LAND & WATER 
August 24, 191 6 
that the mass of Bothmer's forces are still retiring in order 
to consolidate thi'mselvcs upon some better line behind 
(1 have suggested the C.nila Lipa) in place of that im- 
perfect line upon the centre of which they are still fight- 
ing a rearguard action. 
There is some danger that the Russian effort in the 
CarpathiiMis ma\- be misunderstood. It is not true that 
the Russian forces are vet— at least at the moment of 
writing and according "to the last advices — over the 
Hungarian border. Ihev occupy the village of Jab- 
lonit^a, which lies at the foot of the pass upon the Galictan 
side. They are struggling towards and hope to obtain 
the dominating heights on cither side of the pass. These 
once held thev will threaten Korosmezo, the first village 
upon the Hiuigarian side beyond the summit, but 
so far the summit has not fallen into their hands. That 
is, it was not in their hands last Sunday, after which date 
no news has vet reached tis. 
I'pon the Stokhod line in front of Kovel our Allies are 
still lighting for the whole river. They have had some 
suices's in the lower reaches, seizing Tobol upon 
Western side, anci one or two other points, but there was 
no appreciable advance during the past week in this region. 
The critical point still remains the front before Hahcz 
and the railway approach to Jezupol, where the Gnila 
Lipa falls into the Dnieper. 
If the lower reaches of the Gnila Lipa are passed by 
the Russians the whole o' that river as a defensive line 
is in ieopard\-, and it seeit.s obvious from the movements 
of the enemy — as I have suggested— that the Gnila Lipa 
is what he " is really dejpending upon for his defensive 
iinc in this region. 
Turktih Strategy 
The mihtary columns of The Times did a very great 
service to the studv of the war last week by pointing 
out the nature of Tu-.:ki?>:i strategy at this moment, and 
it is from the point raade in the columns of The Times 
that I draw the conclasion recorded here. 
The Turkish foicii- are reduced now to 42 nominal 
divisions, but we are feirly certain that a great part of 
these— though in what de,;^ree we cannot tell— are below 
full strength. There inay be three-quarters of a mvllion 
under arms— say 400,000 bayonets — or there may be less. 
\ figure often quoted, Ilaiow not oh what authority, 
is 650,000 for the total force at the present moment. But 
at anv rate these Turkish armies, which time must 
rapidly decrease, are being used at the present moment 
in a fashion which is fairly clear. 
After the loss of j'.rzerum, succeeded by the loss of 
Trebizond, it was determined for the moment to abandon 
Central and Northern Armenia. The railhead by 
which this district could be supplied was distant ; even 
though it may have been prolonged beyond Angora in 
the course of the war, it did not, 1 beheve, reach Sivas. 
Trebizond was an excellent gate of supply as long as it 
was in Turkish hands : in spite of the presence of the 
Russian ficet in the Black Sea communications were 
maintained along the coast almost to the last, but once 
Trebizond had gone, maintenance of a great force in 
the north and centre became dilficiilt, and the bulk; of 
Turkish effort was turned to saving Mesopotamia. 
The readers of this journal are acquainted with the 
strategical situation there. A small Russian force was 
working tlown the escarpment of the Persian mountains 
towards Maghdad. More important Russian forces, but 
still much less than those employed against Erzerum and 
Trebizond, were striking south-westward from Mush 
and Bitlis towards Diarbekr. If they should reach 
Diarbekr they would already threaten the avenue of 
the Turkish communications in this neighbourhood, which is- 
the railway that now has its railhead perhaps at Nisibin 
and certainly beyond the old rail head at Ras el Ain. 
The Turkish command threw very considerable forces 
forward in front of Diarbekr, and away to the south in 
front of Baghdad pushed the small Russian force back 
up the escarpment of the Persian mountains into Persia 
again and reoccupied the edge of the Persian Plateau. 
The forces before Diarbekr meanwhile were also ad- 
vancing and the inferior Russian forces retired before them 
until, about a fortnight ago, the Turks reoccupied Mush 
and Bitlis, the most important centres of this district. 
In this situation the detached strategical problem 
of the East now stands. Three independent Turkisli 
armies stand in three echelons more and more forward to 
the east as we go from north to south, (i) the northern 
one uncover,^ Erzingan, (2) the central one covers Mush 
and Bitlis, (3) the southern one covers Baghdad. For 
the moment the hold of the enemy upon the whole of 
Mesopotamia and its communications is safe. The 
political conquest of northern and central Armenia by 
the Russians appears equally definitive, and the Turks 
have saved the one district at the expense of the other. 
THE SALONIKA FRONT 
The Salonika offensive has begun. The counter- 
offensive of the Bulgarians has immediately followed. 
Our authorities are of course silent as to. the general plan 
which they propose to develop, but the presence of 
Russian and Italian trooiis at Salonika shows the 
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