LAND & WATER 
October 12, iqi6 
the Allies enjoy from the jiodal position of Salonika and 
from the absence of lateral communication in favour of 
the enemy. To put it diagrammatically, the Salonika 
command can attack at will towards Doiran and up the 
Vardar trench at D, or towards the Monastir sector at 
M, or towards the Stnuna line upon the east (at S), and 
the rapidity with which it can vary its pressure upon 
any sector of the 100 miles of front is far superior to the 
rapidity with which the enemy can shift troops laterally 
from west to east or vice versa. The Salonika command 
e.ijoys three radiating roads and two prominent railways 
J6i\^'jlemented of course by light lines) all radiating from 
Salonika, and thus permitting of alternative action. 
The enemy is, upon the contrary, more or less tied to the 
three points, the Vardar valley, the Monastir plain, the 
Struma line, which are separated one from the other by 
masses of mountain. It would take them by road and 
railway about three times as long to move a given amount 
of men and material from D to M as it would take the 
Salonika cdmmand to move the same. Between 1) 
and the Struma hne (S) the advantage is only slightly less. 
The enemy can therefore upon this front never quite 
know where the chief pressure wiU next come nor, when 
it comes, can he immediately meet it. The British 
offensive eastward towards the Struma not only pins the 
enemy there, but linds the Bulgarian command there 
and lubtedly calling for reinforcement which cannot arrive 
in time. 
Such are the advantages of Salonika as a base for 
this offensive : That it has all the lateral communica- 
tions in its hands while its opponent is gravely inferior in 
that respect. 
The disadvantages are equally obvious. A first suc- 
cess from Salonika soutii of the mountains still iinds one 
(if the enemy is left in strength and not thoroughly de- 
feated) confronted by a vast tangle of roadless mountains 
through which he can defend the only two avenues of 
advance : the Vardar deiile, leading to Nish upon the 
main objective — the Constantinople Railway — and the 
Struma defile leading to Sofia upon the same. The 
moment an advance against an undefeated or only 
partially defeated enemy begins into these mountains, 
the offensive is coniined to defiles of the most difficult 
type for attack and the easiest for defence. 
The Roumanian Front 
Ihe Dobrudja front can be stated in its main elements 
'libw that the enemy has mentioned in his despatches 
the Hnc upon which he is entrenched. This line is the 
line Perveli-Anzacca-Sofular-Carabaca, of a total length 
from Carabaca to the sea of 25 miles. 
Such a line does not, of course, cross the Dobrudja. 
It is continued beyond Carabaca right to the Danube, but 
.this north-western portion of the line is much more thinly 
held, the country being badly broken and abounding in 
wood and cover. The enemy is thus standing in his 
greatest strength upon the south-eastern end of the line 
towards the Black Sea, because our Allies are here served 
bv the branch railway which leads from the main Czerna- 
Voda Constanza railway down to Karaomcr, through 
Cobadinul. It was along the line of this railway that he 
suffered his bad check of three weeks ago, and it is here 
that the mass of the Roumanian and Russian troops is 
grouped. 
As will be seen upon Map VI the line upon which the 
enemy is entrenched is parallel to and above five miles 
distant from the line Tuzla-Cobadinul- Rasova, which 
was the defensive position taken by our Allies to defend 
the Constanza railway. It was not only successfully 
held by them, but they advanced from it over a belt of 
live miles just mentioned after breaking Mackensen's line 
just in front of Topraisar (on September 19, 20, 21). 
The enemy's entrenched line runs, therefore, along the 
positions to which he retreated after his defeat of tliree 
weeks ago. It passes over perfectly open rolling land, 
which rises from the sea to about 180 feet at Pereveli ; 
about 300 at Anzacca, and nearly 400 beyond Carabaca. 
It has been carefully chosen for its water supply, though 
undoubtedly this must also be supplemented by the 
railway from Karaomer. There are numerous small 
wells a.nd reservoir tanks at Carabaca and at Bezaul 
near the railway and a rather smaller supply at Anzacca 
and at Pervcli. There are also a considerable number 
of wells and tanks at Sofular. 
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