August 31, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
-n""""-^~ '"-^ 
THE ROUMANIAN ORGANISATlON/c^^AE^ 
TcnFiPSt Line 
'Divisions 
Organised in 
S^Avmy Ccfpps of A division /horn 20.000 to 21,000 men ivxth 
^J^ivisiotlS each,, {rom 12.000 to 13.000 bai^onets. 
-^ /— 
— N"<- 
75/2 Tles^erve 
Divtstofis 
MenmtkeVejDots r°'-"r"-i 'i' i ■ i 1 1 .i 1 1 
and in peseirve "' 
for Drops the eauival^titofio more IDtvisions in Number 
ARRANGEMENT^ THE ABOVE 
ArmiesattAe -4^^^6 .4r«2^^/t^ A mvfawu{> 
Three Armies 
of some 4* or ^divisions each. 
Stmtecric ILesenre 
Som^ y divisions 
^- — - ii P i h ii m JL— ^Jf»iB— JiwMiiiiAi I i^^Li—i Ji wiiaJt^ I 
Men Kept behind 
for drnftS'- The 
equivalent ofsomelio mope divisions 
I 
rapid instruction, is a necessity of war which' inevitably 
lowers the quality of a force as time proceeds. It has 
affected most of the conscript belligerents fairly equally so 
far and affected them profoundly, but Roumania comes in 
at this moment with all that professional framework intact. 
K I said just now that though the addition of forces 
obtained by the intervention of Roumania looked small 
in proportion to the full Allied power, yet it was very 
considerable for the field in which it appeared. 
In order to appreciate this, let us compare it with the 
numbers recently engaged in that field. The field in 
question may roughly be called the South-Eastern 
front. It is the front which, until last Sunday, stretched 
from the Pinsk Marshes to the southern border of the 
Bukovina and which now stretches on nearly another 350 
miles to the Danube. 
We know to within a very small mar^cin of error in 
what strength the eneniy stood upon that front upon the 
1st of last June. He had at the least 44 and at the most 
47 divisions. The tremendous Russian victories of June 
and Julv obliterated a vast proportion of this origmal 
defending force. Much more than one-third of it was 
actually taken prisoner. Anything from one-half to 
two-thirds had ceased to e.xist as effectives ' ivithin the first 
eight weeks of the great Russian offensive. 
The gaps were' ultimately filled. I.'he. remainmg 
German strategic reserve was entirely -oriiausted in the 
necessity of filhng those gaps and all that Austria- 
Hungary could summon of reserve- m an-power at the 
•moment was also sent forward. The dej )ots were emptied 
and the line, longer than before, tortuo us, and only just 
patched up, was reformed : but not re formed in a stable 
