LAND & WATER 
August 17, T916 
From the positions that Bothmer's reargiiarj occupied 
upon Saturday last, the I2tli, to the positions which he is 
pres^imably making upon the Gnila-Lipa, there is npon 
the average three days' march. We should know, 
therefore, perhaps, by the time these Hnes appear, forty- 
eight hours after they are written, whether he has elected 
to stand upon the Gnila-Lipa line or has taken up posi- 
tions in front of it. 
So far his retreat appears to have been conducted with 
order and success, but it is clear that though this retreat 
shortens the enemy's line, their great defect is lack of 
effectives. They have naturally put as much as they 
could possibly spare for the defence of the main railway 
line in the north and m the south, as we have seen ; they 
have not had the numbers required to stand up to the 
Russian 7th Army. 
1 have already pointed out that the presence of German 
effectives among the Austrians has nothing to do with 
the military value of the lines so strengthened, save in so 
far as the new German units lent add to the numbers 
present. There does not seem to be any appreciable 
difference of quaUty. The proportion of prisoners taken is 
much the same, and the two German divisions in front 
of Letchitsky's army in the south have been mauled just 
as badly as their three Austrian colleagues. 
Value of Lemberg 
Before leaving this, the most important field of the 
war, for the moment, we must appreciate what is meant 
by the " covering: " of Lemberg, and how Lemberg stands 
to all this part of the world. 
The ultimate defensive line is not the Gnila-Lipa 
but the Grodek line of lakes. These, however, uncover 
Lemberg— and Lemberg cannot be light-heartedly 
abandoned. 
Apart from political considerations, Lemberg has a 
liigh military value \vhich we dwelt upon last year when 
the Russians were compellfed to evacuate it, because it 
is at once the only great deix)t and by far the most im- 
portant nodal point in Galicia. 
The accompanying Map II will show what this means 
in the matter of railways alone. 
To the railways the reader must mentally add a system 
of net less than 5 even main roads, which also converge 
upon the town fr om all directions. If ever there were a 
nodal point the p osition of wliich makes all the difference 
to rapidity of c oncentration and presumably tips the 
scale in favour c .f the party that holds it, whether on the 
offensi\-e or the « defensive, it is Lemberg. 
But Lemberg has also a very high political value, and 
in this particuJ ar phase of the campaign that value, 
Enough we muj ,t always subordinate it to military con- 
siderations, is not to be neglected. The possession of 
Lemberg stand s as a sort of symbol to the whole popula- 
tion of Easten i Galicia. It rnarks the Russian recover)-, 
is closely as? ociated with Russian history and par- 
ticularly with Russian intentions in this war , and the 
presence of B ussian troops entering the town for the 
second time victoriously will be of ver\' high effect 
throughout the south-eastern lield of war," should it be 
accomplished. 
There is, of course, something much more than this, 
which is the fact that all this fighting is taking place 
against dwindling enemy effectives. Lemberg reoccupied 
would certainly be finally reoccupied. No one would 
mistake the meaning of such an event. 
It is of some interest to mark upon Map II the lines 
covering Lemberg. A — B roughly represents the line 
Bothmer held before his retreat began, and the dotted 
line to the north and south of him represents the pres^re 
upon his flanks of the Russian 7th Army and nth Army. 
The first day or day and a-half of retirement brought them 
to the line of crosses, and at that moment the correspond- 
ing Russian pressure upon the flanks had reached the 
line of dots, continuing this line of crosses. The line of 
the Gnila-Lipa is marked by the wavy line D— H, 
of which H is HaHcz, with the important railway junction 
just above it at J. The reader will see that a continuation 
of this defensive line will be needed towards the north. 
This defensive line is afforded by the upper waters and 
marshy courses of the River Bug, which is marked by 
the letters E-E-E., and, generally speaking, the main 
line of the defence of Lemberg upon which the enemy is 
most likely to retire is the combined line E-E-E-D-H, 
which represents the line of the Upper Bug and the 
Gnila-Lipa. 
The Importance of Kolomea 
In connection with this sudden change in the Eastern 
front some of my readers ha\e asked me to explain 
what I meant some weeks ago when I said that the 
test of Russian success upon the left of their great ad- 
%'ance would be the occupation of Kolomea, and why 
that point was of such dfcisive importance. I should 
perhaps have made myself clear at the time, but I can 
correct that error now. 
When one speaks of a point as being of decisive im- 
portance, or of its being a " key," one does not mean 
that its possession will be immediately followed by the 
results dependent upon such possession. Movements 
have to be co-ordinated if they are to bear fruit,'and the 
power to advance in some particular locality does not 
necessarily mean the immediate decision to advance ; 
that may have to wait on events taking place in some other 
field. ' 
But Kolomea, whether its occupation were followed 
by immediate action or whether that action were post- 
poned, was equally in either case the test pt)int of all this 
district because it was the first nodal point, that is, the first 
junction of communications at the gate of GaUcia. A 
nodal point, a " knot," means a point where several 
roads or railways join. The rapid concentration of 
armies and their due munitionment can only be effected 
by railways and by roads. 
So long as the enemy held Kolomea he could move his 
men and guns and shell back and forth along a defensive 
line and concentrate them at his will more rapidly than 
could the Russians, because Kolomea was the hub of a 
wheel. He was in a favourable position to hold the gate 
of Galicia. 
But once the Russians held Kolomea the tables were 
turned and the gate was opened. It was now they who 
could concentrate men and guns at any point they 
wished between the Dniester and the Carpathians more 
quickly than their enemy could against them. The 
occupation of Kolomea, therefore, meant that after this 
success the Russians could threaten alternately the Car- 
pathian Passes towards Hungary and the right of Both- 
mer's Army, and leave the enemy in doubt as to which 
was their serious intention. They could at leisure pro- 
duce a concentration of the enemy upon his longer line 
in front of them where they would, and produce a corres- 
ponding weakness elsewhere. Had the Russians beer) 
held up before Kolomea, had the junction of roads and 
railways at that point remained in Austro-German 
hands, there would have been no serious threat to 
Hungary ; the outflanking of Bothmer from the south 
would have been impossible, and the efforts against him 
on the north would have lost half their value. 
Such was the strategic importance of Kolomea. Its 
capture determined all that has followed. 
