October 26, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
15 
group of men inspired by the glory of a superhuman 
pass ; but it cannot be expected of an army, all of whose 
men will not remain heroes forever. Of course, national 
defence is greatly stimulated by the knowledge that it is a 
matter of life or death ; this stimulant acted with great 
force upon the French, and there is no reason to bche\e 
that the instinct of self-preservation is less profound with 
the Teuton than with the Latin. But there are three 
great differences. 
The hope of a return to the offensive, which was great 
in the one case, but must be much less powerful in the 
present case. Secondly, the fact that the Allied defensive 
began at a moment when their moral was more or less 
intact, whereas in the case of the Germans this has 
already sensibly diminished owing to the length of .the 
war. Lastly, confidence in a just cause. There is not a 
soul amongst the Allies who has the slightest doubt as to 
the war having been provoked by an iniquitous aggression 
on the part of the tlerman Empire, whereas not all Germans 
continue to repose faith in their leaders or in the sanctity of 
the motives invoked to justify their declaration of war. 
Under such conditions a passive defensive with the 
object of tiring the enemy is but a vain hope ; it is con- 
demned to failure unless the very nature of things has 
undergone a transformation. Either the German Army 
will need a great change in the general situation, sufh- 
cient to allow them the means and the oj)portunity of an 
offensive, or else it will succumb to the superiority of its 
enemies. Time and manner count for little. A passive 
defensive, a front " firm and unbroken," can only end 
in ruin and disaster, for " unbroken " is not synonymous 
with " unbreakable." If the (ierman army is already at 
this phase it can hardly be worth its while to wait for the 
campaign of iqij before suing for peace. Menc Mcnc, 
Tckcl, IJpharsin ; Cyrus seems to be beneath the walls 
of Babylon. 
Development of British Agriculture 
By Sir Herbert Matthews 
Sir Herbert Matthews reviewed in a reeent nuinhcr of 
Land & Wathk Mr. Middlcton's Official Report on the 
Development of German Agriculture. The various 
reforms which Germany had undertaken to make 
agriculture a really national industry on which that 
cauntry could rely at all times and in all crises 
were defined. In the present article the writer goes a 
step further, and explains some of the more important 
reforms which are immediately necessary in order to 
place British agriculture on an equally secure basis in 
the best interests of the State. 
THE great lesson that this war has tauglit every- 
one holding any position of authority is — that 
the basis of national defence is an assured food 
supply. Another lesson that the nation 'at 
large is still learning is — that the necessary food supply 
is not assured unless it is actually grown in this country. 
There may be in the future, as there are to-day, ample 
supplies of all we need in our Dominions and Colonies, 
which may be (as they are to-day) an.xious. to get them 
into our markets, but the difficulties of a state of war 
prevent many things being done we should like to do, 
apart from loss or damage inflicted by the enemy. 
Speaking in pre-war values it is estimated that the 
United Kingdom spends £400,000,000 per annum on 
food grown in temperate zones, and another £60,000,000 
on food from tropical climates. Of the former about 
one-half is produced in the United Kingdom. We ought 
at the very least to increase this to three-fourths, i.e., 
£300,000,000 measured in pre-war values. 
If the nation is to profit from the lessons of the war 
increased production of foodstuffs can be brought about 
(a) by enlarging the output per acre, (b) by converting 
grass land to arable, (c) by reclaiming waste land. To 
bring about any incfrease under either of these heads the 
result must be commercially profitable. For the moment 
it is immaterial to the argument to whom the profit may 
accrue— whether to the State (if the State becomes the 
owner of the land), to the present landowners, or to the 
tenant farmers. In either case the cost of production 
must be less than the market price of the resulting pro- 
duce, if it is to be continuous. The interests of the State 
and the producer have, therefore, to be reconciled. In 
other words if the State wants the largest possible output, 
conditions must be such as will induce the grower to 
obtain the largest possible output. 
It was shown in my review of Mr. Middlcton's report 
on the development of German Agriculture, that under 
recent financial conditions it usually paid farmers to 
lay land down to grass, because although their returns per 
acre were smaller their total profits'were larger. The 
individual gained at the expense of the State. To reverse 
this process two closely related factors are required— fail: 
prices, and reasonable security for their contrnuance. 
Wide fluctuations, even if prices are frequently high, will 
not bring about any permanent increase of output. 
Like other phases of national defence the reconciliation 
of these two interests will cost money. The question 
that the nation has to determine is whether it is worth 
while to find the money — which admittedly will directly 
benefit the agriculturist— as a sort of insurance premium 
against starvation. 
The desired result can be attained cither by (a) the 
Government guaranteeing a minimum price for certain 
essential foods produced in the United Kingdom, e.g., 
wheat, meat, potatoes ; (b) by duties on such imported 
articles of food as we can grow at home ; (c) by grants 
for breaking up pasture or for reclaiming waste land ; 
or (d) by a combination of some or all of these methods. 
A combination of all three will be found to be the cheapest 
and most effective. 
The guarantee of a minimum price for wheat if effective, 
will increase the World's crop of wheat, with the result 
that the market price of wheat will have a downward 
tendency. An import duty on wheat will gi\e the market 
price an upward tendency. By combining the two a 
large revenue accrues to the Treasury, and the counter- 
acting influences will tend to keep the market price about 
the level at which it stands when the system becomes 
operative. The grant for breaking up jiasture (c) will 
be needed to give an impetus to this desirable course. 
It would eventually come about by the effect of (a) and 
(b) alone, but it would take much longer. 
The arguments used against these methods may be 
summarised briefly as follows : 
I. — Taxing the whole community for the benefit of one 
class. 
2. — Raising the cost price of food. 
3. — Interfering with free trade. 
4. — Benefiting the farmer at the expense of the labourer. 
5.— If the farmer obtains higher prices he will be no better 
off because the landlord will take it all in the shape of 
higher rents. 
Let us examine these in the order given. 
(i) It is true that the whole community will be taxed, 
including the agriculturist, and that that class will 
incidentally benefit. But this equally applies to all the 
workers in munition factories or employees in na\al yards. 
It is not done in order to benefit any class, but to insure 
the nation against panic prices, or something even worse. 
(2) The larger proportion of the cost of producing food 
was wages, even with the low rates paid to the agricultural 
labourer before the war. It would be impossible to go 
on producing food at, say, the average prices of 1885- 
1905, and to pay a higher wage than ruled during that 
period. If, therefore, the labourer is to have such a 
wage as he ought to get it is obvious that the average 
price of agricultural commodities must be kept at a 
higher average than that in the period referred to. For 
example, wheat must not be less than from 42s. to 45s 
per quarter. 
The Government have been frequently urged to control 
the price of the necessaries of life ; a demand has even 
been made that it should commandeer bread and meat, 
and distribute them as required. When you want tg 
