10 
LAND & WATER 
August 10, 1916 
launched for an almost indefinite period. Had the enemy 
not pinned himself so exclusively to the superiority of 
his heavy pieces ; had he depended more upon the value 
of his infantry, he might have reached his goal. As it 
was he conspicuously failed. In the first six days he 
pressed forward over a belt of country varying from two 
to four miles in depth. He took more than 8,000 prisoners 
(he announced 16,000, but he included therein, as is his. 
custom, all losses whatsoever suffered by his opponent.) 
He put out of action and captured a total of field pieces 
more than seventy. But he did not crush back the mass 
of the French forces against the river. He was checked 
at the French second position which follows a rim of 
heights from three to four miles round the town, and 
from this line he advanced only in the most painful fashion 
and only in certain narrow sections, meeting with a 
resistance which clearly showed the difference between 
the quality of the two infantries opposed. 
There have been considerable but futile discussions 
upon whether the enemy maintained throughout his 
effort agaipst the sector of Verdun his old doctrine of the 
close formation or no. Those in the thick of the fighting 
who could bear testimony appeared themselves to differ 
upon the point. But the difficulty is resolved at once if 
we consider what the method of German attack had 
become. It is true that after each bombardment the 
enemy now sent forward small bodies in very open order 
who were no more than scouts, who should test the effect 
of the bombardment and see whether it was possible for 
the main body to advance. It is true that when the main 
body advanced it advanced in successive waves from 
70 to 150 yards apart, and that in each of these waves, 
especially in the first batch, a certain openness of forma- 
tion e.xisted. But the characteristic of all the German 
offensives was that however masked by recent develop- 
ments, the formation was still a column formation. Let 
me give a t5^ical example drawn from an attack which 
was very thoroughly noted and analysed for the French 
authorities in the middle of the business. 
Two divisions were launched against a particular 
sector of the French lines. These two divisions numbered 
18,000 to 20,000 bayonets of actual combatants in the 
attack. Six regiments were the units involved, each of 
three battalions. Against what front did this considerable 
force act ? Against a front of no more than 1,500 yards. 
Each division lay in depth, one to the right, one to the 
left. In each the three regiments, of which each was 
composed, stood one before the other. In the foremost 
regiment of each, one battaUon of the three which com- 
posed the regiment was in the van and of each of these 
two battalions which formed the spear heads, as it were, 
of the deep divisional formation, a company, say from 
200 to 250 men was thrown forward ; a second company 
immediately succeeding it in a second wave. 
Observe the result. You have indeed not a dense 
formation attacking, but a reasonably open order of 
about 500 men advancing against 1,500 yards of line. 
Behind them comes the second wave of another 500. 
The impression of open order is maintained. But the 
assault is continued with further and further fragments 
successively detached In this fashion from the column 
formation behind, and the total result after many hours of 
such efforts, by which time the whole of the effectives 
present have been brought into play was, in effect, that 
two great columns had been launched in a density of 
from 12 to 15 men a yard. In the rare cases when such 
attacks succeeded the cost of the result was heavy 
enough ; in the much more numerous cases where they 
failed it was prodigious, and though the continuous 
shelling of the French trenches by pieces superior in 
number and weight to what the French could bring 
against them cost the French a high proportion in dead, 
yet the total losses of opponent and defender remained 
throughout the long story of these operations approxi- 
mately the same, and in the ratio of two to five. For 
every two thousand French casualties you may reckon 
about 5,000 German. The calculus is not by this time 
based mainly or even partially upon conjecture. The 
French Intelligence is now possessed of so many docu- 
ments captured from the enemy ; has been able to 
identify so many units ; to follow their movement, 
disintegration and recruitment, as to render this estimate 
certain within a small margin of error. 
It was this prodigious expense in men which gave to 
the experiment of Verdun after the first few days of its 
inception the disastrous character which it was to bear 
for German arms, and to decide all the future course of 
the war. Two dates in particular should be noted by the 
student, a month apart — March 9th and April 9th. 
The first was the last of the great massed attacks in 
which the enemy hoped to break in the French lines, 
although these had rallied and stood twelve days before. 
The second was the last of the great main actions in 
which it was hoped no longer to break the French line, 
but at least to compel its reorganisation in such a fashion 
as to allow the entry of German troops into the ruined 
houses lying upon the east of the river and forming part 
of the municipahty of Verdun. It was upon the later 
occasion with the failure of this general offensive, at the 
most appalling expense in men, that the Battle of Verdun 
may be said to be won. It became more and more 
apparent that the effort was now political. German 
prestige demanded it. The now flattened salient of this 
sector was talked of as though it were a fortress suffering 
investment. 
The price paid in military affairs for the error of poli- 
tical digression is invariably severe and usually disastrous. 
It is tlaat error which explains Napoleon's failure in 
Spain ; still more his failure in Russia, and the conclu- 
sion of his power. It is that error which has marked 
successive campaigns throughout history. It was present 
here at Verdun. 
ALLIED WESTERN OFFENSIVE 
The futile and exhausting effort was still in progress- 
when, after a preliminary bombardment of unexampled 
intensity, the great offensive was launched by the now 
greatly reinforced and thoroughly munitioned British 
forces in company with certain French divisions upon 
their right, along the valley of the Upper Somme. The 
first blow was delivered upon the ist of July, and the 
interest of the war which had hitherto been centred in the 
long and deliberate defensive of Verdun, while the head of 
shell and all other preparations were being accumulated 
upon the Somme, turned suddenly to this new field. 
Before summarising briefly the efforts in Picardy 
I must go back to follow two other events of capital' 
importance, coincident with the German failure before 
Verdun and indirectly dependent upon it. 
The first is the Austrian breakdown in the Trentino. 
the plans of which had been drawn up in Berlin and the 
orders for which had emanated from the German and not 
the Austrian Higher Command ; the second is the break- 
down of the Austrian defensive line in the East. 
The attack against the Italians in the Trentino was 
an exact repetition in its details of the attack upon 
Verdun. But the point to notice is that both blunders- 
proceeded from the same source : The inelastic Higher 
Command of the enemy with its centre at Berlin. 
The Austrians were bidden by the Germans who direct 
them to mass the greatest possible number of men and 
guns against the only part of the Alpine wall where there 
was sufficiently open country to deploy for several miles 
in line. Such an opportunity was framed by the tracing 
of the frontier fifty years ago, which left a peculiar ad- 
vantage to Austria in this district, thrusting her terri- 
tories right down to within view of the Italian Plain. 
The Austro-Hungarians informed Berlin that the very- 
most they could possibly gather for such an enterprise was 
18 divisions. The had behind them only one line of rail- 
way running through a narrow mountain valley ; most 
of the food and all the munitionment for the attempt had 
to be accumulated for months by this one avenue. 
Should the attempt succeed, it would have the very 
decisive effect of cutting the main Italian line of com- 
munication. No other army of the Allies was in this 
situation. The communications of the French, the 
English, the Russians ran straight back from their lines- 
and were invulnerable ; but those of the Italians were 
threatened everywhere in flank by the enemy and especi- 
ally from the Trentino at the two capital points of Verona 
and Vicenza, which lie on the edge of the Plain immedi- 
ately under the moutains. 
As at Verdun so in the Trentino, four months were 
occupied in the concentration. As at Verdun so in the 
Trentino success must be rapid to be of service, but it 
was particular!}' the case in the Trentino because the- 
