10 
LAND & WATER 
October 5, iCjit 
absolute victory to the certainty of inevitable defeat, 
might disconcert a people much more conspicuous fcir 
self control than tiie Germans of to-day. Will this 
fear lead to a revival of submarine attacks of the character 
that we saw in July and August 1915 and in April of 
this year ? 
There can be no doubt at all about the pressure which 
is being brought to bear upon the Cicrman (lovernmcnt 
from within. The reason is obvious. The Cerman people 
is convinced that it needs only this to bring England to 
her knees. This conviction rests less on a calculation 
of the economic and military consequences that should 
arise from our sliipping being sunk ; more on the blood- 
thirsty belief tiiat it is the drowning of women and 
children that will frighten us into surrender. \Vc must 
remember that the only medal struck to celebrate a 
submarine success, was issued in honour not of a mihtary 
achievement but of the most comprehensive single effort in 
murder on record. When (lermanv v/ent wrong in the 
belief that f rightfulness had military merits, she went 
wrong altogether. 
Tirpitz's Promise 
It was in December 1914, that that hearty old sailor 
von Tirpitz ga\e his countrymen the specific promise 
that a submarine blockade could reduce England to far 
grimmer straits than any to which the British blockade 
could reduce Germany. At that time neither side had 
tried its hand at blockading at all. Ours indeed, had 
hardly even come into full operation a year afterwards 
But von Tirpitz began his in February 1915, and so had 
first innings. The thing no doubt took the belligerent 
and neutral world entirely by surprise. The neutrals 
could not believe that so cruel, unscrupulous a thing 
could be done. The belligerents were entirely unprepared 
with any adequate means of defence. And, as the 
Germans began with a comparatively small equipment 
of submarines, the start was somewhat tentative. Since 
then there have been four phases in this field of war. The 
first ran from February 1915 until the middle of Sep- 
tember of that year. The second was the Mediterranean 
campaign of last winter. The third was the German 
effort in northern waters which Tirpitz had been preparing 
for ever since the previous autvmin, and began in March 
and nominally terminated on May 4th, 1916. The fourth 
is that which has been proceeding since, both in the 
Mediterranean, in the Baltic and in the waters surrounding 
these islands. 
This periodicity has been brought about by two factors. 
In the first phase the Germans did not take the American 
objection to their proceedings very seriously, and the 
campaign ended owing to the counter-measures of the 
British Admiralty. In the winter months' of 1915-1916 
the German submarines were sent to the Mediterranean, 
where in the meantime the Austrians had succeeded in 
constructing considerable numbers for themselves. It was 
an easy hunting ground, partl\' becau.se the area was too 
large for effective patrol, partly because friendly neutrals 
east, west and south could keep the submarines supphed 
with all the necessaries of their trade. The interval was 
devoted to an effort to narrow the American controversy 
by getting Washington to admit that if a liner was 
armed it became a warship, and therefore not entitled 
to the consideration due to trading craft. At one time 
Bernsdorf had every reason to think that President 
Wilson would accept this doctrine, and on the strength 
of his promises, Tirpitz prepared and threatened a 
campaign of unprecedented ruthlessness that was to 
begin on March ist and finish the war in Germany's 
favour. But Bernsdorf failed, Washington stiffened 
and the German Government, rather than force a quarrel 
with America, dismissed Tirpitz. In two days all Ger- 
many was ablaze with agitation. The Emperor j-ielded 
and the campaign began. We all remember how the 
average losses doubled, trebled and almost quadrupled 
in successive weeks. Everything was sunk without 
warning, and amongst them the Sussex with many 
Americans on board. The President, thereupon, brought 
ipAh houses of Congress to heel, and faced Germany with 
an ultimatum. The surrender of May 4th was the result. 
The promise was definitely made that no ship — the 
promise was not limited to liners — should be sunk with- 
out the humane formalities which America from the very 
bogiiming had insisted. It was the end of f rightfulness. 
But Austria was not a party to the jiromise, and the more 
moderate methods have never pre\ailed in the Mediter- 
ranean, where German boats could do what they pleased 
without fear of bringing things to a crisis at \\'ashingtoni 
for as they flew no flag and spoke the same language as 
their Allies, it was easy to throw the responsibility for 
such murders as those that occurred in the case of the 
I'irginian-on to Austria. Meantime, the Germans had 
the Baltic, North Sea, Channel and Atlantic to them- 
selves, and it is to be presumed that thej' kept suffi- 
ciently within their undertaking to explain American 
inaction. 
The question now is, will Mediterranean methods, 
which prevailed in our own waters before May 4th,. be 
resumed once more at pojiular dictation ? It depends 
ujjon whether the Chancellor dare tell the truth in this 
matter to the people's representatives. It will not be a 
\ery easy business bringing them to their senses. How 
far they are from it can be judged from the manifesto of 
the Bavarian Association for Beating England Quickly. 
Its prospectus is marked by a feature unfamiliar to 
readers of the German press. It is no less than an 
eloquent eulogy of \\hat Great Britain has done in the 
European war. It might almost have been written as an 
answer to those of our ovVn journalistic leaders who a few 
months ago were informing us and our Allies that we had 
so far done nothing. If the poynilar committee is to "be 
believed there never were assertions so wide of the mark. 
Why, it asks, in frantic terms, does the siege of Germany 
grow stricter every day ? Why are the neutrals forced 
to help in the blockade ? \\'hy have Italy, Portugal 
and Roumania joined our enemies ? Why is it certain 
that others will shortly follow ? In spite of Germany's 
^■ictories east, south and west, peace is further off than 
ever. The end of this murdering of the nations is not yet 
in sight. It is the fact that England's strength is un- 
broken that supplies the answer. She has Japan and 
America to help her, and at her bidding gigantic armies 
leap up in beaten Russia. No sooner do the Germans 
kill Frenchmen than Englishmen take their place. . She 
has time on her side ; she is indifferent to loss ; she is the 
most persistent of the Fatherland's enemies. Every 
threat she has iViade she has carried out. She has adopted 
conscription and has created an armv of miUions. Those 
of her people she has not forced to fight, she has forced 
into making munitions, wherewith to equip others to 
iight. She has shut Germany off from the high seas, 
and terrorised the maritime neutrals into forbidding her 
jiroducts that can only come from the sea. Every 
German colony has already or must shortly fall a victim 
to her. 
To hope for an understanding with an undefeated 
luigland is dangerous self deception. She has resolved 
to destroy Germany, and if left undestroyed herself, 
this last threat she will carry out as she has the others. 
\'ou cannot hit her through her Allies because it is her 
strength that prevents them making a separate peace. 
I^ut if she is beaten they all fall with her. 
Most fortunately there is a good side to all of this. 
I'or if England is the most dangerous, she is also the 
most vulnerable of Germany's foes. She is an island and 
an island lives or dies as its shipping floats or sinks. 
It is the lesson of three centuries that England can only 
be beaten at sea. Destroy her marine and America is 
unable to help her. Can this be done ? The answer is 
undoubtedly yes. The past deeds of the German navy 
are guarantees of this, and it can, moreover, be done at 
no great cost, for as the battle off Skaggerak shows, 
the sacrifices in a sea fight are trivial compared with those 
on land. 
This manifesto it will be observed, does not mention 
the submarine specifically. It seems to pin its faith on 
the navy. But it is clear that it is more on the submarine 
than on the fleet that (iermany relies. The people are 
convinced for the moment that it is only fear of America 
that makes Holwegg hold his hand. Tirpitz, Revent- 
low, Buelow, and all that following are for telling America 
to go hang and damn the consequences. Their reasons 
are obvious. Germany's war spirit has somehow to be kept 
going ; and in the absence of victory, murder is its best 
tonic. There are more prudent voices that point out 
that this is a prir»-iple that will hardly work very well 
because even did the submarine campaign succeed, 
1. 
