September 7, 191b LAND & WATER 
Another Problem in Strategy 
By Colonel Feyler 
IN a recent article we examined the theories of 
General von Bernhardi and it would now be inter- 
esting to revert to the essentially military part of 
his work and especially to sec whether the present 
war has consisted of a close application of his programme, 
and, if that has been so, to note how far his foresight has 
been justified in events. Such , an examination will 
consist in a review of results accomplished and will, 
perhaps, explain why the German Staff, after abandoning 
their plan in the West at the end of 1914, resumed it 
with such violence before Verdun in 19 16. To start 
with, let us quote some of Bernhardi's general priticiplcs : 
War is the conflict of two opposing forces, represented 
by armies. Victory belongs to the State whose army shall 
crush that of its adversary. The army which combines 
superior mobility with a numerical superiority will have 
most chance of effecting the said crushing. The first 
of these factors is more important than the second. 
Numerical superiority is indeed only necessary at the 
point where it is desired to obtain a decisive result. It is, 
therefore, necessary to be able to operate as rapidly as pos- 
sible in order to effect this greater concentration of force. 
This is also necessary in order to obtain an initiative which 
shall upset the enemy's plans, as well as to obtain the effect 
of surprise which increases the advantage of the initia- 
tive. Thus mobility increases the effect of mass. 
Taking these principles for granted, let us examine 
Bernhardi's comparison of the position of Germany, 
France, Russia and Great Britain, as viewed thus ; 
France can, at the start, put into line as many men as 
Germany, but only by immcdiatelv exhausting all her re- 
serves. The only possible increase would be from 100,000 
to 120,000 indigenous soldiers from Algeria and Tunis, 
good enough to be used in Europe. 
Russia has, it is true, great superiority in numbers, but 
these cannot all be used in Europe. The Siberian and 
Turkestan corps would have to be left on the Eastern 
Frontier to watch China and Japan. To maintain order 
in the interior of the Empire troops would have to be 
left in Finland, at Petrograd and at Moscow, and the 
army of the Caucasus could not be taken away from that 
district. Notwithstanding these deductions the con- 
siderable total of at least 2,000,000 men would remain. 
The Russian people, however, is hardly capable of under- 
standing foreign politics, and it is hardly conceivable 
that it would support a war with much enthusiasm. 
As for Great Britain, her land forces do not enter into con- 
sideration. Months would pass before the figure of 150,000 
men (the regular army) could be exceeded, and, in addition, 
this regular army supplies the reserve for the Colonial 
Troops which would render their use on the Continent 
very dangerous in case of unrest in the Colonies. At all 
events British troops could only serve as auxiharies and 
Britain's great effort would be limited to sea warfare. 
This sea warfare, however, could only be subsidiary to 
land warfare, and the best way for Germany, in her 
acknowledged inferiority at sea, to gain a sea victory 
would be to obtain a crushing victory on land. 
The above general premises form a basis for the Austro- 
German plan of action. 
The enemy on sea is to be avoided by a victory on land 
and every effort must be strained to obtain this victory. 
Bernhardi reahses, however, that victory on land will 
not be a mere walk-over despite numerous advantages, 
and will only be obtained if Germany, while striking very 
rapid blows, prepares for a durable resistance should 
these blows fail. It is essential, however, that they 
should not fail, and to this end every effort was made 
to obtain superior mobility. 
These are, roughly, the fundamental principles of 
Bernhardi's teaching. It is noticeable that they under- 
lay all recent military reform in Germany ; essentially 
they amount to the principal of having a peace army 
as nearly as possible equal to the war army and ready to 
strike the decisive blow. The reserves, especially those 
of the second ban, would provide the necessary resisting 
force should the said blow not succeed. It is further 
noticeable that the general plan of campaign followed 
these fundamental principles. An attempt was made 
to destroy promptly the French forces, as being the 
most formidable of Germany's enemies but under the 
disadvantage of not having sufficient reserves. It was 
not thought that Britain, practically without an army, 
would be able to supply this deficiency. After this ^ 
blow Russia was to be attacked and it was calculated that 
a Russian offensive would soon collapse owing to lack 
of national enthusiasm. 
After two years of war there is no room for doubt 
that the above plan of campaign was closely followed. 
During the first year especially no variation from Bern- 
hardi's programme was apparent. The campaign was 
conducted just as a study of German organisation proved 
that it would be conducted, and victory was sought just 
where this organisation had prepared to find it. Let us 
now examine the results of the plan, and compare each 
separate intention with its execution. 
First Intention : "To destrov, by means of the perfectly 
prepared active army, the French forces which were 
lacking in reserves." a- ■ ^ 
'Result: The French army was not destroyed and sufficient 
reserves are still in existence at the present tune to carry 
on with the war. The perfectly prepared German forces 
obtained no decisive victory and it was necessary to 
support them, not only bv the first reserve, but, m some 
cases, by hastily prepared formations from the second 
reserve (cf. Battle of l-'landcrs). 
Second Intention : " To destroy the French army before 
Great Britain could supply the French lack of reserves, 
or, prepare an army of her own." 
Result : Great Britain had time to prepare a land army 
which now occupies in France a front considerably 
larger than the original British front and has plenty of 
reserves. A great error of appreciation on the part of the 
German Staff was proved by the fact that the British 
Colonies moved only to support and not to hamper the 
Mother Country. Not only was it unnecessary for the 
150,000 men to act as reserves for the Colonial army, 
but the Colonies themselves provided large contingents 
for the armies in France, etc. 
Third Intention : " To transfer the first line troops to the 
£ast, to repulse the Russian oftensive, and to break the 
moral of the I^ussian people. 
Result : The Russian offensive was indeed repulsed, but the 
Russian moral was unbroken. Russia regained her 
strength assisted by Japan before whom it was not necessary 
to immobilise a Siberian corps. 
Fourth Intention: "To gain the mastery of the sea by 
means of a victory on land." 
Result : Neither France, Russia, nor Great Britain have 
been sufficientlv vanquished on land to create the slightest 
impression upon British command of the sea. Rather, 
the balance of naval power has gone against Germany 
since the battle of Jutland. 
The reader can conclude whether these statements 
are correct or not. He will see that Germany for many 
years prepared an army whose superior mobility was to 
compensate for the enemies' superior numbers. He 
will see that the programme failed of realisation, that 
the carefully prepared army obtained no decision, and 
that the numerical superiority of the AUies was not 
brought to naught by the superior German mobility. 
The German leaders must have been the first to reaUse 
these facts, more especially when the taking of Erzerum 
by the Russians definitely put Turkey on the defensive 
and set a limit to the long prepared turning movement 
against British power. It must have been evident to 
them that the programme of conquest would now have 
to be replaced by the scheme of durable resistance in 
defence of the national soil. They did not, however, 
wish to substitute this new programme without a last 
great effort. To proceed against Russia could not have 
produced sufficiently rapid results, for, however exhausted 
the Russians might be, it would have been necessary to 
push too far into the enemies' country before peace could 
be obtained. To crush France and, through France, 
Great Britain offered more favourable prospects. For 
this reason was recommenced the scheme which in 1914 
had failed of accomplishment and which was once again 
to astound the world by its renewed vigour. It was 
resolved to storm the fortress of Verdun. 
