H 
LAND & WATER 
August 17, 191G 
U.S. Report on the Battle of Jutland 
WE publish a very interesting passage from 
the repoft of Captain William S. Sims of 
the United States Naw on the lessons of 
the battle of Jutland. The report was written 
on the request of the Secretary of the U. S. Navy, artd 
was suppressed for some time because Captain Sims, in 
giving evidence before Congress on the naval programme, 
had strongly advocated the construction of battle 
cruisers, and. there was a natural curiosity? to know if 
the battle in any way modified his opinion as to the 
war value of such ships. Captain Sims's report deals 
therefoie, primarily with the light that the Jutland 
battle throws on battle cruisers, but incidentally 5 he 
has touched on other aspects of the engagement. 
Captain Sims is virtually the creator of modern gunnery 
in the American Navy and is regarded as probably 'the 
ablest officer now on the active list. 
" I do not desire to modify my statement in any 
respect in regard to the types of vessels recommended 
in my hearing as most needed at the present time to 
.strengthen our fleet. I have read carefully the American 
press accounts of the action, also a considerable number 
of clippings received from England which give a much 
fuller account. The latter includes two comprehensive 
articles published in Land & Watku by Pollen, the 
well-known naval critic. 
" I consider all these accounts distinctly on the de- 
fensive as attempts to justify the attack of a superior 
force (German battleships) by a greatly inferior force, 
(British battle cruisers). As Mr. Pollen indicates the 
accounts are published under the control of the censor. 
For example, the Admiralty permitted Mr. Pollen to 
make certain purely negative statements concerning 
the causes of the sinking of the battle cruisers, but de- 
clines for the present to pubHsh the real cause. This is 
a common procedure while War is in progress. For the 
same reason, that is, to avoid the loss of prestige, even 
radical mistakes in tactics may be defended. 
" For the above reasons it may be quite possible that 
certain essential features of this battle arc being sup- 
pressed, these reasons being both military and political. 
In view of this possible, and even probable condition, 
my opinions regarding- the action should be considered 
only with extreme reservation. 
" This reservation being clearly understood the follow- 
ing comments are submitted, based only upon the known 
essential facts : 
" (a) Referring to Mr. Pollen's article, and particularly 
to the diagram illustrating the relative positions of the 
British main body and battle cruisers, and the German 
main body and their battle cruisers, at the time sight 
contact was first made between the battle cruisers of the 
two sides, it will be noted that the situation was typical 
of that considered most probable, in our war games on 
the sea and on the game Ixiard, in the opening phases of 
a sea battle between large forces. 
" (b) Assuming the above forces in the relative posi- 
tions indicated and, considering the marked superiority 
of the British in numbers of all the different types, and 
assuming the British forces to have executed the (under 
the circumstances) very simple manoeuvres necessary 
to concentrate their forces and strike with all their power, 
there can be no possible doubt as to what the result 
would have been. Considering the great superiority of 
the British, both in numbers and in power, one of two 
things must have happened : 
" Either the German main fleet would have been decis- 
ively defeated, or it would have decHned decisive action, by 
retreating behind its defences ; and even the latter would 
have inflicted upon the Germans a humihation impossible 
to conceal, much less to claim as a victory for the en- 
couragement of their people. The latter (forcing the 
German fleet to retreat before a concentrated superior 
force) could have been accomplished with little or no 
material loss ; and if the Germans had elected to fight 
a decisive action, there could be no doubt that both 
their proportionate and actual losses would have been 
vastly greater than those of the British. Also, in either 
case, the various type of vessels, including battle cruisers, 
would ha\'e been employed to the be&t advantage in the 
legitimate roles for which they were designed. 
" (c) The contention of British writers that the 
sacrifice of the battle cruiser squadron in fighting a 
delaying action against battleships, late in the afternoon, 
was justified in tlie hope of bringing on a general action 
between the main fleets, is not believed to be sound, 
and this for the simple reason that the military situation 
did not require the British fleet to fight a decisive action, 
or any action at all, because they alreadv had practically 
as complete control of the sea as would have resulted 
from the defeat of the enemy fleet. Control of the sea is 
accomplished when the enemy fleet is defeated or ' con- 
tained,' and the German fleet h^s been contained since 
the beginning of the war, is now contained, and doubtless 
will remain so. 
" (d) There is no reason to believe that the Germans 
have ever intended to risk their fleet in a decisive action 
against the greatly superior British fleet. They are not 
in the habit of pitting any military force against twice 
its numbers of at least equally powerful units. There 
is, on the contrary, every reason to believe that the 
Germans knew exactly what they intended to do during 
this last sortie of the grand fleet, and it is a reasonable 
presumption that they accomplished what they intended, 
namely, the trapping and pounding of the British battle 
cruisers before they could be supported by the British 
main body. 
" (e) The surprise to naval critics, and doubtless to 
.the Germans, was the extraordinary resistance battle 
cruisers can sustain and the extraordinary amomit of 
damage they can inflict even against battleships. This 
indicates a greatly enhanced value when they are em- 
ployed in their proper role in a general naval engage- 
ment ; that is, with their driving power on the scouting 
line, their suppport of destroyer attacks, etc. 
" (f) That the British attacked battleships with battle 
cruisers and armoured cruisers is their own affair. They 
doubtless had what they considered sufficient reasons 
for doing so ; but we may rest assured that this was done 
with the full knowledge of the probable nature of the 
sacrifice, and not with the idea that these vessels are a 
match for battleships ; and if the conditions as to visi- 
bility had been better the sacrifice might well have been 
justified by success in engaging with the German main 
fleet. At all events, battle cruisers proved that in case 
of necessity they can fight a delaj'ing action against 
battleships with reasonable chances of success. 
Battle Cruisers Vindicated 
" (g) There is nothing, however, in the incidents of 
the fight to justify any argument against the necessity 
for battle cruisers. When for any reason they are de- 
liberately put against battleships ..they must expect to 
suffer in proportion to the relatively small number of 
their guns and the relative lightness of their armour. 
It is the same with all other types of vessels. If 
in this battle it had been considered necessary to launch 
flotillas of unsupported destroyers against the enemy's 
battleships in daylight, and half of them had been des- 
troyed, there would doubtless have been some arguments 
in opposition to building any more destroyers — and these 
arguments would have been precisely as sound as the 
popular arguments now c|irrent as a result of the sinking 
of the three British battle cruisers. 
" (h) Beyond the demonstration of the unexpected 
resistance of the battle cruisers, the incidents of the action 
in question have no bearing upon the arguments advanced 
in my hearing as to the immediate necessity of the ad- 
dition of battle cruisers to the United States Navy in its 
present condition. That the battleships must constitute 
the main strength of a naval force admits of no doubt ; 
but, as I attempted to show by my testimony, an ade- 
quate force of battle cruisers is necessary in order that the 
battleships may be used against an enemy with their 
maximum power. This is particularly true of the situa- 
tion that would confront us in case of the necessity of 
repelling the attack of an enemy fleet against our coast. 
William S. Sims 
The New York Times, Saturday; July 29th. 
