; August 17, 1916 
LAND & WATEJk 
3 
LAND & WATER 
EMPIRE HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C 
Telephone: HOLBORN 2828 
THURSDAY, AUGUST 17. 1916 
CONTENTS 
La Revanche. By Louis Raemaekers. i 
The Two Principles. (Leading Article.) 3 
The Retreat of Bothmer. By Hilaire Belloc 4 
The Future of Agriculture. By Sir Herbert Matthews 11 
L'Aicule. (Poem.) By Emile Cammaerts 12 
The Establishment of iPoland i.> 
U.S. Report on the Battle of Jutland 14 
To British Merchant Captains. Bv Lewis R. Freeman 15 
The Battle of the Marne. By Professor Spenser Wil- 
kinson ^7 
A Night in the Salient. By an Officer i» 
Grecnmantle. Bv John Buchan iQ 
The West End 22 
Town and Country -4 
Choosing Kit ^• 
THK TWO PRINCIPLES 
THERE are two principles governing the pre- 
sent phase of the war which we must clearly 
grasp if we are not to be led into errors resuR- 
ing from the old war of movement and to mis- 
judge the great moments now upon us. 
The first of these principles is one fairly widely 
propagated by this time: That the general offensive- 
af^ainst the enemy is now one and single in cause and 
We are dealing with a ring because we are deahng with 
a siege. The cracking of the ring at any point and the 
consequent advance of the Allies at that point may be 
directly due to unmoving pressure put upon the ring at 
another place two thousand miles awaj-. 
We all know this in theory, but it is difficult to 
remember it in particular cases because one cannot help 
concentrating one's attention and hopes upon the places 
where moxement happens to appear. We look eagerly 
at the Isonzo and the Strypa to-da}-. A fortnight ago 
we looked with equal eagerness at the Stokhod and the 
Styr. Earlier still to the Somme. But all are one. 
We must always remember that every sector is mtimately 
bound up with the whole campaign. 
For instance, the immobility of hne all along the valley 
of the Dwina is directly connected with the difficulty 
the Germans ha\e of sending further divisions. to the 
south. The apparently insignificant moves in front of 
Verdun, one hundred yards this way and that, mean that 
the French have thoroughly "hooked on" and retained 
their foe, and are therefore "directly connected with all that 
the Germans are suffering upon the Somme two hundred 
miles away, as is the immobility of the line north of the 
Somme and from that district to the sea ; the Trentmo 
which superficially was no more than an advance followed 
by a retreat, directly produced the fall of Gonzia ; and 
even the long stationary months at Salonika correspond 
to the elimination of the Bulgarian contingents from the 
Eastern field. u t lo 
The second principle is less widely appreciated, but is 
quite as important. It is this : . 
We are dealing e^•e^v\vhere with the modern defensive 
conducted with such numbers that its lines everJ'^vhere 
repose upon untumable flanks. Therefore (and h^e 
again conditions are governed by the fact th?t the whole 
thing is a siege) though position stUl has its importance 
and though manoeuvre when possible has its old 
strategii- consequences (for instance a double pics^uu; 
on Bothmers flanks distributed over a whole month has 
compelled his retirement from the Strypa), yet the main 
clement now is not a strategic element of movement but the 
ability of any given enemy i.ector, through the number and 
(quality of its defence, to nithstand the pressure upon it. 
It is almost true to say that in the present phase of 
the war the breakdown of such sectors will nearly always 
come at une.xpected points. 
Where the attack is made in great strength there will 
necessarily be a great concentration against it and a cor- 
corresponding checking of movement. This concen- 
tration weakens another, perhaps very distant, sector in 
numbers or in quahty or in both, and the pressure a/re«(/y 
long brought to bear upon that distant sector thus suddenly 
becomes sufficient to upset the balance. The other day 
upon the Isonzo the heaviest blow was struck, not in 
front of Gorizia but in front of Monfalcone, yet it was the 
Gorizia sector that gave way. 
A metaphor used the other day by a French authority 
is fairly applicable. If one is trying to break the 
resistance of thick rubber, one will at first be dealing 
with a common quality in every part of the band ; 
but after a certain length of time and exhaustion, 
weakness begins to appear not throughout the belt 
of riibber nor necessarily in front of the place where 
'one is putting forward the greatest e.xertion, but in 
two or three places which may appear almost at random 
at any point on the whole length of the belt. There 
the rubber has " perished " or hardened, or from some 
special local cause of friction grown thin ; and the system 
breaks up, accidentally as it were, and nearly always in 
unexpected places. 
If we combine these two principles we shall maintain 
a just view of the common Allied effort, which has now 
brought the war into its third and last phase. We 
shall be indifferent to the particular geographical situation 
of the areas which show movement. We shall remember 
that it is the universal pressure that counts and we shall 
neither exaggerate our own efforts nor be jealous of any 
of those who are working with us. We shall not attribute 
the increasing tale of success to false causes, flattering our 
own esteem or exasperating our own anxiety. We shall 
think of the war as one ; and it is one to-day as it never 
could be in its earlier phases when first the mere numbers 
in men were inferior to those of the enemy ; next the 
munitionment inferior ; later still though not inferior, 
ill distributed. It is only now that we have aU the ad- 
^•antages beginning to appear on our side ; they have 
hitherto been wholly with the enemy. 
In the interval he has had two years in the West and 
one in the East in which to consolidate his defences. 
Our task is correspondingly hard. But the factors of 
ultimate success are now clearly apparent and are no 
longer potential but actual. The machine is thoroughly 
started and is doing its- work every\vhere. 
This does not mean that the enemy will not attempt 
counter-offensives. He is perfectl>' free to do so if he 
chooses to use his remaining margin of man-power in 
that fashion. It only means that if he attempts counter- 
offensives he shortens the war. If we can provoke him 
to such counter-offensives so much the better. He 
may very well attempt one when he has accumulated 
a certain number of trained 1918 class in Germany 
and some of the balance of 1917 with a further 
recruitment from his conNalescents Such an experi- 
ment would only add to the rate of his losses, audits 
effect upon the map. if any, may be total y disregarded. 
If upon the balance he thinks that a prolonged defence 
will give him a better chance of the inconclusive peace 
■ which he desires, he is free to take that course also^ 
Tte result will be the same, though it may be postponed 
by a few months. 
