LAND & WATER 
October 5, 1916 
" caught in an n'on ring " of their " annihilation," and 
I know not what other nonsense. Even a single divisinn 
successfully envclo}x:d would mean the capture of at 
least six -tmies as many field guns alone as the emniN' 
can show (or claim) of pieces of all calibres. There was 
no envelopment. There was a bad squeeze and the Id^s 
of many wagons along the road. It is a pity that the 
German communiques are now all falsified, becaiisc it 
makes them almost useless in the study of the war. 
Until lately they were, as I have often shown, a mixtuix- 
of acute detail and some falsehoods, but since the 
Verdun failure they have become more and more fan- 
tastic and latterly, since the Somme offensive and the 
last war loan, they hardly make sense. 
The affair is an excellent example of the value of gnod 
lateral communications used by a commander who is 
weak in men but strong in materiel. Falkenhayn liad 
been able through the possessi(fn of lateral communu a- 
^ions, which the I^oumanians here lack, to use with 
double effect the insufficient forces at his disposal, and 
how this is so the accompanying sketch will, I think, 
show. 
!I 
Muhlbrch 
'^<^ Hermrmnstarit 
ReJ 
\ XTower 
Petroscmj I -';^ri^^"^^ • 
](PuIkan' '^^ Chimtu 
to TtTCUS 30 
The main lateral communications of the enemy, to 
repose upon which he retired when the Roumanians 
crossed the frontier upon their entry into the war was, as 
the reader will remember, the line of the Maros which has 
a railway along its whole length and a good road as well. 
This line at its southern end is continued by a branch 
along the Aalley of the Streu to Hatzeg and so through 
the Merisor defile to Petrosen\' and the foot of the Vulcan 
Pass. Now about a day's march up the Maros line near 
a town called by the Germans ]\Iuhlbacli, there comes out 
a branch line which leads to Hcrmannstadt. It follows 
the road between the two places and goes imdcr the 
EsccUo hill by a tunnel, which is about 600 feet above 
the lexel of Hcrmannstadt and 1,200 feet above that of the 
Lower Maros. The whole trajectory from the Hcrmann- 
stadt point of concentration to the Hatzeg point is, I 
think, rather less than a hundred miles. 
With these communications considered Falkenhayn's 
action is fairly clear. He mustered out of a total force 
equal to or perhaps even less than the comparatively 
small two separated Roumanian detachments, one of 
which was acting across the Vulcan Pass and the other 
40 miles away across the Red Tower Pass, a couple of 
bodies. One of these enemy bodies Falkenhayn con- 
centrated upon Hatzeg, the other upon Hermanstadt. 
He retained a third body as a mass of manoeuvre. He 
first of all added this mass of manceuvre to the first body 
at Hatzeg, and thus had a superiority of force against 
the Roumanians as they were advancing through the 
Meriser defile. He thus checked the Roumanians here 
and thrust them back upon the Vulcan Pass. Mean- 
while, the force' at Hcrmannstadt was being gravely 
threatened. He next, therefore, stood fast upon the 
defensive near the Vulcan Pass, and brought his mass of 
manoeuvre round again by rail to Hcrmannstadt, thus 
rcinfordng the body there and appearing again in superior 
numbers against the Roumanians, who stood three miles 
from the town. With that local superiority he thrust this 
second body back upon the Red Tower Pass, just failed 
to secure their complete destruction by a flank march in 
surprise, which cut their communications and, though 
they sa\'ed themselves, compelled them to retire fi\'e 
miles behind the frontier to Chineni, as we ha\-e seen 
above. 
The Roumanians had, unfortunately, no corresponding 
lateral communications upon (heir side, and the enemy 
had thus in this field in spite of a total inferiority of 
number or, at any rate, no great superiority, the power, 
through mobility to increase very largely" his striking 
efficiency. 
But it does not seem that this offensi\'e power, due to 
a superior mobility, permits the enemy to press his 
ad\antage through the mountains. The Roumanians 
appear to be able to hold their own upon the defensive at 
both points, for they ha\e concurrently with this pressure 
exercised upon them on the two Passes to the north, foimd 
it possible to throw a force across the Danube, and that 
movement, which may pro\-e of the utmost importance 
if it can be maintained, must next be studied. 
The Cfossing of the Danube 
It will be remembered that we saw in connection with 
Mackensen's advance into the Dobrudja, that he neces- 
sarily relied upon the impossibilitj' of his enemies crossing 
the stream. He thought his left flank perfectly secure. 
That stream was not passable sa\e by an overwhelming 
superiority in heavy artillery or through some element of 
surprise. 
That there has been an overwhelming superiority of 
heavy artillery upon the Roumanian side, we know to 
be impossible. The success hitherto obtained, therefore, 
is certainly due to surprise. 
How far it can be maintained only the future can show, 
but what we can already study in detail is the character 
of the surprise spring by our Allies upon Mackensen. 
It was very interesting to follow. 
The northern bank of the Danube is, as we hav'e had 
many occasions to explain, marked by a broad belt of 
marshes, quite impassable to troops sa\e at a few favoured 
spots where hard ground comes right down to the river. 
Mackensen clearly believed that there were onlv two such 
{)laces upon his rear, those opposite Rustchuk and Tur- 
tukii. At the first, Giurgevo, a railway from Bucharest 
comes right down to the river and runs along a stage right 
upon the water side. That crossing we may be very certain 
was thoroughly watched and a concentration of men and 
guns upon the Roumanian side could easily be seen, for 
Oltenitza 
tjiunjevo 
Rustchuk 
there is a railway leading up to Rusuhuk and .serving that 
town. Oltenitza, opposite Turtukai was, we may be cer- 
tain, similarly watched, and it appears to have been taken 
for granted by the (ierman Commander of the Bulgarians 
that the northern shore between these two points would 
afford no sufficient " jumping off place " for the Rou- 
manian troops. 
It is not surprising that this misjudgment should have 
occurred, for the whole stretch of 38 miles is, as to its 
western half, a mass of marshes and shallow meres of 
which the largest is the Pctrikn', while its eastern half 
was almost entirely occupied by the great Greaca mere 
with only a strip of bad marshy soil between it and the 
river. 
But it so happens that in the eastern half of this dis- 
trict, taking advantage of belts of sand and a line of 
k 
