iS 
LAND & WATER 
Artrst 10, 1916 
The document contained maps of the various theatres 
of the war with explanations of the strategic movements 
of the armies, and in the margin is a summary of the 
official communiciues issxied by the German Staff since 
the beginning of the war. These telegrams an- 
nounce of course nothing but victorious engagements, 
on an average about one daily. Very few actions are 
described as indecisive, amongst these being especially 
two battles near Paris, at Meau.\ and St. Montmiraii. 
on September loth. But the' notes explanatory to the 
map of the Western front do away with any doubt as to 
these actions in their version of the whole German strategy 
in France. Dotted lines show the routes followed by the 
German armies in August, from the Rhine down to the 
furthest line reached bv their foremost colimms, between 
the rivers Marne and Seine. This furthest line is marked : 
IJinil of the buttles fought hv the advance t^uards of the 
pursuinfi German armies from the qth to wth September." 
Behind this line of alleged advance-guards a red shading 
shows the country occupied by the actual armies with 
the remark : " Battle of the Aisne since the middle of 
Sefytembcr." ' 
This map supplies the illustration of the first legend' of 
the Marne and is the graphic equivalent of the ecjuivoca- 
lion contained in the telegrams quoted above. It is an 
attempt to spread the belief (and an attempt that 
was successful in Germany) that only advance- 
guards and not the actual Cjerman armies had 
advanced between the Marne and the Seine up to the 
Grand-Morin. According to this version the main armies 
remained on the Aisne awaiting the result of the pursuit 
by the advance-guards. When the latter however were 
met by the Allied counter-offensive of September 6th, they 
retired fighting towards the bulk of the armies who then 
accepted battle, as described in the dementi of September 
14th ; this is the battle known throughout the German 
Press as " The Batth; before Paris " (Die Schlacht 
vor Paris), in which the French and British were of 
uourse victoriously repulsed. Thus was a Gcnnan 
defeat on the Marne transformed in the eyes of a misled 
public into a German \ictory on the Aisne, wherein the 
battle of September 6th to the nth was but a small 
episode of mantenvre by which the Allies were enticed 
to attack the fortified position which the main armies had 
occupied further to the north. 
It is hardly necessary to add that the hypocritical 
falsity of this version has been made brutally clear by 
the now perfectly well-known German orders for the battle. 
It was not merely advance-guards but, apart from three 
solitary army corps, the five complete armies deployed 
west of Verdun, that were engaged in this battle ;' in 
short, liaenty-three out of the txfcnty-six army corps that 
had crossed the northern frontier of France. This is 
the actual version, as opposed to the ingenious but cjuite 
fantastic legend invented by the Imperial General Staff 
to hide the (ierman defeat. 
For a long time this legend obtained full credence in 
Germany ; some, probably, still believe in it. It could 
hardly be otherwise considering that it was served \\\i in 
every shape and form by a blind and docile press and by 
means of the war map which, in its letter-card form 
was bound to have a swift and extended circulation. 
By its use thousands of soldiers at the front gave silent 
confirmation to the story the Higher Command wished 
them to spread, and, at home, thousands of families 
received and accepted it. 
German Map Summarising the Legend of 1914 
