer possessed for such a retirement, when he should 
consider it necessary, very nmch better and more rapid 
means than were open to his opponents in their advance. 
He had behind him three systems of railway, all con- 
verging ultimately upon Lemberg. 
I have, upon the accompanying Sketch II, numbered 
these I, 2, and 3. Not only has he these three main lines, 
but he has connecting lines which join them up and relieve 
the pressure. Further, he has a very good road system, for 
it has been among the merits of the Austrian rule in Galicia 
that it has provided that province with communications 
as good as any in Europe : excellent metalled, roads 
serving almost every country town. The modern use of 
petrol has so largely supplemented the railway that this 
is an important point. 
One may digress, by the way, to point out that it is a 
point which now helps the Russians also in their advance 
to the north and the south ; for in the last few days they 
have crossed the border and can now use the Galician 
road system, but, unfortunately, there is no corresponding 
road system of their own on the Russian side of the 
frontier by which to bring up with equal facihty supplies 
from their bases. 
To return to the position of Bothmer : 
The scheme of the thing is that presented in the abovC 
Sketch II. Bothmer did not stand e.xacth' upon the old 
lines (though in some places on his left he is still holding 
the original trenches constructed a year ago), but he is 
everywhere in the neighbourhood of the original line ; the 
Russian advances to the north and to the south of him 
have now been pushed as far as the dotted lines upon 
the sketch. Observe that as a consequence his triple 
• The T2th, 32nd, 15th, 3<)tl), lotli, 55tli, 38th. and 36th .Austri.-in. 
also 1 believe the _s6th ; the 48th German reserve division of the 
34th Corps. A cavalry division (the 2nd) was also present. 
^The Bruise 
ofNizniow 
"Railway Bru:^e perrrnittuiq alterna^tve 
coatmurucai'ion through S&czncsAzu 
by7/o.2 System 
systemof railway, though still intact, is imperilled. Line i 
is threatened ; line 3 is under distant Russian fire at X 
and apropos of the peril of line 3, the following 
detail is worthy of observation — it hangs like so mu::h 
else upon the decisive causal moment formed by the 
Russian occupation of Kolomea. 
Once the Russians had occupied Kolomea, they were 
free to move up the main high road to Stanislau. They 
did so, and reached Tlumacz. 
.< 'Xfdes lo 
Note the road and railway bridges at Nizniow. 
It is a very important detail, for it means that Bothmer's 
chance of retirement by his right will have gone, when 
or if the Russians reach that bridge. Nevertheless, 
we must not exaggerate the difficulties of Bothmer- 
position. He can still retire when he chooses, and 1 
might here repeat v.hat I have already said in these 
columns, that the position would only become critical 
when or if the Russians seize the bridge of Halicz. 
I do not say that when that bridge is seized the central 
armies cannot get away at all. The modern defensive 
is an immensely strong thing ; a comparatively small 
rear-guard can cover (as in the Trentino) a vast 
