September 28, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
5. 
Next, let us recall the nature of the ground over which 
these communications pass. 
As has been pointed out already in these columns 
the geological formation of the Dobrudja is calcareous. 
Therefore the soil is generally dry and hard, . though the 
exceptionally heavy rain at the end of the recent battle 
spoilt it and hampered movement on both sides. An 
even more important consequence of this geological for- 
mation is that the water supply, as we have seen, is bad. 
Any considerable force acting in the Dobrudja is gravely 
affected by this question of water supply, especially, I 
believe, at this season of the year. A force ', acting 
along the north-western side, relying upon the river, has 
obvious advantages in this respect against a force acting 
along the sea. There is, however, a certain scanty 
supply from deep wells in the villages, and road traffic and 
the single railway can to some extent supply the defect. 
So far as field of fire is concerned, and opportunity for 
continuous deplo3mient and observation, thje Dobrudja 
changes gradually in type as one goes northward from 
the south, and as one goes towards the Black Sea from 
the Danube. Roughly speaking, the southern portion 
is more broken and more wooded than the northern, and 
the north-western or Danube side more broken and more 
wooded than the eastern or Black Sea side. Really 
open country is reached in the belt which extends about 
two days' march south of the railway — though even here 
right near the Danube in the neighbourhood of Rasova 
and to the south of that place there is a good deal of 
broken ground, steep escarpments, and wood. 
It is in this belt of open ground that the main battle 
for the defence of the railway was bound to take place 
and has taken place. It appears to be still in progress, 
but to have so far turned in favour of our Allies. 
Now let us gather as best we may from two or three 
fragmentary sentences of information provided, the 
nature of the operations, and of the main defensive line — 
which Mackensen failed to reach, and on which our Allies 
in the last resort proposed to cover the Czerna Voda- 
Constanza railway. 
In order to advance against the Roumanian, Russian 
and Serbian forces which had the task of defending the 
railway and the bridge, Mackensen's six to eight 
divisions and his considerable number of heavy guns had 
no good road so long as they kept towards the Danube 
side of the field, and it was upon this side that they elected 
to advance the mass of their forces, probably governed 
by the water supply. They went in rather dense for- 
mation, comparable as I have said in a previous article 
to the " phalanx " of last year (though, of course, acting 
upon a much smaller scale) and struck the advance 
body of their opponents upon a line which we marked in 
the article of last week Karaorman-Parachioi. The ad- 
vanced Roumanian forces retired, and this action was 
the source of the foolish telegram describing it as a 
" decisive victory," which the German Emperor sent out 
last week. 
The real struggle came nearly a week later on the 17th 
i8th and 19th of this month and was engaged, not 
upon the main Rasova-Tuzla defensive line (which 
Mackensen failed to reach), but about six or seven miles 
south of that line. 
It took the following form : 
Mackensen's main blow was delivered along the arrows, 
A A in the broken and wooded country lying in front of 
the line joining Rasova and Cobadinul. His line was, 
of course, further extended (though thinly), towards the 
east, so as to guard against being turned by his right. 
This extension had passed and occupied the port of 
Mangalia before the main battle was joined. But 
Mackensen's main blow was delivered where the arrows 
marked A on Sketch I. are shown. 
It failed in its effect. The Russo-Roumanian counter- 
stroke was delivered upon the 21st against the weaker, 
eastern part of Mackensen's line along the arrows B-B. 
The weight of the blow fell upon a front of 14 miles from 
Kazil through Enghez to Carachioi, which is a point ten 
miles south-east of Tuzla. Upon the delivery of this 
stroke, which was in the nature of a turning movement 
trying to get round Mackensen's right, the usual con- 
tradictory accounts appeared, each side giving its own 
version. But a comparison of the two clearly shows that 
the advantage lay with the Russian and Roumanian 
forc?3. 
In the first place, there was a capture of guns by the 
latter. Eight field pieces were taken. In the second 
place, the next heavy bit of fighting we hear of on the 
following day, September 22nd, is still further south at 
Mustapha, a point on, or near, the single line railway 
which runs through the Dobrudja from Medgidia to 
Dobritch. and so to the Roumanian railway uniting 
Rustchuk to Varna. 
The news of this fighting of the 22nd in the neigh- 
bourhood of Mustapha did not reach London until Sunday 
the 24th. There has been no news since, save tfie vague 
remark that the enemy had fallen back to a prepared 
position, and the mention of 5,000 Bulgarians being 
found on the field covered by the Roumanian advance. 
What would seem, therefore, to be the general result 
so far is this : Mackensen having struck with the bulk 
of his forces upon his left "against the Russo-Roumanian 
right, and using what was certainly a superior weight of 
heavy guns, attempted to break through. He did not 
break through. He was held ; was counter-attacked 
upon his right by the Russo-Roumanian left,, and fell 
back about one day's march to the south. At that point 
we leave an action which is, perhaps, still in progress. 
The reader will be struck by the fact that Mackensen j 
though dependent as the enemy always is for his success 
upon a superiority in heavy- pieces and their munition- 
ment, did not mass this advantage of his along the single 
railway, but to the north and west of it between that line 
and the Danube, while it was the Russo-Roumanians 
who mainly used the railway. The explanation of this 
is probably that the supply of his pieces was assured to 
Mackensen in spite of the absence of good roads and of a 
railway by the nature of the soil and the dry weather 
which favoured his advance, but broke at the end of it. 
A force acting in Salisbury Plain, for instance, over 
similar hard, dry land, open, and covered only with 
short grass, could be supplied in good weather by petrol 
traffic almost anywhere. And after all, his total dis- 
tance from the lateral line on which his rail head stood, 
the railway line along the frontier from the Danube to 
Varna, was not 80 miles, even at the furthest point 
of his advance. It is possible, however, that this dis- 
tance was enough to handicap him and his plan and to 
lead to his defeat and retirement. 
In what strength he now holds the line upon which he 
has fallen back ; whether as the communiques suggest, 
he intends to hold that line and merely to contain any 
further advance of his opponent, or whether he will 
attempt a new blow towards the north,- only the future 
•, can show. But we must not neglect the truth that if 
Mackensen chooses merely to keep a Bulgarian force upon 
the defensive here, and if he succeeds in so remaining, he 
has achieved a certain negative result. He has failed, it is 
true, to secure the Constanza line and the Cerna Voda 
bridge and therefore he has hitherto suffered a strategic 
defeat so far as his main object was concerned. But he 
