October 12. 1916 
LAND & WATER 
occasional spotting of batteries and direct hits upon them 
by indirect lire over the cover which shields them, has not 
the effect of fire directed upon them from positions 
where no obstacle intervenes. 
These small tactical salients, therefore, are necessarily 
doomed when they are acute, and throughout this war, 
especially in its latter siege stages in the West, we have 
had innumerable examples of that truth. Indeed every 
commander has reduced such salients when they began 
to appear save in the rare, cases where he deliberately 
sacrificed their garrison for the sake of delay. Verdun 
afforded many examples ; Avocourt for instance ; the 
Eastern end of the Goose Hill ; the wood above Vaux, etc. 
In all cases where a sharp salient developed the width 
of which was small enough to permit average effective 
range to tell upon both sides of the angle, and upon the 
gun positions which supported it, the salient could not 
stand. 
Now between these two general types — the first large 
one, which may roughly be called the strategical salient, 
and the second small one which may roughly be called 
the tactical salient — there obviously lies a doubtful cate- 
gory, and it is the examples within this doubtful category 
which have afforded some of the most interesting problems 
in the course of the war. 
Ypres is a very good example. The salient of Ypres 
was too large to be called a tactical salient, perhaps, but 
when it was sufficiently pronounced to approach a semi- 
circle in shape, it was discovered that this line was too 
bold. The losses to the troops holding it by reverse fire 
from the enemy were too serious, and therefore about 
eighteen months ago that salient was reduced. The 
form which it fi.nally took, an arc rather of 100 degrees 
than 180, was discovered to be stable : but a more 
pronounced bulge was unstable. 
The salient formed by the last positions to which the 
French retired in front of Verdun was slightly sharper 
than this, and could be held only on account of the 
accident of ground, but it was considerably more than a 
right angle. ' 
What are we to say with regard to this Beaucourt 
salient ? 
It must, of course, be premised at the outset that stv;dy 
of this sort is quite superficial compared with the con- 
clusions that could be arrived at upon the groupd itself ; 
but what I am about to point out, though little more 
than a fragmentary suggestion, is based on more than a 
study of the map, for I was acquainted with this country- 
side some years ago, and have a fairly clear memory of 
its appearance. 
(i) The salient of Beaucourt is, as yet, not acute. . It 
describes, as we have seen, a full right angle. 
We can appreciate upon the accompanying Map ' 1 1 
the extension of its lines. But every advancj uadi 
northward from the positions of Courcelette, L2 i ars, 
and Eaucourt L'Abbaye, all of which are now in thj 1 and; 
of the British Army, renders the trace of the salient 
more acute. A fortnight ago it was something like 12 J 
degrees in rough measurement ; a week ago it was some ■ 
thing like 100. After the capture of Le Sars and the 
advance beyond that village it sank to almost exactly 
90 degrees, and with every further advance the angle 
will become acute and more acute. 
So much ■ for the most elementary point, the mere 
trace of the salient. What of its size ? 
(2) The base of the salient represents an extreme 
