August 10, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
15 
cover such different purposes as an effort to get into the 
Atlantic, an attempt to cut the communications of 
Archangel, or to get the whole Battle Fleet through the 
Skagerrack and the Sound into the Baltic for a com- 
bined sea and land attack on Riga. The first and second 
of these objects could have been better achieved by 
simpler means, if we assume that the German staff realised 
that to get across the line of the Archangel supplies, or 
to be at large in the Atlantic, were things for which it 
would be worth risking the existence of their more 
powerful units. 
The argument of Riga being the objective of the fleets 
is based on the supposition that the latest Dreadnoughts 
of the Koenig class are not able to make their way 
through the Kiel Canal. And at the end of May, before 
the Austrian resistance to the southern end of the 
Russian line had collapsed, an advance on Petrograd 
might still have seemed the most promising enterprise 
that Germany could undertake. 
But, on the whole, the indications are that the sortie 
was made with the deliberate intention of engaging our 
scouting ships, and of limiting that engagement, if possible, 
to a fight with those forces. Later communiques, in- 
deed, suggest that this clearly was the object. They 
tell us that Sir David Beatty had made frequent sweeps 
into the waters off Jutland in the months of April and 
May, and that the Fleet was sent out to engage him. 
The German tactics throughout the battle — -so far as 
those tactics were due to their own initiative — confirm 
this theory. On the day the luck was, on the whole, 
on their side, but it was against them on one point. 
Their Zeppelin reconnaissances seem to have been 
fruitless owing to the haze, so that the encounter with 
the Grand Fleet, into which Sir David first enticed and 
then forced them, was, in fact, a surprise. If this view 
is correct, the German Fleet came out to fight a partial 
action, so that those of the ships that returned to harbour 
should be held as a fleet of conquerors. The point is 
important. 
Nothing is more striking than the contrast between 
the sailorly language of von Stebbinghauss, the Secre- 
tary of the Admiralty, in reporting to the Reichstag, 
and the childish rhodomontade of the Emperor on his 
arrival at Wilhelmshafen. The first limited himself 
to announcing that the greater portion of the German 
Fleet had returned safely to harbour. The Emperor 
would have it that British sea power was crushed by the 
^lory of a decisive victory. So long as this could be 
kept up, the ever-pressing preoccupation of the Higher 
Command was met, for the greatest danger to that 
command to-day is the discontent and discouragement 
which the continuation of the war, the diminution in the 
food supplies, and the increase in their cost, are causing 
amongst the civil population. The immediate peril of 
this discontent was its possible reflection within the 
walls of the Reichstag, and it is surely significant that 
the first use that was made of the Emperor's boasts was 
to induce the body representative of the German 
people to pass a vote of credit for £600,000,000. A 
boast cannot be called an empty boast that leaves the 
Treasury full. 
The Skill and Valour of the Fleet 
What lessons has the battle itself to teach us ? 
First and foremost it should establish in the minds of aU, 
an absolute and unwavering confidence in the courage, 
ability and judgment of the British admirals in chief 
command. The brunt of the fighting fell, as was in- 
evitable, on the Vice-Admiral in command of the Battle- 
Cruiser Fleet. And it appears to be the reasoned opinion 
of those whose professional judgment is best worth 
respect in this matter, that from 2.20, when the advance 
•scouting forces sighted each other, until 8.48, when he 
saw the enemy for the last time. Sir David Beatty's 
conduct of the operations was not only faultless but 
brilliant. To Sir John Jellicoe there fell a far more 
restricted opportunity, and it fell in circumstances of a 
gathering fog that encompassed its efl[ective employment 
with difficulties and responsibilities unparalleled in the 
history of war. The Commander-in-Chief's deployment 
and dispositions have, as was inevitable, been subjected 
to the closest and most rigorous examination, and the 
naval authorities, who advise the Board of Admiralty, 
have expressed absolute approval of every order that 
he issued. It therefore happens that in the most 
crucial of the elements of sea strength that had not 
hitherto been tested in war, viz., tactical and strategi- 
cal capacity of the Fleet's leaders, the Battle of Jutland 
affords us conclusive evidence that all is well. And in 
addition to every other quality that was shown, there is 
one that cannot fail to impress the enemy. From the 
first contact between the light cruisers until 
the last destroyer had, after midnight, fired its last 
torpedo at the retreating German Fleet, there was never 
a chance afforded to a British ship to attack that was 
not taken. This is not to say that there was any " rash 
impetuosity," for there was not. But in the highly 
complex development of a naval action, there do come 
moments when the risk of utter destruction has to be 
run to gain advantages that may be decisive. Where 
any such opportunity offered on the 31st May, it was 
seized with a seaman- like skill and heroism worthy of the 
noblest traditions of our history. 
If the personnel justified the high expectations of those 
who put no limit to their expectations, it is due to those 
who provided the material for the navy to say that in 
no particular did the material fail. As in the engage- 
ment off the Falkland Islands and Dogger Bank, the 
almost incredible claim was made — -and, it is believed, 
with perfect accuracy — that again and again the ships 
in action exceeded their designed speed. What, ten 
or fifteen years ago, would have seemed almost equally 
incredible is that in no single ship was there an engi- 
neering breakdown. 
Gunnery Skill and Gunnery Method 
Perhaps the greatest technical surprise of the action 
was the apparent inefficiency of the gunfire on both 
sides, and the fact that only a single torpedo hit was 
registered against the British Fleet. It has been pointed 
out, and it may very likely be true, that these two things 
explain each other. Quick manoeuvring may again 
and again have saved ships from torpedo attack, and the 
manoeuvring may very easily have rendered their gunfire 
ineffective. The result is woefully disappointing, because 
it in no way reflects the skill and devotion which 
the gunnery men have brought to their task. They 
seem either to be handicapped by an ineffective method, 
or to be faced by an insoluble problem. That the exist- 
ing fire control has very marked limitations in this 
matter has often been pointed out, so that the Battle of 
Jutland only confirmed the expectations of those who had 
made a careful study of previous engagements. 
The result is certainly in sharp contrast with all that 
may be called the ordinary lay expectation of a sea 
action. . Speakine: in the House of Commons on March 
i8th, 1912, Mr. Churchill said : 
" We must expect that in a fleet battle between good 
and ef&cient navies equally matched, tremendous damage 
will be reciprocally inflicted. Many ships on both sides 
will be sunk or blown up. Many more wUl sustain in- 
juries which wiU take months to repair. Others, again, 
will not come out again during the whole of the war. 
Indeed, the more we force ourselves to picture the hideous 
course of a modern naval engagement, the more one is 
inclined to believe that it will resemble the contest between 
MamiUus and Herminius at the Battle of Lake Regillus, 
or the still more homely conflict of the Kilkenny cats." 
Never has the potential power of naval force stood in 
so sharp a contrast with its actual efficiency in war. So 
far from battleships destroying each other with the 
fierce facility of Kilkenny cats, it seems that they can 
to-day maintain a reciprocal bombardment from a 
quarter to four until seven o'clock at night with only 
three ships being sunk on one side and apparently only 
one by gunfire on the other. Yet had any one of von 
Hipper's or Admiral Scheer's squadron been anchored, 
and any of Admiral Evan Thomas's squadron been 
allowed five salvoes at her from a range of 14,000 yards, 
it would be Dreadnoughts to dough nuts that the German 
ship must have been sunk before the fifth salvo was 
fired. It is a state of affairs that illustrates how little 
the gunnery difficulties which action manoeuvres must 
create, were appreciated before the war. Not that 
there has not always been in the Navy a considerable 
party, strong both in brains and in numbers, that in season 
