August 24, 1916 
LAND & WAlliK 
13 
The Invasion of Belgium 
By Colonel Feyler 
A MONGST the historical problems raised by the 
/^ great European war, the question of the in- 
L — ^ vasion of Belgium remains one of the most 
X JLabsorbing. The German official theory, of 
course, lays the responsibility upon the Belgians them- 
selves, in that they violated their own neutrality and thus 
forced the German Army to protect itself against the trap 
they had laid, by occupying forthwith their territory. 
It is interesting to examine whether strategical principles 
(and the German doctrine of their application)", M'ill 
help to support tlHS theory. 
Let us first of all remember that (apart from a detailed 
examination) the mancjeuvre of 1914 across Belgium 
gave a striking first impression of being a thoroughly 
organised and long-considered operation, and showed, 
outwardly at least, every sign of perfect production and 
stage-management. Of course, in such a judgment, 
formed without serious documentary evidence, imagina- 
tion may perhaps play a large part ; but we cannot get 
away from the fact that this judgment coincides exactly 
with what the Germans themselves affirm to be the 
reason of that superiority which confers on them the 
right to world-hegemony, namely, in the words of a great 
German scientist, the chemist Ostwald : " That faculty 
hr organisation which, has allowed Germany to attain a 
higher stage of civilisation than the other nations and to 
rhich only the war will raise them [the others). The 
French and the English are still at a stage of civilisation 
which the (Germans left more than fifty years ago, the stage 
of iudividualism. Germany to-day is at the higher stage, 
that of organisation." 
The Dominant Idea 
If this had been the opmion of a single man, however 
influential, it would have been more or less negligible. 
It was to be found, however, in a multitude c^f writings ; 
numberless and most varied circumstances go to prove that 
the opinion of the chemist Ostwald was a current, or 
rather dominant, o]>iaion i'n Germany. The idea in- 
spired the German people, and, surely to a much higher 
degree, the German Army. Thus the General Staff was 
to organise victory by virtue of this superior stage of 
civilisation, just as the Government would organise the 
nation's labour by suppressing the inferior principle of 
individualism. 
Of course, at present we can only deal in hypotheses. 
The study of this subject must be resumed at a later 
date, when it can be approached in a calmer spirit. We 
can none the less seek to find to what extent the cam- 
paign of 1870 influenced, in Germany, that of 1914, for 
it is bej'ond doubt (and this applies to France no 
less than Germany) — that the preparation for the war 
of 1914, excepting, of course, the fixing of its date, began 
as soon as the Treaty of Frankfort had laid down the 
new frontier-line. 
At that moment the Prussian General Staff started 
work on what one might call the scientific or dogmatic 
history of the war of 1870-1871, for the famous work, so 
well-known to all military men, was intended not merely 
for a summarisation of facts, but more for a justification 
of methods. An attempt was made in this work to show 
how warfare should be scientifically organised, leaving 
nothing, or practically nothing, to chance, and securing 
victory by its Very perfection of theory and practice, 
in short, the German method of warfare, as impeccable 
and infallible as German science and German truth. 
The victorious Moltke of 1870 was thus made a proto- 
type for the present war, being proclaimed superior to 
Napoleon, not only by virtue of his militar}' prowess, 
but also by reason of that amazing German superstition 
of race-superiority. Napoleon's equal in military genius, 
Moltke had the advantage of belonging to a superior 
race. 
This puerile belief, however, does not prevent Moltke 
being inferior to Napoleon, and indeed to many more, 
in one respect : he conducted but two great campaigns, 
as against Napoleon's fourteen. Less by many were the 
occasions on which he liad to solve intricate strategicnil 
l)roblems and, in the few cases when he was called upon 
so to do, cuTumstances always led him to repeat the same 
manoeuvre. Sadowa, the attempted French envelop- 
ment on the Sarre, St. Privat and Sedan, all these four 
battles were of a similar type. 
Moltke and Hannibal 
Successes of such a lightning character proved irre- 
futably (to the German mind) the worth of complete 
organisation, and the German theory of warfare (based 
first and last vipon superior organisation) would, there- 
fore, t«/a//?6.'y lead to a complete German victory. Forty 
years of military literature impressed this view upon the 
minds of officers. The campaign of 1870 (regarded, of 
course, from the necessarily superior German point of 
view) was the principal, and Sometimes the sole basis for 
the study of strategy ; subsequent campaigns were only 
considered in their relation to this prototype, and previous 
wars studied in the same spirit. The latest manifestatioa 
of this idea of strategic preparation was the publication 
in the great and (in my opinion) excellent German Staff 
periodical, the " Vierteljahrsheft fiir Truppenfiihrung " 
of an article by Field-Marshal von Schlieifen, entitled 
" Canned," comparing the Moltke of Sadowa and Sedan 
with the Hannibal of Cannre, and demonstrating that 
certain victory is the appanage of him who follows most 
closely the classic examples of these three battles. 
It was upon this 'basis, then, that the General Stafl 
prepared the imposing flank movement across Belgium, 
as being a development of infallibly successful manneuvre 
of 1870 and of dimensions suHiciently colossal to satisfy 
the new German spirit. For years, since 1870, and 
especially since the establishment of the French fortified 
dyke in Lorraine, this scheme had been mounted and 
organised, and when the right moment came, one pressure 
on the button sufficed to set the whole machine in motion. 
Thus would Germany establish in the sphere of war, as 
she had established in every sphere of peaceful operations, 
the supremacy of that superior stage of civilisation whicb 
she claimed to represent — the stage of organisation. 
A Military Necessity 
This hypothesis of a long and minute preparation ol 
the German manceuvre on the Western front leads 
logically to the conclusion that the invasion of Belgium 
was premeditated. As a matter of fact, it is incredible 
that anyone with the slightest knowledge of German 
strategical science should have any doubt on the subject, 
despite the subsequent denials by the Imperial Govern- 
ment. The only man to be frank on this point was von 
Bethmann-Hollweg himself (at first), when he declared 
to the Reichstag that Belgium was being crossed iu 
defiance of all treaties, as a military necessity. 
The manoeuvre through Belgium was not only a con- 
sequence of the systematic study of Moltke ; it was 
w rit large in the local - geography. The development 
of the intention could be followed from 1870 to 1914 by 
noting the variation in the zones of concentration foi 
the armies as betrayed by strategic railways, stations 
and platforms. As and when the French strengthened 
their eastern frontier, so the Germans tended to abandon 
their original bases at Strasbourg and Metz and to de- 
velop their preparations for concentration on the frontier 
of Luxembourg, and even further north, right up to the 
Dutch frontier. Many writers in France followed this 
evolution closely, so much so that the large and interest- 
ing work by Senator Maxime Lecomte and Lieut .- 
Colonel Camille Levi ; " Neutralite beige et inva.'sion 
allemandc," published in 1914 on the eve of hostilities, 
prognosticated the operations almost exactly as they 
took place. 
To the question " When the Germans invade France, 
will they pass through Belgium ? " these authors 
answer most clearly " The Germans will pass through 
Belgium." In a chapter thus headed, they examine 
