August 24, 1916 
.AND & WATER 
There again the figures are perfectly well known. 
The enemy hold altogether about two million prisoners. 
The Allies not quite a million and a half. The command 
of the sea by the Allies gives them, of course, relief 
from labour to an indefinite extent, and they can use 
prisoners, if they choose, exactly as the Germans and the 
.\ustrians can. But we are considering the use of 
prisoners in the particular case of the relief of German 
numbers. Can this use of prisoners at the present 
stage of the war appreciably increase those numbers ' 
Obviously it cannot. It is the plainest common sense 
that all prisoners who could be used to replace skilled 
and absolutely necessary labour, let alone labour of a 
more general kind, have already been used long ago. 
Otherwise Germany would not have had to call already 
upon her i<)i8 Class, and otherwise the German organisa- 
tion would be positively imbecile. Every man sound and 
passed for service has been sent off long ago. The indis- 
pensahles alone have been kept back and the prisoners — 
who, a year ago, were nearly as numerous as they are 
now — have replaced all who can be replaced. 
The presence of prisoners has permitted Germany to 
mobilise something like nine million instead 'of a little 
over eight, but its effect on mobilisation has long been 
past. Her occupation of territory has permitted the 
increase of munitions, coal, food, etc. ; but for increase 
of men it has done nothing tor a long while past. Her 
exhaustion and her calling upon boys under 18 (as nearly 
half the ic)i8 class is) proves this. 
Stretch the real figures and the positive definite calcula- 
tion as you will, and you cannot get a million of reserve 
man-power for drafts between this and the next summer 
season, and those who say you can ought to give ong 
their figures. Where is the other million ? No one has 
ever presented it in a rational analysis, and I do not 
believe any one can. 
One thing Germany could do, and is threatening to 
do, and that is to empress the Polish population. That 
would give her another half million at least, and it is the 
business of the Allies by a sound international diplomacy 
to make that impossible — for the emprcssment of Poland 
could only go with a mutilated Polish constitution, 
accepted by the Polish people from the enemy in despair 
of anything better. It is for the Allies to declare positively 
for the full establishment of Poland. 
But of resources within herself Germany has not a 
million in reserve, unless you choose to count any old 
men, or invalids, or boys which she may (as other Powers 
have in desperate straits) put into uniform and arms. 
But that policy is always a gratuitous subvention to 
one's opponent. The more thoroughly inefficient men 
you have in any army, the rapidly weaker it gets. 
A Study of the Italian Front— III. 
The Trentino Adventure 
I conclude in this article my study of the Italian front 
made while I was visiting that front and postponed, so 
far as this conclusion at least is concerned, to the present 
number. 
It will be convenient to include in this study certain 
remarks upon the way in which the Austrian break- 
down in the Trentino ultimately led to the Itahan victory 
the other day before Gorizia, although I have dealt with 
the details of this victory in last week's article. 
My readers are already familiar with the main lines 
of the Trentino adventure, which were dealt with week 
by week as it took place in these columns, but we are able 
now to see the thing as a whole and to describe it in better 
proportion than was possible while it was in progress ; 
moreover, it is essential to comprehend it as a whole if 
we are to understand the present phase of the campaign 
on the Italian front, and the whole meaning of that 
front. 
It is usually the case in any big strategic experiment 
that not one opportunity is presented by it but a combina- 
tion of opportunities. William the Conqueror, for in- 
stance, when he encircled London after the Battle of 
Hastings, not only cut off the seat of Government and 
largest town from supply, but also incidentally in such 
a march could seize a string of castles, which cut off the 
South from the North. He could also in the s4me plan 
make certain of the line of the Thames, and on the top of 
all that he had the political advantage of not directly 
offending the material interests of the burgesses, upon 
which he relied, and which a direct attack upon London 
would have damaged. 
Almost every great strategic movement in history 
has this multiple character. It was so with the plan to 
break out against the Italians through the Trentino. 
There was in the first place, and most obvious of all, the 
point that here alone one of the main communications 
of the sector of the Allies ran right in front of the enemy's 
striking power. 
There was in the second place, the fact that the Tren- 
tino alone offered something of a gap in that enormous 
mountain wall, which everywhere else obstructed effort 
upon either side. The Trentino front was indeed moun- 
tainous' but it was subsidiary to the main ranges of the 
Alps and dealt only with their foothills. 1 
There was again the point that a success here would 
have had the political effect of putting the Austrians 
within a few days upon the Italian Plain, in occupation 
of the rich cities of that plain, notably of Verona and 
Vicenza. 
Lastly, there w'as the fact that an attack here came 
'at a maximum distance from Italian headquarters, and 
from the main Italian front upon the Isonzo. 
Climatic conditions prevented any considerable action 
upon this front until the early summer, and the date 
fixed upon, the middle of May, was the very earliest 
in which anything could be attempted. The great draw- 
back to the use of the Trentino front was the fact that it 
depended for its provisionment, for the evacuation of its 
wounded, for its supply of shell and everything, upon one 
line of railway, the line leading from Trent to the junction 
of Franzenfcste. After that point there were two lines, 
one going through the Pusthcrtahl eastward and the 
other up northward to Innsbruck, and to the Bavarian 
and German centres whence, of course, the Austrians 
drew a great part of their supply, although Italy was 
not, technically, at war .with Germany. 
Another drawback which proved in the event much 
more considerable than was expected at first, was the 
waterless condition of the Asiago Plateau, which lay overr 
hanging the Italian Plain and formed a sort of half-way 
step between the higher mountains and the towns and 
railway communications of Italy. 
A third drawback was the absence of good commmii- 
cations for an advance. There were two main divergent 
avenues (I am here repeating in condensed form a great 
deal that has already appeared in these columns) ; the great 
road and railway by the Brenta Valley and the great road 
and railway by the Adige Valley, both convergent upon 
Trent. But between the two, over a distance of 40 miles, 
there was only one good road, the road from Rovereto 
to Schio, at which latter point a single line led down to 
the plain. 
Poverty of communications, above all the existence of 
but one line of railway for so long a distance behind the 
new front, made it necessary for the eneniy to depend 
upon a rapid success ; and also made it necessary for 
him to begin his preparations a long time before he 
actually attacked. It was incumbent upon him to 
accumulate a great mass of provisions and shell, for the 
