September 7, iqi6 
LAND & WATER 
Verdun and the Trcntino were the two desperate 
efforts to obtain a decision somewhere upon the unmense 
hne before things should change. The Trentino failed 
and Verdun turned out a blood>- defeat. It was thought 
a bold thing when the title " The Battle of Verdun is 
won" was printed in these columns by the present 
writer whose function it is rather to analyse e\euts than 
to express opinion, but to tell the truth that phrase was 
not onlv amply justified (as events have proved), but . 
used if anything tardily. The Gennans had clearly lost 
the game upon this sector after the failure of their great 
attempt of April 9th ; that is, at the end of the hrst six 
Already there was in the German army, though not 
among civihans, a mass of disappointment and complaint. 
There were critics who said that the West had been too 
much reinforced at the expense of the East, and that 
trouble would follow. <• t> -i 
The unexpected and tremendous success of Brussilov 
in June gave colour to such criticism and the launching 
of the great oflensive on the ist of July added weight to 
it. By the first days of August it was clear that the 
whole defensi\e scheme with which the name of Falkeii- 
hayn was associated had fallen in ruins, and that the 
Central Empires were now in that most gloomy of 
situations, attendants upon Time. 
They could never recover their former superiority of 
numbers and munitionment. They could not prevent a 
corresponding superiority arising against them and in- 
creasing with exery day that passed. 
All this was perfectly clear long before Roumama 
declared war. But Roumania's declaration of war was a 
glaring proof of how the situation was now everywhoro 
appreciated outside the Central Empires and, as it were 
taken for granted. There was no one in the Central 
Empires so" stupid or so remote but was affected by the 
news ; and the mechanical policy of repeating a lesson to 
the populace with the certainty that it would be accepted, 
broke down. Certain papers were instructed to talk 
nonsense about Roumania being one more captive added 
to the conquering Central Powers, but such a folly could 
\iot last 24 hours. There are limits to stupidity, even 
when it is purely mechanical, and the situation was 
understood at last in North Germany as it had already 
long been understood in the more intelligent south. 
The Press, the sole means by which we can obtain infor- 
mation on their general state, was not allowed to express 
what had evidently been clamoured upon every side, 
but the event has been enough to betray to us what the 
uproar must have been among the public in Germany, 
Austria, and Hungary. The Emperor summoned H inden- 
burg simply because his name was the name long idolised 
by the civilian population of Germany. He did what— 
paradoxically enough— all military governments do 
when military affairs go badly : Turned his back on the 
army and expert judgment : appealed or succumbed to 
the civilians and the towns : for such governments can 
always depend upon the obedience of their armies and 
at the same time are always very much dependent upon 
popular illusions. 
The presence of Hindenburg in nominal command 
of the German Armies would mean nothing but for the 
very able man who is his Chief of Staff— LudendorfL* 
It was Ludendorff who first of all pointed out Hinden- 
burg as the right man to deal with an invasion of East 
• He bears a new title— as does Hindenburg. But in practice 
Hindenburg has been made Ceneralissimo, and Ludendorti is Chiet 
oi Staff. 
Prussia. It was a judgment well formed and it imme- 
diately bore fruit. Hindenburg had a very intimate 
knowledge of one particular district— the Masurian lakes 
—and had studied in detail the particular strategic 
and tactical problems presented by it. Ilus special 
knowledge working in a highly restricted iield achieved 
the great victory of Tannenberg in the first days of the war. 
Tannenberg relieved that panic, which the North 
German is peculiarly susceptible to when his territory 
is invaded, and which is always potentiall\- present when 
a Russian army is on the move. N'ast numbers of refugees 
had rushed westward from East Prussia, spreading terror 
and prophesying a profound Russian invasion of all 
Eastern German territory. Tannenberg, though sub- 
sidiary to the general course of the war and in no way 
deciding its general form (as did the Marne) reheved 
all that tension. It had the further effect of being a 
clean cut and decisive victory which everybody could 
grasp, and which gave immediate fruit in the shape ot 
vast numbers of prisoners and guns. This is the founda- 
tion of the Hindenburg legend, and on this foundation 
the legend has securely reposed ever since. -Nothing 
has happened to add to it in military opinion. It is a 
purely civilian legend. . 
So long as Hindenburg was primarily concernefl wit It 
the Eastern operations thev conspicuously failed. He 
was the General who wasted himself in the Bzura lines 
and lost the action in front of Mlawa. It was Falken- 
hayn who designed and Mackensen who carried out the 
great drive through Poland. But the Hindenburg 
legend remained. It continued to be what it had always 
been, a sensation of the great industrial towns. It was 
harmless on the military side, and politically valuable 
to the Government because it provided a permanent 
source of enthusiasm for the war. . 
The putting of Hindenburg, therefore, in nominal 
command at this moment is, as I have said, merely 
political. What is militarily important is the real power 
given to his Chief of the Staff, Ludendorff, a man whose 
high \ alue is everywhere recognised. And it is to be 
presumed that Ludendorff will do whatever remaining 
work has to be done in attempting even at this eleventh 
hour to obtain an inconclusixe peace. 
But the really essential thing we have to remember 
is that no difference in personalities, no clianiies in com- 
mand or even policies, can note seriously affect the sttuation. 
If voii had put at the head of the army of Pans in 
December 1870. any genius you might name, if wu had 
put there Napoleon 'orMarlborough, the issue would have 
been the same as it was under Trochu^ lo organise 
such sorties from the siege as that of Buzenval, and 
Champigny, for instance, was a matter as much wthm 
the ability of a tenth rate as of a first-rate commander 
and the defeat of such a sortie under such conditions ot 
enemy superiority and of siege, was equally certain 
whoever might be in command. 
The Central Empires have massed upon the VVest 
about half of their effecti\-es. They have seen the line 
which thev with difficulty hold upon the East suddenly 
increased by 700 miles, and the number of formations 
immediately oi^posed to them further increased m that 
field by several di\isions. 
Though blundering so as to allow themselves to be 
besieged their prolonged defence hitherto has depended 
entirely 'upon superiority in number and in munition- 
ment ■ That superiority'is gone. No regrouping and no 
changing of direction can affect so simple a situation. 
The siege will now run its course-saving political 
diversions— normally and perhaps rapidly. 
The Somme Offensive 
THE moaning and value of the uninterrupted 
Allied offensive on the Somme front is grasped 
less continuously by the public at home than it 
is carried on by the armies in Picardy. Its 
alternation of territorial gains and preparations for each 
such stroke correspond to a similar rise and fall in the 
interest 'it excites on the supposed i)rogress of its action. 
But the operations on the Sommeought not tobe judged 
in this fasliion. It is not their object .to accpure narrow 
and long belts of ground alone, n )r even to reduce one 
by one successive lines as the enemy ■ construct them. 
It is their object to maintain an unbroken superior pressure 
ipon a certlin chosen sector of the <^^y ^ ^^',.^ 
to keep this pressure at such a high Pf^'^l:'\^^l^^, 
borrow a term from physical science) that the enem> 
sS be compelled 'to" concentrate here a very la ge 
fraction of his available effectives, that his loss shall 
glt-e hJni increasing anxiety. That the perpe ual neces- 
sity of resting and replacing men under ^'J^^^^ f ^"J 
shall exhaust his numbers, and that ht shall be 
prevented altogether, or perilously hampered in h s 
attempt -which must come sooner or later -to saxt his 
