October 26, 1916 
LAiNU & WATER 
leads to enormous losses and further causes the troops to 
separate (that is to lose their units, or for the units to 
lose contact) before they are in touch with the enemy." 
It is this depth of formation which largely accounts 
for the failure of the German counter-attacks. Even the 
second line starts from a distance which handicaps it in 
its attempt to recapture the front trenches when they 
have been lost. 
For instance, in the counter-attack upon the iM-ench 
a fortnight ago, on the 7th of October, the second battalion 
started from a distance nearly 2,000 yards behind the 
first trenches. And the battalions in the first trenches 
themselves did not sufiiciently garrison the first line. 
Of four companies in the battalion, only two were dis- 
covered in the first line, the other two were some hundred 
yards behind in supporting trenches. 
Another example of the congesting effect of pressure 
is the mi.xture of units, which has been proved to take place 
more than once the last few weeks. It is not easy for the 
attack to identify this. We cannot tell how frequently 
it takes place. When a large number of prisoners are 
taken from many quite different units in a comparatively 
small space, the fact could be established. For instance, 
when the loth Reserve Division went to pieces on the 
edge of the Wood St. Vaast a fortnight ago, it was hurriedly 
replaced by two regiments of the 113th division, which 
came from its left, and one regiment of the 17th 
Iveservc which came from its right. And three days later 
the French were able to identify in the midst of the debris 
of the loth division portions of three regiments which had 
been sent hurriedly in from three other distinct units, to 
prevent, if possible, the capture of Sailly. 
H. Belloc 
Certain omissions in Mr. Hilairc Bclloc's article have 
been made at the request of the Press Bureau. As these 
omissions often interrupt the thread of the argument, the 
places ic'hcrc thcv occur arc marked by asterisks 
Sea Fo: 
By Arthur Pollen 
WHATEVER else a writer of naval events can 
attempt during the progress of the war, there 
is one thing absolutely barred to him, that is 
the task of writing contemporary history. In 
the mi]itar\' field something more than a bare outline 
of events is public property almost as soon as the events 
occur. And the skeleton that the official bulletins supply 
can he made li\ing by tlie censored testimonies of corre- 
spondents at the front and the elucidations of skilled 
critics at home. But it would be a gross exaggeration 
to suggest that the scattered items of naval news that 
reach us afford even a skeleton outline of the truth, and 
if they did, for various reasons it would be impossible 
for the analytical writer to add materially to the picture. 
It is not difficult to illustrate the truth of this, or to see 
a reason for it. At the end of the third week in August, 
for instance, we heard, from our Admiralty commuiucjue, 
that tlie (ierman fleet had entered the North Sea pre- 
ceded by scouting Zeppelins, that these had found the 
British llect were out in overwhelming strength, and that 
thereupon the Ciermans had retreated precipitately to 
their harbours. In searching for the enemy, two British 
light cruisers, Nottin'^hani and Falmouth were, we are 
told, lost by submarine attack, but that we had sunk 
one German submarine and rammed the second. Behind 
all this there was obviously an interesting story, and its 
interest was far from limited to the bare fact that the 
German fleet a\oided action, as soon as it learned that 
action meant engaging a superior force. But the 
Admiralties of both sides agree in maintaining absolute 
silence as to all the things we want to know. For instance 
the German press had told us shortly before this ex- 
pedi4:ion was announced, that all the ships injured at 
Jutland were repaired and once more ready for action. 
The British communique says that the " German High 
Seas Fleet " came out, but does not specify either its 
numbers or its composition. Yet our lookouts pre- 
sumably saw them all, and any way they passed a con- 
siderable number of Dutch trawlers, so that the identity 
of tiie constituent ships must have been known to many 
besides the enemy. If we could be told the facts, we 
should have an important check on the presumed losses 
of the Germans at Jutland, and an index to their present 
strength. Again, we do not know how far north nor 
how far west the Germans ventured. Clearly not so far 
but that retreat, wjien retreat became necessary, was 
open. But it certainly would be interesting to know 
exactly where the turning point was, for without knowing 
this the significance of the sortie can hardly be judged. 
Next, take submarine attacks. We would give 
something to know how far the German subrriarine that 
attacked Nottin>^ham and Falmouth was from the 
main fleet when the attack was made, for this would tell 
us something about the German plan. Was the sortie 
just a trap that had achieved its purpose when our look- 
out forces ran into the under-water ambush ? It seems 
certain that it was not the ambush that checked the 
pursuit, for that must have become impossible earlier. 
We ask all these questions in vain. 
The German communique, if reliable, which is, of 
course, very unlikely, supplied some illuminative com- 
ment, in spite of its silence as to the main operation, 
to wit, the sortie of the fleet. The enemy's first story 
was only that one of his submarines sighted five British 
cruisers accompanied by two destroyer flotillas on the 
south-easterly course at five in the afternoon. Behind 
these were six battle cruisers protected by a second 
flotilla. The submarine proceeded to sink a four-funnel 
destroyer, whereupon the whole British squadron turned 
about, when a cruiser of the Chatham class was torpedoed 
twice. Two and a half hours later the submarine, which 
had in the meantime been dodging the patrols, got in a 
third shot on this wounded cruiser, which was now being 
towed home. And the third shot proved fatal. Still 
later a second submarine got another British cruiser. 
Of this story all that related to the sinking of a 
destroyer was contradicted by the Admiralty. But 
the rest of it, which is not inconsistent with the 
British communique, was published without official 
comment. On balance the enemy were something to the 
good, but, as usual, the facts were not sufficient, so he 
characteristically proceeded to magnify the event. On 
the 22nd August a new official communique was issued 
in Berlin, in which the British fleet encountered by the 
submarines had battleships added to it, and of these the 
submarines claimed to have hit one, with terrible and 
picturesque results to the battleship in question. But 
beyond claiming this additional success this communique ■ 
added nothing to our information about the time of the 
attacks or the disposition of the forces. And the addi- 
tional success was incontinently denied at Whitehall. 
Fleet Disposition 
WTiat are we to make of such material ? As it stands 
it throws little light on the intentions of the enemy, and 
none on his present strength, and it leaves us still in com- 
plete ignorance as to the dispositions of our own fleet. 
At Jutland, of course, we know that the Vice-Admiral 
commanding the Battle Crui.ser Fleet had a squadron 
of battleships under his command. A httle less than a 
month before Mr. Balfour, in his much-discussed com- 
munication to the mayors of the East Coast towns, had 
said that important units of force would be moved further 
south. :,Has the Vice- Admiral this battle squadron 
still ? The Germans say he has. But then they are not 
to be believed. Still the Germans must know exactly 
what were our dispositions on August igth. It is one 
of the advantages of Zeppelin scouting that the enemy 
can get this knowledge when he pleases in clear weather. 
But such are the exigencies of naval war that we, whose 
interest in the British fleet is surely not less, cannot be 
