October 5, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
II 
the indignation ot America would only substitute a 
new and ri-^!er paymaster for the Allies, in place of 
him whom Germany had temporarily brought down. 
So that the argument against quarrelling with America 
is represented to be as strong as ever. 
liut, of course, the real argument against the resump- 
tion of ruthlessness in the submarine campaign is strong 
enough by itself without dragging in America at all. It 
is that it cannot succeed. It has been tried and it has 
failed. It is undoubtedly believed in Germany that to 
adopt the sink at sight poHcy is to multiply the efficiency of 
the submarine campaign indefinitely. And, somewhat to 
my surprise, I find that there are people here who think 
there is ^something in it. But the real facts are perfectly 
simple and obvious, and are cjuite inconsistent \dth this 
theory. I have said earlier on that there were four 
phases in the submarine campaign. A careful analysis 
shows that the following principles can be deduced 
from them. 
Ratio of Submarine Success 
(i) If a given number of submarines are operating in 
the waters round Great Britain — a number we will 
assume to be normal — experience shows that a certain 
limited, but steady, toll can be taken of the shipping enter- 
ing and lea\'ing our ports. Let us, for purposes of argu- 
ment, call this toll an average of one ship per day. 
(2) If the number of submarines is doubled or trebled 
for a short time, the toll will rise, not in proportion to the 
number of submarines,, but in a somewhat smaller pro- 
portion. Thus, three times as many submarines may, 
for this short time, yield a toll of say double the normal 
or two ships a day. 
(3) If ships are sunk on sight, the chances of sub- 
marine success will increase by roughly fifty per cent. 
Thus three times the normal number of submarines pro- 
ceeding on the abnormal principle of sinking at sight, 
may be expected to raise the rate of loss from two a day 
to three. Here, too, however, the proviso must be added 
that the expectation of success must be limited in point 
of time. 
(4) The reason why increased numbers of submarines 
do not in the first place give a proportionaic increase in 
victims, nor can continue to take any increased toll for 
more than a short period, is this. There is an extensive 
and vigorous force engaged in protecting shipping and 
attacking submarines. It employs various methods and 
weapons, the general character of which is more or less 
familiar to readers of naval news. When the number of 
submarines is what I call normal, the rate of toll which the 
counter-campaign takes of them is fairly regular and con- 
stant. It can be compared with the number of foxes 
xilled in a given county by packs that are hunting say 
four days a week. There is a certain ratio of quarry to 
area, and the trophies will be proportional. But if the 
number of submarines is trebled, the law of chance is 
changed in favour of the hunters, because their 
opportunities are multiplied. It would not take any 
hunt long to bring the head of foxes down to normal, if, 
by some freak cause, they were suddenly multiplied 
by five. So, too, in the submarine campaign, where the 
under-water boats are greatly increased in numbers, 
the numbers that fall victims to our campaign is increased 
in a still higher proportion. 
The figures of the last year's autumn campaign, and 
of that of April of this year, bear out this contention 
conclusively. Throughout July and August, 1915, the 
numbers of submarines that came into the field increased 
week by week. The rate at which ships were taken in- 
ci-eased also. The exact rate at which submarines were 
sunk has never been published. But the results speak for 
themselves. It was early in September last, when the 
ships were falling faster than they had ever done before, 
that Mr. Balfour informed a startled world that Germany 
was the vctim of a complete delusion in this matter, and 
that her crime would turn out to be a blunder. Within 
a fortnight the whole thing had come virtually to an end ! 
Here the submarines are not only reduced to normal, but 
below it. We saw the same phenomenon in the seven 
weeks' campaign of last spring. The crisis came between 
the third and fourth week, and the rate of loss had fallen 
to normal before the German promise was given to 
America on May 4th. In both these cases we had the 
double factor at work m tavour ot the submarine. Tl^? 
numbers were increased and all proceeded on the lines 
of ruthless attack. But it was impossible to m:*-ntain the 
attack in full blast for more than five weeks in the first 
case, nor more than four in the second. Apart alto- 
gether then from any unpleasant consequences that might 
follow to Germany from America being forced to inter- 
vene, supposing Germany to adopt the old principle of 
ruthlessness, we mu.st recognise that we have very little 
to fear, and the Germans must realise that they have 
very little to hope, from any enhanced enemy effort 
in the submarine direction now, because experience shows 
us that the greater the effort that is made, the more 
rapidly it must be brought to an end. 
I am, of course, far from saying that the present losses 
of shipping, or that even a temporary increase in them 
are negligible. They have unpleasant financial and 
embarrassing economic consequences. But in this 
matter, it is surely somewhat con.^oling to remind our- 
selves how very little wc arc feeling the war in this country 
and how small our privations are compared with what 
we all expected them to be in August 1914. Nor can 
there be the least doubt that our overseas supplies could 
now be cut. down at least by one-fifth if not by a quarter, 
without landing the civilian population in a tithe of the 
hardships that holds all Germany in its toils. The idea 
that German submarines can sink one-fifth or a quarter 
of the shipping supplying this country is preposterous. 
If the rate of destruction were twice as high as evei 
it has been for a period of two weeks, it would have tc 
be maintained thus for twenty times as long a time, 
before this reduction, of one-fifth, could be made. The 
submarine menace, then, is one that we do not have to 
take at all gloomily. 
Ton for Ton 
But it does astonish me that the neutrals do not .seem 
to see, in the position which Germany has created, some- 
thing far more menacing to them than to us. The're is 
not the faintest chance of our losing the control of the sea 
before the end of the war. Whatever the final upshot, 
to make a peace at sea will then be solely in our hands. 
Every British and Allied ship which the Germans sink 
means a German ship the less sailing under German 
colours when peace is restored. For there is no manner 
of doubt that no German merchant ship will put to sea 
at all until ton for ton compensation has been rendered. 
In the new state of things that starts after the war then, 
French, Russian, Italian and above all British shipping will 
start upon its world trade at least as strong in tonnage 
as it was on the first of August two years ago. The Ger- 
man merchant shipping will be proportionately reduced, 
and it is for Germans to say how much smaller they wish 
it to be when the present war is over. If there is any- 
thing of truth in what the German papers, contain of the 
efforts now being made to reorganise German economics 
after the war, we must infer that every man that can be 
spared from war shipping is now being engaged in building 
merchant shipping for the future. And even when 
actual building is not proceeding, materials are being 
collected and plans laid down for a prompt and vast 
increase of the German merchant marine. 
What will be the position of neutrals in the new com- 
petition that will arise after the war ? Take, for instance, 
the case of Norway. A fortnight ago it was officially 
announced that loi Norwegian steamers and 47 of her 
sailing vessels had been sunk since war began. Thirteen 
of her steamers have been sunk since. The loss a fort- 
night ago was put at over£"4,ooo,ooo ; it must now amount 
to nearly £4,500,000. The money loss is, by insurance, 
spread over the whole community. It is conceivable 
— but hardly likely — that some small portion of it may 
be repaid, in the form of cash, by Germany. But if it 
was all repaid, it would not replace the Norwegian keels 
that are gone. No other neutral has lost quite so heavily 
as this. But Sweden, Denmark and Holland have, in 
the aggregate a heavy score to charge against the common 
enemy. Now we know that Germany is longing for peace, 
and the neutrals are as anxious for peace as the 
Germans. Might it not be a good occupation for them 
to try their eloquence on their still powerful — but 
failing — neighbour, to quicken 'his realisation of things 
as they are ? Arthur Poll^;: 
