August 10, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
27 
just south of Brzezan. System JNo. 3 is very twisted 
and [round-about and a section of it is already under 
distant lire in front of Tlumacz at T in the south. 
But as I also pointed out there are the roads, and 
petrol traction has so largely supplemented the railway 
in modern war that we must consider the main roads 
quite as much as the railways of this district. 
Now when we turn to these main roads (which are 
marked on Map II. by double lines) we discover this very 
interesting point ; that there are in effect two only, the 
one marked R (1) and the other marked R (2). AH the 
other roads are lateral roads taking the pressure off the 
main roads, or parallel roads which ultimately fall into 
these two main roads. It would no doubt, during a 
retirement, be a great advantage to the enemy that he 
still possessed for falling back three roads, the road 
from Podhayce through Halicz and so on up to the point 
marked Z on R (2) , the road through Kozowa and Brzezan 
and, for relieving the pressure, the road from Brzezan 
northward and the road from Podhayce 'northward ; but 
ultimately the whole pressure comes, to bear upon the 
two main roads to Lemberg, which I have marked on 
Map II. R(i)andR(2). 
Can he construct other roads ? He can certainly 
construct and has certainly constructed both roads and 
railways supplementary to this Russian one on the Eastern 
part of the field immediately behind his lines, and with 
these he is still feeding the 14 or 15 divisions which he 
has massed between the Dniester and the Upper Styr. 
But there is a natural feature in this countryside which 
handicaps him gravely in the creation of. any considerable 
supplementary body of roads for a retirement, and that 
natural feature is the valley of the Gnila Lipa. This 
valley, all the way up from HaHcz past Rohatyn almost 
to the sources of the stream, is flat and marshy, and only 
at special points, and with great labour, can new 
crossings of it be constructed. The enemy can drive, and 
probably has driven, a supplementary road following 
the railway from Brzezan to Rohatyn and so crossing 
the valley of (inila Lipa, but it may be doubted whether 
he has any other system of parallel roads in the region. 
It follows from such a conspectus of the situation that 
the enemy is disturbed if or when Nizniow is taken with 
its two bridges ; is really in grave peril if the main road and 
railway on the north (i) and R (i) are cut, and in more 
than peril — in almost certain disaster — if system 3 and 
the bridges at Halicz and Jezupol" are in Russian hands 
at the same time that system i in the north is cut. The 
Russian forces are about the sarrie" distance in mere 
mileage from both these vital points in the north. They 
are, say, 11 to 12 miles away from the main railway in 
the south, about 15 miles away from the'Bridge of Jezupol, 
and 20 from that of Halicz. 
Do these things mean that we can .. expect in any 
probability disaster to Bothmer in the near future ? 
\Vere such an event to occur it would, of course, be in 
the nature of a decision. Nothing could save the Eastern 
front if 15 of its divisions were to disappear. 
It is impossible to prophecy in war, but such a disaster 
seems to be at least in the highest degree improbable. 
What does seem probable is a retirement at no distant 
date. That the Austro-German line from the Sereth to 
the Dniester should hold on beyond the point of acute 
danger is highly improbable, for the_ simple reason that 
the envelopment of a great force, even under the con- 
ditions of a completely immobile warfare, cannot take 
place save through surprise. Short of complete in- 
competence no commander allows himself to be enveloped 
save through allowing himself at the same time to be 
surprised. We have had two great examples of this in 
the present war, one of an envelopment which failed 
U) be decisive in the first action between Manoury and 
Kluck two years ago, and one a week earlier than this — 
completely successful — at Tannenberg. 
Now in this case you have progress from defensive 
position to defensive position, the Russians forcing their 
way against the flanks of Bothmer and Boehm Ermolli 
in broad daylight, as it were, each advance covering weeks, 
and you have these advances made agafrist the conditions 
of the modern defensive. It is true that there are only 
II or 12 miles between the foremost of the Russian posts 
and the Sereth and the vital railway in front of this, but 
the Russians themselves, though c(wfronted with the 
Austro-German army at its highest point of munition- 
ment and strength, kept at bay the enemy's most 
vigorous efforts when these were but six miles off the 
vital railway leading from Przemysl in June of last year, 
and evacuated materials and guns along this railway for 
something like a fortnight before retiring. It is true 
that the Austro-Gcrmans now are almost as badly pressed 
for men as the Russians then were for munitions, but it 
would seem certain that with defensive covering this 
northern railway could be maintained quite long enough 
for a retirement to proceed during the next few days. 
What the Russians have done in the north may be 
followed on Map II. with some detail. There is the upper 
source of the river Sereth consisting of two forks, the 
Sereth proper, and the Graberka, the northern fork of the 
two. What the Russians have done is to force the 
Graberka at Zwyzyn, a portion of the Upper Sereth and 
six miles of the common stream down to below Zalosce. 
They have not only forced the river, but have occupied 
the crests of the hills beyond : bare rounded moors with 
outcrops of rock some 200 feet higher than the \'alley 
floors. They must make one further advance of the sort 
against we know not what positions, nor how long for 
further concentration of stores and munitionment before 
they can even at the longest range drop shell upon the 
road and railway R (i) and i. The interest of the situa-' 
tion is that during the last fortnight they have steadily 
made these successive advances in spite of opposition. 
Meanwhile, in the south, all the Lower Koropiecs 
river has been forced, including the town of Monasteryska. 
Railway No. 3 is under fire, not only at T, but also in 
all the section near the river, and we may at any moment 
hear of the capture of the bridges of Nizniow. Such an 
event would not be as perilous to the advanced Austro- 
German section as the corresponding movement from the 
north on to the vital railway, but combined with a new 
Russian success in the north it would be very serious 
indeed, and if the Austro-German commanders do not feel 
themselves sufficiently secure against the Russians cover- 
ing these 10 to 15 miles on cither flank within the next 
fortnight, then preparations for retirement will be made. 
We must not exaggerate the effects of that retirement 
in our favour. There is no reason why with such ample 
railway and road communication it should not be effected 
in perfect order. Still less is there any reason why, if 
it takes place, the successive rearguard actions covering 
it should not hold without excessive loss. 
Further, we must not disguise from ourselves that a 
general retirement of the advanced section now com>- 
manded by Bothmer and Boehm Ermolli would give the 
enemy what he is increasingly anxious about, and that is 
a shorter line. So long as Bothmer and Boehm Ermolli 
stand the Russians will extend the Lutsk salient and push 
on towards Stanislau. A retirement of Bothmer and 
Boehm Ermolli would not restore the balance, but would 
at least save on the total 15 or perhaps even 20 miles. 
AFFAIR ON THE EGYPTIAN FRONT 
The affair in Egypt is one of which the fullest details 
have been printed in the daily press, and my readers are 
so fully acquainted with these that no recapitulation of 
them would be of service. What might be of interest 
in such a journal as this would be a detailed analysis of 
the situation and discovery, if that were possible, of the 
military motives underlying so extraordinarily futile an 
effort as that, which the Turks appear to have made here. 
But I must confess myself quite incompetent for such a 
task, nor can I see it undertaken by anyone else with 
any approach to success. The Turks apparently attacked 
with one weak division and within range of the sea a 
force immeasurably superior to their own, a complete 
defensive organisation, the product of two years of 
labour and the power which has the sea wholly under its 
control. The answer to why such a thing was done — if 
there is a military answer at all — is not forthcoming. 
The puzzle is greater from the fact that the command 
was German, and that the proportion of German officers 
among the enemy's forces were so high. One might, if 
one cared to add to the list of extraordinary features in 
this affair, point out that it was undertaken at a season 
of the year when it has least chance of success even 
upon a considerable scale, but, I repeat, the whole thing 
is inexplicable as a military operation, unless one regards 
it as a mere fatuous blunder of some local commander. 
