14 
LAND •& WATER 
August 24, 1916 
tho why and tlio how. II7n' ? Because ol the weakness 
of the northern l-'rencli frontier compared with tlie eastern 
(for the French had long relied on Bt-lgian neutrality 
to cover their northern flank). Hoic; ? Through the 
xchole of Belgium, for the size of the fust-line armies 
would involve a crossi.ng of the Meuse, without which, 
indeed, this right wing would hardly succeed in its 
attempted envelopment of the French : " Their right 
icing " wrote Messrs. Lecomte and Levi, " uill advance 
across central Belgium, making in force for Paris and 
moving chiefly along the valley of the Oise, approximately 
along the line Brussels, Mons, Paris." 
It is obvious, too, that .so enormous an operation 
"onld not be improvised on the spur of the moment. In 
irder to be carried out with the regularity which no mili- 
tary man can but admire, the movement must have been 
prepared in its most minute details with the utmost 
foresight. The success of the whole |)lan depended upon 
a torrential overflowing of the Belgian territory ; it is 
hardly to be expected that Realpolitik would have omitted 
to stock its hand with all the available trumps and that 
in this particular case, therefore, above all (where only 
success could justify the iniquitous means), Germany 
would fail to employ what .has always been hef ace of 
trumps, namely her minute organisation. 
Yet another argument : Germany has never shone in 
the realms of improvisation, but always as regards 
analysis and elaboration. Germans have always known 
how to use and develop to the best advantage the in- 
vention of others. To take a recent example, look at 
aviation ; aviation originated in F"rance, but at the out- 
break of the war the German air service was very much 
better adapted than the French. In France on the other 
liand a certain indifference seems always to follow on 
the heels of a crisis of enthusiasm. Who, for instance,- 
would have thought that, after the. hard experience of 
1870, the French would have been so little prepared for 
iqi4 ? Germany, howe\er, tends to sin on r'le otiier 
side, by an exaggeration of minute organisation vvhl h 
would often compromise a situation brought about by 
novel and unexpected circumstances. This is another 
reason why an improvised invasion of Belgium would 
seem to conflict with all the most stable qualities of the 
German character. 
Lastly, an argument still less assailable, although lack 
of documentary evidence causes it to be hypothetical : 
having taken Mollke as strategic mentor, it would be 
most extraordinary had the Cierman staff departed from 
his most masterly tiuality, namely, an unceasing reviewing 
and improving, of the plans he meditated for fuiure cam- 
paigns. Moltke prepared the campaign of 1870 for 
thirteen years, from 1857 onwards. During this period 
he prepared no less than twenty detailed memorials 
addressed to the King and his ministers, generals, 
etc. Upon every political change in Europe, upon 
every moclifleation of inferior conditions in Prussia, 
upon every increase in the strength of the army, he im- 
proved and jK'rfected the details of the offensive against 
France. In 1869 the twentieth plan was ready, and 
when, faithful to his tradition, Moltke re-examined this 
plan, he found it satisfactory and wrote in the margin 
" Gut auch fiir 1870." (Good also for 1870.) 
' Is it possible that the staff which copied all from Moltke 
would neglect the method of working which was his most 
shining success ? Gut of the question. For many years 
past the violation of Belgian neutrality must have been 
written in tfie dossiers of the German Staff. And again, 
not only would they thus be following Moltke, but all 
great warriors. Napoleon wrote much, on this subject. 
Letter to Berthier, 2nd October, 1804 : " At the moment 
of declaring war there is so much to do that it is wise to 
start some years beforehand." 
Letter to Eugene i8th September, 1806. " Matters must 
be considered niany months before they come to pass." 
Letter to the Staff 8th September, 1808 : " Only solid and 
well-conceived plans can succeed in war." 
Journal at St. Helena : "A plan of campaign must 
foresee all that the enemy can or may do, and must con- 
tain in itself the antidote." 
That which Napoleon and Moltke emphasised as neces- 
sary would not have been neglected by the German StafTf 
of the twentieth century, self-styled superior to these. 
From the moment when the German (iovernment decided 
to violate the treaty it had signed, the Staff had no 
alternative but to prepare the said violation : the more so as 
Government and Staff are one and the same in Germanj'. 
Everything contradicts, therefore, the puerile excuse, 
that the Belgians had violated their owai neutrality, and 
on the other hand, proves that the passage through 
Belgium was premeditated, probably more in the light 
of conquest than of mere passage. But this last question 
will remain for history to answer more fully. 
How Aeroplanes are Used in War 
By a Correspondent 
THE way aeroplanes are utilised in the war has 
proved different from every pre-war forecast, "so I 
propose to indicate what our three classes of aero- 
planes do and how and what their enemies are. 
Passing from little to big, we find that the smaller 
the craft the more agile it -is, and, let me add, the more 
popular with pilots for many reasons which will appear. 
The business of the little machine is to be mobile, to 
climb quickly, turn quickly, dive quickly, recover 
quickly, and to secure this quickness which is its one 
defence, all other qualities must be, and are, sacrificed 
to the limit of risk. Thus only is the acme of per- 
formance achieved. There must be the lightest weight 
engine, the largest horse-power — generally 100 to 150 
H.P., only one man, only one gun, the minimum of 
petrol (for petrol becomes a great burden if many hours' 
flight is to be effected with these big engines). The 
slowness of -alighting, which is such a comfort to the 
pilot who has to land in a restricted aerodrome " in 
the held." must be sacrificed so as to keep the wings 
small and light, comfortable space for the pilot must 
he cut down, armoured seats are generally avoided in 
this craft, pistols, heavy clothes, easy landing gears • 
with large tyres and shock absorbers, all these things 
are not for the " short range " defence aeroplane. It 
generally has a fixed machine gun arranged so as to fire 
thiougli the disc of the propeller, and the ainnan aims 
the gun by aiming the whole machine to which it is 
rigidly fastened. Such an aeroplane was the Morane 
(badly copied by the Germans in their Fokker and never 
eclipsed or beaten by the Fokker, for all that the latter 
was cleverly advertised by the Germans and foolishly 
advertised by ourselves ; for — the secret must out^ — much 
of the British Press is as ill-informed as voluble on 
matters aeronautical.*) 
The functions of the machine are notable : Its busi- 
ness is hardly to go over the enemy's land at all. It 
carries no bombs, nor camera, nor need the airman ever 
take field glasses. It carries, but it does not for its proper 
functions need, a compass. It waits for the enemy's aero- 
planes (diagram I). It does this waiting either on the 
ground, springing into the air at 1,000 feet per minute 
as soon as he is in view, or when he is announced as 
coming, or else it waits on high— at 10,000 or 14,000 
feet, and from there its object is to pounce, andpoimcing 
means moving at incredible speeds because the downhill 
gradient is very steep, and the movement may thus 
correspond to working at the rate of an engine power 
of 200, or even 300 H.P., for the period of the descent. 
This mobility enables it to keep behind the raider aero- 
plane which forms its proper prey, blanketed from the 
effect of the raider's gun by keeping behind the planes 
or behind the tail and rudder of its enemy. When the 
Germans had suffered severely from our Moranes and 
Bristols they copied us. They put up some bright and 
clever young pilots like Immelmann and Boelcke, who— 
no discredit to them — selected their prey amongst those 
• We wete actually told tliat Fokkers were dropping bombs in 
Kngland ! The public shuddered and more ha'pence were duly col-, 
lected by those who trade on sensation. 
