LAND & WATER 
September 7, 1016 
MONAiTIR- 
during such a pause than acquire some rough general 
idea of what is here opposed to us by the encm\'. 
We have here against us about ten divisions ; at least, 
that is the number hitherto identified, apparently, bv 
the Allien. But contact has not everywhere been 
thoroughly established, nor are we ever^-where certain 
of the number of the divisions opposed to a particular 
sector or front. 
The Bulgarian line runs (somewhat disconnectedly) 
from the front of Monastir, or to be accurate, from the 
neighbourhood of Banitsa. north-west of the Petrsko 
and Ostrovo Lakes, to the Struma River upon the east. 
which it follows from the bridge of Demirhissar (so-called 
— the bridge is between four or five miles from the town) 
to the mouth of that river. 
On the way the big crescent of positions passes by 
Lake Doiran and between Lake IJoiran and the eastern 
lakes runs parallel to, but as it goes westward nearer 
to, and, just north of the western lakes, crosses, the 
new frontier line of Greece. 
There is here a good deal more than a hundred miles 
— nfarly 120 — to be held upon the defensive, let alone to 
be used for offensive purposes. With what does the 
enemy here threaten us ? Starting from the eastern end 
along the Struma to the Demirhissar Bridge round 
Lake Uoiran. we have a full half of the forces opposed 
to us ; five divisions. 
From Lake Doiran to the Vardar River with its road 
and railway line, and a little beyond them the line is 
held by a division which would seem to be mi.xed and 
to contain .Vustro-Hungarian as well as Bulgarian units. 
To the right or west of this again another Bulgarian 
division holds the mountainous region, which stretches 
from the Vardar Valley westward. It is this division, 
I think, -.vhich the Serbs have lately pushed back to the 
frontier line. 
Finally on what may be called " the Monastir front," 
that is the sector covering the north of the two lakes, 
Petrsko and Ostrovo. we have three remaining divisions, 
one the number of which has not been (apparently) 
yet identified ; on its right another division. Lastly, 
completing the line, on the west of the Monastir railway 
and road stands a third division, the last or western- 
most of the units upon this front. - 
It will be seen that the weight of the Bulgarian forces 
lies heavily to the east, that is to their left, one-half of all 
their effectives being in this region on the Struma or 
between the Struma and Lake Doiran. 
We must not under-estimate the strength of the total 
force. These ten divisions that have been actually 
identified are certainly in full strength, and the Bulgarian 
division is a larger unit than the French or the British 
or the Serbian. There are certainly a quarter of a million 
men, probably somewhat more, facing us from the Struma 
Valley to the approaches of Monastir. 
But over and above these units on the Salonika front 
there is some considerable force watching the new front 
against Roumania, which is now a true front through 
the declaration of war by Bulgaria in the course of the 
present week. 
So far as is known fire divisions are here present. 
There is certainly an admixture of German and Austrian 
troops in this region, but in what proportion we do not 
know. We cannot here talk of divisions identified (for 
contact is not yet established), but information has been 
received which has permitted the communication to the 
French public of certain numbers. Thus the ist, 4th, 
6th and 12th divisions are reported upon this front, and 
the weight of them massed in front of the open Dobrudja 
frontier. These four are not all the troops in line on the 
north, a fifth division, or the equivalent of one, has been 
noted, but we are not certain of its number or composition. 
Appointment of General von Hindenburg 
THE dismissal of General von Falkenhayn from 
the supreme command of the (ierman Armie*; 
and his replacement by General \on Hindenburg 
is, of course, a purely political matter. Its 
significance has been everywhere appreciated, and thf-re 
has been no divergence of view upon the motives which 
led to the change. 
The defensive strategy of the Central Empires was 
taken over entirely by Beriin after the bad blunders of 
1914 (terminating with the (ierman defeat at Vpres by 
the British upon November nth) had rendered the 
victory of the Central Empires impr^sible, in spite of 
their still enormous numerical supt-riority, and had left 
nothing for them to hope for in the future (for the in- 
structed judgment) but the chance of an inconclusive 
peace. This defensive strategy was connected with the 
name of General von Falkenhayn, whu had succeeded 
t^e defeated Moltke in the supreme tommafld. 
The whole of the year 1915 and half the year 1916 — 
that is, all the time during which the enemy was suc- 
cessively still (a) superior in numbers, next (b) superior 
in munitionment, then (c) still overwhelmingly superior 
in munitionment over one isolated sector of his enemies 
(the Russian)— was filled with this defensive strategy 
and superficially (or immediately) it was successful. For 
it maintained the war on enemy soil and occupied a great 
belt ot new territory upon the east, where it still had the 
advantage of an o\erwhelming superiority in munition- 
ment. But, fundamentally, it was a failure, because the 
object of all defensives is a later offensive. There can 
be no such thing as an indefinitely prolonged defensive, 
and it was clear that the moment was approaching when 
the advantage of the Central Empires in men and 
munitions (their sole advantage, for neither in discipline, 
military spirit, nor type of armament did they surpass 
the Allies— and least of all io strategy !) would end. 
