LAND & WATtK 
Septombor 2T, iQif 
The Cerna Voda Bridge. 
[London yewi Agency. 
Eastern frontier from the Carpathians to the Baltic, 
becaiise upon these enormous fronts the enemy is still 
able to maintain a sufficient number of effectives to 
conipel siege conditions ; and this state of affairs will last 
until his line breaks somewhere. 
There was a moment in the early summer when it 
looked as though a true war of movement could be 
restored on the Eastern front through the destruction of 
the Austrian armies between the Roumanian frontier 
and the Pripet .Marshes, but just enough forces were 
brought up to re-establish equilibrium for a time at least, 
though it is an equilibrium which the enemy knows to be 
very precarious, and which upon the southern part of the 
hue is still violently debated in front of the critical 
point of Halicz. But if the Bulgarian armies are 
■ ' ited. that is. if the Allies can effpct a junction upon 
l.'il-anan territory (for that is what the phrase reall\- 
means), observe what follows : You have certainly addecl 
to the new front of 350 miles on the Roumanian border 
the whole front of the Austrian Danube and Save very 
mountainous country, it is true, but not Alpine, and that 
addition of line would carry the stretching of the enemy's 
effectives past the breaking point. There is not the 
slightest doubt of that. A defeat of Bulgaria by the 
Allies before the close of thefpresent season would restore 
the war of movement upon one sector of the great ring 
and when such a war ot movement begins, it will spread 
like tire in dry grass along the lines to the right and the 
left. Conversely, if Bulgaria maintains her position and 
can keep either opponent at arms' length to the north and 
to the south, the present position endures in the East for 
some months to come. The whole Bulgarian effort at this 
moment is of that nature. The Bulgarian commanders 
under their German (ommander -in-chief are occupied in 
keeping within bounds a threat from the north and a 
threat from the south. 
The plan adopted is now quite clear. Of the original 
ten or twelve divisions drawn up to watch the mixed 
army of Sarrail, the greater part were left stretched out 
from in front of Monastir to the line of the Struma 
The mission was givtn them of receiving the shock of the 
Allied offensive based on Salonika, and holding firm 
1-or this purpose by much the greater part, of course of 
J he whole Bulgariaa army was needed. But a con- 
siderable proportion wa. detached for the simiUtaneous 
effort to be made in the north. This fragment was, just 
before Roumania made war, five divisions strong, of which 
four were the full Bulgarian divisions — 50 per cent, 
larger than our own— and a 5th, a mixed division partly 
Bulgarian apparently and partly Austrian. In the first 
days of the war, or possibly just"^ before war was declared, 
these five divisions had swelled to at least seven ; Turkish 
troops were present and very probably another division 
had been withdrawn from the south. The talk about 
numerous German troops being added to the Bulgarian 
forces here is very doubtful. There are certainly a very 
large proportion of German and Austrian heavy pieces, 
for that is the arm upon which' the enemy universally 
depends ; his whole theory of action to advance now 
depends upon it. It is certain that there is a considerable 
proportion of German officers present, and we are told 
that the Higher Command here is now wholly (ierman, 
but the great mass of the infantry which is doing the work 
is Bulgarian. 
That work consists in clearing the Dobrudja and. as we 
have said at some length in these columns for the last 
two weeks, reaching the great Cerna Voda bridge. If 
they hold that bridge and compel its destruction by the 
retiring Roumanian army, all chance of the Allies meeting 
on Bulgarian soil is, for this season, at an end.. 
Had the Roumanians stood strongly upon the defensive 
along the passes of the Carpathians and used in conjunc- 
tion with the Russians the unique opportunity which the 
( erna Voda Bridge gives of turning the Danube obstacle, 
there might be a very different story to tell. For reasons 
of whicl^of course, we know nothing, but which no doubt 
were sufiicient to convince the higher commands of the 
•Mlies, that course was not pursued. Perhaps three, 
perhaps four, Roumanian divisions at the most, some, 
say only two— the evidence is very conflicting— were 
entrusted with the duty of holding the Dobrudja, that is, 
a perfectly open line 100 miles in extent. To these 
some unknown number of Russians were to be added 
with very difficult communications behind them : the 
sea which has proved insufficient for full munitionment 
under modern conditions— unless one has quite exceptional 
tonnage at one's disposal and a very short passage— and 
a single railway broken in gauge upon the Russian front. 
In otlier words, a numerically inferior force suffering 
further from inferiority in the calibre of its guns, their 
