August 10, 1916 
LAND & WATEH 
^5 
The Week's Operations 
By Hilaire Belloc 
THE THREAT TO BOTHMER 
IN the campaign as a whole by much the most 
important event of the last week has been the 
Russian success in crossing the Upper Sereth 
river upon Friday and Saturday : a success 
which they followed up upon Sunday with the advance 
of a few further miles and the capture" of further prisoners 
and guns (including, two heavy pieces). 
In order to understand the importance of this event 
we must study in some detail the conditions under which 
the Austro-Cierman salient, commanded by Bothmer 
and Boehm ErmoUi, stands at the moment of writing. 
We have already discussed this matter in the past. I 
propose to-day to follow it in detail. 
The Russians, as we know, have produced a great 
and increasing bulge round the town of Lutsk. Upon 
the north-west of this bulge they threaten Kovel, and 
the importance of Kovel as a junction is familiar to 
everybody. The Austro-Germans great natural line of 
defence was the river Stokhod. This has been forced 
and the Russians are in most places lighting far beyond 
the further bank and are within 20 miles or so of the 
junction. But those twenty miles can be defended 
indefinitely, if the Austro-Germans choose to make 
that the essential of th'e campaign in this district. 
What the enemy cannot do is to be equally strong upon 
every threatened point of his line. He is here as every- 
where throughout the campaign at this period (and the 
disadvantage will increase more and more as time pro- 
ceeds) anxious for men. He has not got enough men to 
fulfil the task imposed upon him by the Russian initia- 
tive. As the bulge round Lutsk gets bigger and bigger 
the line the enemy has to defend gets longer and longer 
and he has to suffer a proportionately increasing strain. 
Now the first effect of his determination to defend 
Kovel at all costs has been the almost uninterrupted 
series of successes which General Sakharoff has achieved 
on the other face of the salient, the south-western face. 
He has proceeded from the victory of Michailowka, a 
fortnight ago, to the victory of Berestecho and 
thence to Brody and beyond Brody until now he holds 
the line represented on Map I. by the line A.C. It has 
been a continuous progress in the direction of the arrows 
very nearly due south, from the first victories at Michai- 
lowka and the crossing of the Lipa. 
It is clear to every observer of the merest elements 
of the map that the Austro-Germans, remaining as they 
have been for two months in the forward positions repre- 
sented on Map I. by the line D E, are increasingly imperil- 
led as the Russians threaten them in flank from north 
and in the neighbourhood of Stanislau from south. 
But to understand the general nature of their peril 
and to prevent ourselves from exaggerating it (which is 
the^ tendency of the moment) we must proceed to appreci- 
ate|certain characteristics of ground and communications 
upon which this Austro-German force depends. 
The first thing we should note is that the defensive 
positions in all this region correspond to the river 
valleys. A retirement from the Austro-German advanced 
line D E upon Lemberg (most of that retirement would 
be under Bothmer's command, but the northern part of it 
under Boehm Ermolli) would be protected from direct 
pressure by rearguard actions along successive river posi- 
tions such as the Zlota Lipa and the Gnila Lipa in the 
southern and central part, the Upper Bug and its 
tributaries in the northern part. 
But it will be remarked that these river streams are not 
continuous. There is a set flowing south and a set 
flowing north, and between the two a watershed. It is 
this watershed which is roughly followed by the great, 
road from Brody to Lemberg, and the Russian command' 
of this as it advances turns the defensive positions both 
north and south one after the other. 
The next thing to be noted is the exact plan of the roads 
and railways upon which Boehm Ermolli and Bothmer 
would depend for their retirement, and for this we must 
sketch the position in more detail. 
I have here set down on Map II. all the existing com- 
munications as the enemy has found them when he first 
occupied this line a year ago. I shall describe in a 
moment what he may be able to add and what he is un- 
able to add to these particulars. 
Readers of this journal are already acquainted with 
the railways by which this front is maintained. There 
are three systems which I numbered i, 2, and 3 in my 
last article upon the subject. I showed how system 3 
would be lost when the Russians should reach the bridges 
of Nizniow upon the Dniester and the whole retirement 
of the right wing of Bothmer rendered impossible 
when they sliould have reached the railway bridge 
Jezupol and the road bridge of Halicz. Similarly the 
retirement of the left wing would be gravely compromised 
should the Russians reach the railway system numbered 
(i) on Map II. on the main line Lemberg to Tarnopol. 
The further point with regard to these railways which 
has not yet been described is this. JVIuch the most im- 
portant line, the one on which you find most opportunity 
for storing rolling stock and fuel, the most opportunities 
for repairing, the best sidings, etc., is the great Inter- 
national line which ultimately leads to Odessa and in 
this section is marked upon IVIap II. by the number (i). 
Of course the enemy has been free to build supplementary 
