LAND & WATER 
October 26, 1916 
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cutting of the unfinished canal along the valley of the 
Tortille affords a further protection to the group. Even 
in the old days of small armies and of rapid mo\ement 
the position was remarkable. It covered Peronne and 
the smaller and larger rivers made a sort of moat around 
it upon three s'des. To-day it has far greater value and 
for a very different reason. It affords the best cover 
and position for the enemy's guns to be discovered in the 
whole of his line between Bapaume and Chaulnes. The 
reason of this is that the far or eastern side of the Mont 
St. Quentin, the side tvirned away from the French, is 
curiously ravined with shallow depressions, excellently 
suited for the emplacement and concealment of the guns, 
while at the same time the position is central. Fire proceed- 
ing from this point and deli\ered at an average range of, 
say, 7,000 to 8,000 yards reaches the region of Combles on 
the north and the slopes of the hill of Villcrs upon the 
south; while the larger pieces can deliver shell almost as 
far as the region of Bapaume on the north and not \ery far 
from Chaulnes itself upon the south. The Mont St. Quen- 
tin is exactly central in the line. The position is of i)ar- 
ticular value for the defence of the worst, that is, the 
most dangerous section which the (iermans lia\ c to hold 
in the w^hole line. This section is the five miles between 
the Somme at Biaches near Peronne and the village of 
Berny which the French took the other day. The reason 
that this is so bad a piece of line for the (iermans is that 
they have behind them, down hill most of the way and 
ai the furthest not much over two miles away, the flooded 
valley of tlie Upper Somme. The Somme itself is here 
quite a small stream, and this is paradoxically enough a 
bad disadvantage for those who have to cross it. For that 
small stream, flanked by a canal, has upon the further 
side of it marshes differing in width but often expanding 
to close on half a mile. Whether these marshes are fully 
flooded at this particular moment 1 do not know. They 
are under water the greater j^art of the winter and tlure 
are few sights more curious than the aspect of Peronne 
standing up above a sort of lagoon of wat*r as one come - 
up by the light railway from the south in winter. 
Were the low -lying" stretch behind the German line 
filled by a broad and deep river the throwing of pontoon 
bridges acfross it and the replacing of them when they 
should have been observed and ranged by the enemy's 
fire would be a process normal to war. Even then the 
position would be a difficult one, for it is always perilous 
to fight with your back to an obstacle. But a narrow 
stream flanked by marsh is a much more serious matter. 
The floating of pontoons to bridge a stream is a simple 
matter, rapidly accomplished, and if such a bridge be 
destroyed it can be (piickly replaced elsewhere. But the 
crossing of many hundred yards of marsh, even if the 
marsh be not yet fully flooded, is quite another business. 
Whether you establish causeways or throw across a long 
bridge on piles you are in either case condemned to very 
slow work, expensive in men as well as in time, and fixed. 
Now these long bridges which the Germans have estab- 
lished are jx-rpetually being destroyed by the French 
artillery, thanks to the supremacy in the air which the 
Allies have established. They are as perpetually being 
replaced. But it is a very serious labour, and the result 
of this grave difficulty is that if the five miles of (iennan 
line immediately in front of the river were to break or 
even if a very rapid retirement were necessary, there 
W(»ild be a local disaster. 
Further, it is a difficulty which interferes with supply. 
The bringing of men and numitions and food up to these 
tj^ve miles between Berny and Biaches and the evacua- 
tion of wounded therefrom is still in part being conducted 
across the river, because that is the shortest though the 
most perilous way. But communication is depending 
more and more upon the roads (w ith their light railways) 
which come up from the south, and as the single line 
railway running from Chaulnes to Peronne can no longer 
be used, the distribution has to come all the way from 
the neighbourhood of Ncsle, west of which point on the 
main line the artillery of the Allies renders the line un- 
usable ; indeed, I believe Nesle (at a range of full 12,000 
yards from the nearest French batteries) to be the German 
railhead. 
But to break or even cause the retirement of this German 
sector between Biaches and Berny the French must seize 
the heavily fortified village of Barleux, standing in its 
hoUow, and all the ground behind it is swept by artillery 
fire from Mont Str Quentin. 
In the same connection we must note the second main 
gun position, that of the hill of Villers, for it not only 
supports Barleux to the north, but also the depression 
between Berny and the river to the south. 
The word " hill " is perhaps a little misplaced for the 
large roll of land on which the village of Villers-t'arbonne. 
stands. It is barely 100 feet above the Somme behind it, 
and makes no more than a flattish lump against the sk\ 
as seen from the French positions to the west. But it i;: 
almost as well suited for the emplacement of the German 
pieces as the Mont St. Quentin itself, for, like the Mont 
St. Quentin it has parallel narrow depressions rounding 
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