14 
LAND & WATER 
October 26, igiG 
The Chancellor's Latest Speech 
By Colonel Fcyler 
In (hi following remarkable analysis of H err HclhtHiinn- 
Holhvegs speech to the Reichstag, Colonel l-'eyler, the 
distinguished Swiss military critic, shows that this 
utterance f>resupposes that Germany has reached a state of 
passive defensive, which is tantamount to the udmission 
that the crumbling of the Central Powers has begun. 
COMMENT upon the political side of Hcrr von 
Httliinann-Hollweg's latest speech has been 
ab\indant in all quarters ; but it seems to me 
that there were military ■ considerations in the 
speech which do not deserve to be neglected, and it is of 
these that I sliall speak in the present article. We are not 
going too far if we venture to siiggest that tiic Chancellor 
must have been somewhat embarrassed in composing 
the miUtary portion of his utterance. His jneceding 
speech, deUvered April 5th, i()i6, and which will be known 
to liistory as the " W'ar Map " sp>eech, was already some- 
what daring in its manipulation of strategic i)nncipies, 
although it could claim to be in accord with general 
appearances. The deliverance of September 27th, however, 
is manifestly contrary to all appearance 
A Comparison 
We can hardly consider these speeches separately. 
Although given in very different spirit the second is to all 
intents and purposes a complement to the first. On April 
5th von Bethiiiarin-HoUweg was still on the offensive, 
and his speecli demonstrated how victory continued to 
establish the new map of the Central Empires, the 
" War Map." On September 27th, however, he passes 
to the defensive and shows how the German armies are 
maintaiu'ng this new map, firmly and indestructibly, 
by allowing the enemy to destroy himself in a nmltiplicitj- 
of unsuccessful attacks until he shall be convinced of the 
vanity of his efforts and sue for peace. 
This is a radical change. In 1914 and 1915 German 
policy demanded that its armies should take ; in 1916 
it demands that they should keep what they have taken 
until the original owners consent to let go. In more 
concise terms this is a policy of "Your money or your 
life." From a strategical point of view the difference be- 
tween the two moods is enormous. The ( ierman Staff has 
constantly gi\en proof of its adherence to the principle of 
the offensive, which alone can procure decisive results. It 
has shown this adherence quite recently in the Dobrudja 
where it deprived the Allies of an initiative which they 
should ha\e been prepared to take themselves, and the 
results of which would have probably been most marked. 
This offensive was decided upon notwithstanding the 
difiliculty of the general situation and the slenderness of 
its chances of success. Can it be said that this principle 
has been deliberately abandoned on the Western Front. 
We are entitled to have our doubts. 
Two facts prove the contrary. Firstly, the battle of 
Verdun where the violent German offensive did not cease 
until it was necessary to resist the Allied attacks on 
the Somme. This was the first proof of a drainage of 
the Imperial resources, for the German army had to give 
up an attack in order to assure a defence. 
The second fact is the Berlin communique of Sep- 
tember 26th. with regard to the defeat at Comble>;. To 
palliate this defeat mention was made of " the inter- 
vention en masse of the material manufactured for many 
months by the war industry of the whole world." As a 
matter of fact, this recalls Blucher speaking of Napoleon : 
" What on earth do you want me to do with those 
Hussars ? .\gainst those brutes we need guns and plenty 
of them." War material prepares the territory whicli 
the infantry seize. As long as the Germans believed 
themselves to have a superiority of material, they stuck 
to the offensive ; if they have now given up the offensive 
it is not so to speak in order to give their enemy a choice 
of the moment when he will consent to hand over his 
money— it is rather that the superiority and material 
has changed sides during the last few months. 
The Chancellor then was constrained to confess a 
substitution of the defensive for the offensive, and it 
was only necessary to conceal the weakness to which 
this substitution was due. But is this new state still 
intact ? " Our strength remains firm and unbroken," 
says the Chancellor. This is false ; for the last six 
months it has been neither firm nor unbroken, for it has 
been sadly damaged at least three times under conditions 
whose full effect is not yet manifest. 
The first occasion was at Erzerum, where the Russians 
forced the Turks to a strategy of defensive and of retreat, 
(ierman military circles know quite well that their 
Turkish Ally is broken and that the Turks are of no further 
use other than to supply drafts to the German armies. 
The second occasion was on the Sereth. Not only was 
the Austrian Ally very much damaged here, but he in- 
volved German armies in his defeat, (iencrals von 
Bothmer and von Linsingen cannot be quite ignorant of 
this and Marshal von Hindenburg himself must know 
sometliing about it. 
The third occasion is more recent still. However 
we may regard the operations on the Somme, they at 
least show a (ierman front which has not remained firm 
and unbroken. It remains to be seen whether a con- 
solidation slightly in rear will obviate a more complete 
smash or whether fresh Allied progress during the next 
few weeks will oblige the German front to w-ithdraw, not 
only in the region of these attacks, but also on a more 
extended scale. 
This is not all. Even if the crumbling of the Central 
Empires had not yet begun we would be justified in 
dwelling upon the risks involved by the Chancellor's new 
strategy ; for the defensive always implies a certain 
amount of risk. To hold fast in all quarters and only to 
retreat step by step when it Ls impossible to do othei\Fl33 
presupposes an extraordinary, almost supernatural, i 
strength of will, for the defender is always nearer the 
boundary of demoralisation than the attacker. Thej 
latter is always able to choose the moment for ceasing] 
attack, whereas the former is confined to speculation as] 
to whether he can hold out so long. 
Different Kinds of Defence 
Of course, there is defence and defence. The re- 
sistance even of inferior forces can often be long sus-l 
tained without much moral decay if there is a likelv hopei 
of a future re-establishment of balance which will' allow ' 
of an offensi\'e and a probable victory. Fabius Cunctator I 
adopted this strategy against Hannibal and sustained] 
public opinion at home by the hope of a subsequent 
offensive and a knowledge that m .ns were being pre-J 
pared to turn the tables on the enemy. 
We need not go back to ancient history to find similar 
examples. Neither Belgium nor Serbia, despite the 
purely defensive character of their present strategy, have 
gi\en up hope, as they anticipated an improvement inj 
the general situation which should enable them to com- 
pensate for their losses. We can say the same of France] 
which during 1914 underwent the gra\est anxiety, andj 
during 1915 the greatest alternations of hope and despair ;] 
but France founded her courage on the hope of a returnl 
to the offensive when her British Allies should have hadJ 
Imie to prepare. Neither Belgians, Serbians nor Frenchi 
would admit that the end of the struggle depended upon' 
the will of the enemy, but are confident of their own 
victory which with their Allies they have been stead- 
fastly preparing. 
Ciermany to-day is not in the same condition ; the 
defensive proclaimed by the Chancellor (" firm and 
T'^i^"^f"' ' '^ ^" ^^ prolonged, not unfll new means 
shall allow it to be replaced bv a victorious offensive, but 
for a time (indeterminate) until the Allies shall admit 
their incapacity to break it. This defensive will have no 
moral support from a belief in the promise of a better 
situation, but will need to rely upon a strength of will 
ready to hold off all attempts and all risks without any 
clelinite hoi>e of ultimately avoiding collapse. Such a 
state might he expected of an isolated man or of a small 
I 
