LAND & WATER 
September y, 1916 
The Roumanian Operations 
By Hilaire Belloc 
T 
,HE absence of a censorsliip in this country has 
jx-rmittcd a certain section of the Press to 
induic;e, if not in advice to the Higher Command 
^— of the Aihcs in the -East, at least in criticism ; 
and the public has been given to understand that the 
vital strategy following upon the entry of Koumania 
into the war required a combined attack upon the artery 
which feeds the Turkish Empire and which passes througji 
Bulgaria. Criticism of this sort is \alueless, because 
it cannot have the slightest effect upon the operations — 
sa\ing in one case, which is when it breeds a panic and 
thu^ reacts upon the (iovernment of the country. 
What we have to do, therefore, is to foHbw with as 
much accuracy as may be the movements now taking 
place in the East and to show what opportunity the 
enemy has of meeting them. There are at present tlirce 
theatres connected with the Roumanian entry into the 
war. A fourth may come into existence at any moment. 
The three theatres directly concerned with the Rou- 
manian entry into the war are : 
(i) The operations in the Bukovina, in Eastern Cialicia, 
just to' the north of it, and in Northern Roumania just 
to the south of it. 
This tield has for the thesis of its Higher Command 
either the piercing of the obstacle presented by the Car- 
pathians or so strong a feint upon them as to compel a 
large enemy concentration there and a corresponding 
enemy weakness elsewhere. Which of these two plans 
it is pursuing we do not know. It is pursuing one of the 
two. 
(2) The second field of operations is in essence separate 
from this first, and has for its thesis the Roumanian 
occupation of Transylvania. It regards the central and 
Southern Carpathians, particularly that south-eastern 
high portion of the chain which stands in front of and 
covers Kronstadt and Hermanstadt, and is called the 
" Transylvanian Alps." 
Although operations are taking place along the whole 
length of the chain from the Bukovina right down to 
the Danube, yet we must not confuse this second field 
with the first. 
The Higher Command here has a different objective 
and is working on a different thesis. That objective is 
undisguisedly the occupation of Transylvania and the 
thesis is a containment of the Austrian forces on the 
centre and north of the frontier, and an advance from 
the south : the two movements between them compelling 
the Austro-Hungarian forces to evacuate the bulge or 
great salient which eastern Transylvania makes upon the 
map and to fall back westward. 
It is this field of operation, this. objective, this thesis 
which most concerns us. for the campaign is in being 
and is de\eloping before our eyes. 
The first field remains so far what it was before Rou- 
mania came in. and so far is concerned with Russian 
effort alone. There is no sign of a Roumanian con- 
centration specially devised to turn the Carpathians 
and acting as an extension of the Roumanian line and 
thus immediately to threaten the plains of Hungary 
proper. ■^ 
It might be argued that the occuixition of Transylvania 
alone would anyhow turn the Carpathians, and that such 
an operation in itself thus turning the Northern 
Carpathians and occupying in Transylvania what is 
Roumanian land killed two birds with one stone. 
This is not the case. The second field with its second 
thesis and second objective— the occupation of Transyl- 
vania alone— does indeed turn the mi-re crest of the 
Carpathians. But it is not the crest which is the soul of 
the obstacle. The Carpathian region is an obstacle 
'because of its few communications, its dense forests 
and its earlier winter ; and the Northern Cirpathians 
covering the plains of Hungary proper— that is the 
district the threat to which is of such violent political 
effect upon the Hungarian people and C,o\ernment~ 
' the plain of the upper Thei.ss — could remain intact even 
thougii Transylvania were occupied by the Roumanians 
right up to the neighbourhood of Khiusenbm-g. 
The reason of this is that the further south you go in 
the Carpathian system, the wider grows the belt of hill 
and forest, and that the partial occupation of the eastern 
part of this broad belt only does not turn the whole of 
It as an obstacle. If an army were trying .to force the 
Piedmontese Alps in order to threaten the plains of Italy, 
that obstacle would not be turned by the presence of 
another allied army behind the Isonzo or in the Trentino ; 
although both these districts are on the Italian side of the 
watershed. The Piedmontese obstacle would only be 
turfted when or if the allied army to the east had actually 
reached the plains of Italy. 
It is exactly the same with the Carpathians. The 
high northern wall which covers the plain of the Thciss 
is not turned by mere invasion of the \'ery broad mountain 
and forest district the eastern half of which is the salient 
of Transylvania. 
We must then in following the Transylvanian campaign 
treat it as something separate from the Russian action on 
the north. 
(3) The third field directly connected with these 
eastern operations is, of course, that in which the Bul- 
garian army is operating against the Expeditionary 
Forces of the Allies which are based upon Salonika and 
are under the command of (ieneral vSarrail. 
A fourth field of operation may come into existence 
with the ad\ance southward of the Russian force against 
the Bulgarian frontier, the beginning of which has been 
officially announced. 
The first field we can neglect, for as I have said it has 
not yet become a principal theatre of activity. 
I will deal this week, therefore, with the second and 
third. 
The Invasion of Transylvania 
The Roumanian operations for the occupation of east 
Tran.sylvania have taken the form of a seizure by advanced 
guards of all the passes — road and railway — from the 
northern Gyiemes Pass right down to the Danube : the 
narrow passage served by road and railway between 
which river and the end of the Carpathian chain near 
the Iron Gates between Varciova and Orsova may be 
regarded as the ultimate or ninth pass over the chain. 
I say " advanced guards " or " covering troops," 
bccau.se it is clear that Roumania — ^which only began 
mobilising a week ago — has not yet put her full armies 
in the field. 
If we mark on the map the positions of the Romnanian 
hcads-of-columns last Sunday and Monday, we find them 
everywhere in possession of these passages. On the 
Danube they hold the western slope of the frontier hills ; 
they have Orsova under their guns and the Austro- 
Hungarians have retired behind the river Czerna. This 
gives the Roumanians control of the " Iron Gates " of 
the Danube am/ /Jicrcforc closes all I he loieer river to the 
enemy — a most important point. The next passage, with 
a road sixty miles and more to the north-east is, the 
Vulcan Pass, which is marked No. 8 on Map i . Here the 
Roumanians are in occupation of Petro Zseny. Next 
comes the road, railway and pass marked (7), the Red 
Tower Gorge, and beyond this the Roumanians have 
reached and occupied Hermannstadt. The two next 
passes marked (6) and (5) (the second a road and railway 
pass of Predeal, the first a convenient flanking road 
close by), have both been seized, and Kronstadt, which 
is their junction, has been occupied. Pas.ses 4, j, 2 and 
I are all in the same situation. The Roumanians have 
passed them all and hold them all. 
The first thing we notice in this opening of the cam- 
paign is that there has been no serious Austro-Hungarian 
resistance upon the actual frontier. There has been a 
