October 19, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
;Bcu3xa 
Adiudd. 
But if the only good coiuiminications of the neighbour- 
hood are these roads across the mountain perpendicular 
to the direction of the chain and eich isolated one from 
the other, the separate columns are hghting at a great 
disadvantage. One of them being subjected to unex- 
pected pressure by the eneriiy cannot quickly reinforce 
itself from the next columns on either side of it because 
the roads are isolated one from the other by the masi^es 
of difticult moimtain coimtry in between. 
It is liere then that the very great importance of good- 
lateral communications, the second type of commiinitJa- 
tions, arises in the strategy of mountain warfare^or 'in- 
deed in the strategy of any warfare specially concerned 
with a prolonged and difiicult obstacle. 
If there is a good continuous communication all along . 
the foot of the mountains linking up the places from 
which the separate columns start to cross the various - 
passes, the disadvantage of isolation disappears. If- of 
two bodies struggling in a mountain chain one has good 
lateral communication on his side, but the other has none, 
the one with the good lateral commimications will, other 
things being equal, have a decisive advantage over his 
opponent and will prove the master of the chain. While 
occupying the attention of his enemy in every pass he 
will be able to throw a mass of man(euvrc from one tp 
another at far greater speed than his opponent can 
correspondingly reinforce. And he is sure to succeed at 
some point or other in this policy. He will be able- to 
attack some one of the passes sooner or later with such 
a superiority of force that the passage will be won and 
he will appear upon the rear of the neighbouring 
passes. He thus will have turned his opponent's posi- 
tions and will have broken his opponent's line. 
Now-a-days good lateral eoninumication of- tIiis's«>H;t 
means a railway. If of two fairly eijually matched 
opponents one has a railway upon ins side of the hills 
following along the foot of them and linking up the mouths 
of the passes, while the other has none, the one with the 
railway will presumably ha\-e the better of the other. 
It may, in passing, be worth while to note that lateral 
communications of this sort are for the most part the 
product of conmiercial or peace conditions and only under 
exceptional conditions the deliberate device of strategy. 
It is natural that at the foot of each pass in the plain 
a centre of local commerce should spring up, that is, ^ 
town, and that this string of towns should be connected 
by some main road and later by some main railway. 
But when armed nations have stood facing each other for 
a long period lateral communications of this kind will 
be built for purely military consideration though there may 
not be a string of towns worth linking up for commerce, 
and therefore no economic excuse for a railway. Some- 
thing of that sort has taken place on the Hungarian side 
of the Southern Carpathians with which we are here 
dealing. The lateral railway serving the enemy has no 
sufficient economic reasoR for existence east and north of 
BrasSo. Its object is military. 
To return to the present position in the Carpathians : 
If we look at a road and railway map of the Carpathian 
system along which the old frontier between Hungary and 
Koumania runs, we shall find two prominent features of 
contrast between the two sides of the chain. 
First, on the Hungarian side the lateral communication 
I I I is continuous. On the Roumanian side 222 it 
ceases to be continuous after the junction of Ploesti. 
Secondly the lateral communication on the Hungarian side 
I 'I I is everywhere much closer to^the crest of the ridge than 
it is upon the Roumanian side 222. The lateral communi- 
cation upon the Roumanian side nowhere comes nearer to 
the crest of the ridge than at Ploesti itself, which is "40 
miles from the crest, and at Adiudu, which is 35 miles 
distant, while the average distai;ice is between 40 and 
, 50 ii^les. ~ The Hungarian lateral commmiication is 
. iiowhere more than .;5 miles from the crest and at Kron- 
studt (.or Brasso), which is the base for the present Austro- 
Hungirian oh'ensive, it is barely ten miles distant from 
t.iic ciTst, while all along this southern portion it aver- 
ages "no more than 15-20 miles. 
Observe the consequence of this disposition of the lateral 
railways. 
