August 3, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
retirement, and we have had many examples in 
this great war of what even a single line of railway 
can do in aid of a rapid retirement, but it does seem 
to me that with Halicz gone and with the enemy pres- 
sing down the line from Brody, Bothmer could not stand. 
Of course, he has been subjected to no considerable 
pressure, for it must be the object of the Russians to 
keep him there as long as ever he cares to stay, since 
every day makes their chance, if not of enveloping him, 
at least of pounding him during a rapid retirement, 
greater. 
To this general summary of the great Russian success 
during the last week, it may be useful to add a few other 
considerations. We should note, I think, the remarkable 
contrast between the last Russian and German com- 
muniques. The Russian communiques sutfer from too 
much terseness ; we have difficulty in following them, 
but the German communiques are frankly false, and 
clumsily false at that. Their description of the fighting 
which ended in the breaking of their centre on the Upper 
Stokhod would leave anyone, who had not the advantage 
of hearing the other side, under an impression the exact 
reverse of the truth. They say, for instance, that they 
retired in order to shorten their line. The retirement 
from the elbow of the Stokhod at Ugly, or, to be more 
accurate, the heavy defeat they suffered there, did indeed 
shorten their line locally, but the line as a whole has been 
made very much longer. 
This is a point which we in the West ought always 
to bear in mind. A German retirement in the West, if 
it is effected without too much loss, is to their advantage, 
because it gives them a shorter line to hold with their 
diminishing numbers. Luckily for us, political con- 
siderations make them dread such a shortening, but in 
mere strategy, apart from such political considerations, 
a German re rcment in the west strengthens the enemy. 
It is not so in the East. The Russian advance every- 
where increases the mileage which the enemy has to hold 
and the great Russian superiority in numbers has here 
p;onounced advantage. The reader has only to look 
at Map I to see how in the Lutsk salient, for instance, 
each of the successive lines i, 2, 3 is longer than the last. 
There must inevitably come a point where such a 
process will lead to a break. 
Another thing which wc should not forget in con- 
nection with the Russian successes, is their magnitude in 
mere numerical statement. They are greater than the 
corresponding enemy losses of last summer. The average 
of valid prisoners taken and the number of guns taken is 
greater. On the 30th day of the Russian opei^ations they 
can be strictly compared to the corresponding operations 
of the Austro-Germans in the third week of June 1915. 
Now where were the Austro-Germans in the middle 
of June 1915 ? They had just passed the line of the 
San. They had been held up there for more than a fort- 
night. The total number of their valid prisoners was 
only a little more than half the number the Russians have 
taken since the 4th of June. The captures in guns were 
also, I believe, inferior, at least up to the occupation of 
Przemysl. • There had, it is true, been a greater occupation 
of territory. But save in this respect the Russian ad- 
vance in this year everywhere shows a superiority over 
the Austro-Germans here. 
We have here exactly the same phenomenon as we have 
in the comparison between Verdun and the Somme. 
When a German success is toward it is advertised in the 
loudest manner, neutral nations are deafened with the 
cries of victory, and opinion in this country at least is not 
a little affected. In the reverse case there is a curious 
diminution. I will bargain that not not one man in a 
hundred in this comitry appreciates that the Somme is 
in e\'ery respect a more successful operation than Verdun, 
far more dangerous in character to the enemy thanVerdun 
was to the French, and in every one of its details a proof 
of greater offensive power. I am afraid it is further 
true that not one man in a hundred appreciates that 
what the Russians have hitherto done in the first fifty 
days of their action surpasses what the Austro-Germans 
did in the first fifty days of theirs last year. 
But there is a last point which is much more important 
than any of these and that is the obvious truth that 
losses in men are quite a different thing in 1916 from what 
they were in 1915 ; quite a different thing when it is the 
enemy who is suffering, from what they are when it is 
the Russians who are suffering. The great asset of 
Russia was her reserves of men ; the one great anxiety 
of the enemy has been his exhaustion in men. The 400,000 
prisoners already taken since the Russian offensive began ; 
the other casualities — which cannot possibly be less than 
an extra 50 per cent., making 600,000 in all ; (the total 
may be anything more up to three-quarters of a million, 
or 800,000, but it cannot be less than 600,000), are 
taken from a re.servoir which is running dry. The 
quarter of a million which were the Russian losses 
in prisoners in the same space of time thirteen months 
ago were taken from an almost inexhaustible supply. 
It is the capital feature of the eastern campaign. 
Baranovitchi 
Before leaving the Russian front we should consider 
a point which has not hitherto been dealt with, and that 
is the actions which have taken place in front of Bar- 
anovitchi Junction and just north of the Marshes. 
The central group of the Russian armies is under 
General Evert, whose command extends from south of 
the Marshes where it is in touch with Brussilov's command, 
right up to the branch railway marked A-A on the map, 
from the Dwina line, which runs just north of and parallel 
to 55" north latitude. The Russian lines in this neigh- 
bourhood are covered by Lake Narotch, and cut the 
above mentioned railway line in the neighbourhood of 
Postavy Station. 
General Everfs action in support of what was going 
on in the south under Brussilov had two objects. One 
was to "fix " as many German and Axisfrian troops as 
possible north of the Marshes — that is, to prevent further 
reinforcement* being sent south of them against Brussilov; 
and the other was to get hold of the \ery important junc- 
tion of Baranovitchi. If the Russians could get hold of 
that junction they would not only sericrusly interrupt 
the German and Austrian lateral communication from 
north to south, but they would also complete their own 
lateral communications by possessing a complete rail- 
way line behind their lines ' everywhere through Bar- 
Bonmovitchi > r, 
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anovitchi and Minsk, and so through the Marshes by 
Luminetz to Rovno at B-B-B. As it is their only complete 
lateral line is far to the rear at C-C-C. 
The action against Baranovitchi opened almost simulta- 
taneously with the great offensive upon the Somme. 
It achieved its end in fixing great masses of the enemy and 
preventing further reinforcement of theirs from going 
• In the course of June Hindenburg just scraped together the 
equivalent of four divisions from his local reserves and sent them in 
aid of the southern Austro-C-erraan armies attacked by Brussilov. : 
