10 
LAND & WATER 
September 21, iqi6 
Captain Sims' Critique 
By Arthur Pollen 
I DEALT last week witli one of three reasons 
why it seemed that Captain Sims was mistaken 
in saying that as onr general command of 
the sea was complete enough for our purposes 
so long as the German fleet was contained, there 
was no need for the British fleet to have attempted 
to force a decisive action with the (iermans on the 
31st May. My hrst reason for thinking liim wrong 
was that the German llc*et came out obviously to raise 
German prestige and hence to improve the vioral of the 
nation. It was clearly a military object of the highest 
importance to us to turn their adventure into defeat, 
because by so doing we should depress (ierman courage 
and resolution more than the High Seas Fleet had ever 
lioped to raise it. But a real and final destruction of the 
<ierman fleet would have made certain further naval 
operations feasible which must have been of a still more 
direct military importance, .^nd there would have 
followed, both from the defeat and from the operation 
that it made feasible, economic results the value of which 
are quite incalculable. Let us deal with the naval opera- 
tions first. 
One of the things that more than anything else has 
puzzled lay .students of the naval side of the war, is the 
precise reason why British warships cannot enter the 
Sound nor German warships, the Channel. They know 
generally that narrow waters can be mined and clearly 
lend themselves to effective defence by submarines and 
destroyers. But they also know that mines are not an 
absolute bar to the progress of a fleet, for the simple 
reason that they can be removed ; and that a fleet, 
adequately protected by light craft, can face torpedo 
attack, whether from the surface or from below, with a 
reasonable chance of protecting itself altogether. Why 
then, they ask, should we regard the Sound and the 
Germans the Channel as waters that cannot be entered ? 
The answer is, that the best defence that a fleet has 
against torpedo attack is its speed. Capital ships cannot 
hang about where destroyers can attack them from 
imder cover of the land or submarines from the unseen 
depths. If, then, a mine field has to be removed, which 
can only be done by sweeping, and even with the best 
appliances is not a very rapid process, the craft engaged 
in it must be on the spot, and finish their work before the , 
capital ships come upon the scene to use the channel 
whi.h they make. How are these craft to be protected ? 
If they are only covered by light cruisers, the heavier 
ships of the enemy will come down and drive them in 
and then have the mine sweepers at their mercy. Their 
own capital ships cannot come to the rescue, except — 
ex-hypothesis — to fight in very disadvantageous circum- 
stances. Thus the function of mine fields and torpedo- 
craft disposed for the blocking of narrow waters is not 
primarily the •creation of an impassable physical barrier, 
but the establishment of an obstacle that can only be 
removed by a lengthy process, during Which the craft 
engaged in it must be supported by the strongest possible 
naval force. They cannot be thwarted or the barrier 
removed without the main fleet being involved. If this 
is a correct analy.sis, the removal of the enemy's main 
fleets alters the problem altogether. If there were 
no German battlesliips nor battle cruisers, a passage into 
the Baltic could be forced and a fleet sent in adequately 
protected against underwater attack. The first result, 
then, of the total destruction of the German fleet would 
be that a junction between the British and Russian navies 
would be feasible. What would be its mihtary value ? 
Invasion from the Sea 
The left of the German line in Rus.sia rests on the Gulf 
of Higa, which is 100 miles east and about 100 miles 
north of Memel. There is, therefore, in the rear of the 
(iermans over 200 miles of the coast of Courland open to 
invasion. If the Haltic were opened, if there was no 
German battle fleet to interfere with the operations. 
transports could be loaded with men, guns, and horses at 
Reval and Kronstadt, and a force landed north or south 
of Libau. It would compel the witlidrawal of the whole 
German line, and such a withdrawal might easily be 
decisive. There is no lack of men in Russia, probably 
no lack of shipping in Russian ports. With the Sound 
open, the provision of the requisite shipping would 
jMcsent no difticulties anyway. The point need not be 
argued in detail, for it is clear that if the Allied control 
of the Baltic were absolute, as it would be if the High 
Seas Fleet were destroyed, there would not only be 200 
miles of the Russian Courland coast open to invasion, 
but the best part of 500 miles of German coast as well. 
When Sir Ian Hamilton's forces landed in Gallipoli, 
in the face of the most scientific defences conceivable, 
there was not wanting those who said that this was a 
final proof that England would be successfully 
invaded by Germany. But they omitted from their 
calculation the governing condition at Gallipoli. It was, 
of course, that the invading force possessed an absolute 
command of the sea. But they were probably right in 
interpreting the event to mean that if defences are military 
only, they cannot suffice to prevent a properly supported 
landing any more than the best trenches can resist 
penetration, if the right kind of force in adequate quantity 
is brought against them. And at (iallipoli^the landing 
was attempted at a very limited number of points, and 
those made as impregnable as the engineering and artillery 
skill of the enemy could make them. Any such prepara- 
tions would be impossible over the whole of the many 
hundred miles of Germany's Baltic coast. The first, 
therefore, and the most obvious of the military advan- 
tages that the complete destruction of the German 
fleet would make possible, would be an Anglo- Russian 
invasion from the Baltic. 
But. just as mine fields, torpedo defences and so forth, 
cannot be overcome except by the ultimate backing of 
overwhelming naval force, so, conversely, if there is no 
very formidable naval force at the disposal of the enemy, 
minefields and barriers can be pushed into his own imme- 
diate neighbourhood. In other words, instead of main- 
taining, as we now do, a long-range blockade of Germany, 
we could, if no German fleet existed, establish a short 
range blockade. Instead of mining them out of the 
Channel, we could mine the (iermans iiilo their own 
harbours. Instead of netting their submarines out of 
our waters, we could net and blockade them into their 
own. We cannot do so now because the establishment 
of barriers of this kind is the work of small craft, because 
it takes time, and because it has to be done by ships, 
either largely stationary or moving very slowly. It has 
to be done by ships that cannot protect themselves 
while they are doing it. But if there was no fear of their 
being attacked by very formidable units, the problem of 
protecting them woxild be reduced to very simple pro- 
portions indeed. There would thus follow, from the 
final and complete destruction of the ("lerman battle 
fleet, the possibility of relieving British and Allied shipping 
from the formidable toll which the (ierman submarines 
take. And that this toll is, in spite of American protests 
and of German promises, both intrinsically heavy and 
taken without the least scruple as to safeguarding the 
lives of passengers and crew, is unfortunately still the most 
disconcerting feature of the naval position. " To be almost 
altogether quit of it, would then, be an enormous relief 
to the whole Allied undertaking, which, it must never be 
forgotten, rests solely on the sea service that British 
naval supremacy guarantees. 
Economic Worth of Complete Sea Victory 
But this again does not exhaust the case, for, for neariy 
two years now, the whole resources of the British ship- 
building industry, together with a large proportion of 
the steel makers' capacitv, has been devoted— and quite 
necessarily devoted— to building battleships, battle 
