JNovember 2, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
putting out of a fire, and suppose the only instrunu'nt 
one has for putting out that lire are buckets of water. 
Suppose we have, say, ten thousand gallons of water in a 
cistern at our disposal, and a great number of buckets of 
various sizes, holding four gallons, three gallons, two 
gallons. 
At first the fire is confined to one spot, and it seems 
the best policy to try to put it out by deluging that spot 
with water in the largest possible quantity. We use 
buckets as large as a man can conveniently carry from the 
cistern to the fire. A hundred of them, say, holding four 
gallons each are in action, and as each is emptied it is 
refilled from the reservoir. 
But the fire breaks out in another place and yet another. 
With each new field of action we need a separate supply 
of water. It may well become a better policy in the 
face of these new perils to use the smaller buckets in 
larger numbers. The water has to be carried further ; 
must in some places he taken up on ladders to a con- 
siderable height ; the strain on the men is increasing, 
etc., and in the place of 100 four-gallon buckets we shall 
change to using perhaps fifty four-gallon buckets and 
one. hundred two-gallon buckets. 
There will probably be an actual increase in the amount . 
of water used per minute and a consequent more rapid 
exhaustion of the reservoir than at the beginning of the 
fire, but there might well be a great increase in the number 
of buckets by this using of smaller ones, without an 
increase in the amount of water used per minute. 
In such a metaphor the water actually in the buckets 
at any moment is the army in the field. The buckets are 
the divisions into which it is divided and organised. The 
reservoir is the total man power of the nation. 
Why is a division thus treated as the essential unit 
of action ? 
The reason tliaj a division, whether larger or smaller, 
remains the fighting unit, is that the division is in itself 
a little miniature army complete with all its elements of 
guns, infantry, medical service, staff, etc. Its commander 
is the true head of one body. It is the cell of the organism. 
The full division, the largest bucket convenient • for 
handling, is normally of some 20,000 men in the French 
and German services— a little less in the British service ; 
far more in the Bulgarian. And of the 20,000 or so in a 
German division at full strength on a war footing you 
may say that some 60 per cent, are normally "in- 
fantry, or, as the traditional term goes, " bayonets." 
The German division at full strength counts "roughly 
12,000 bayonets ; a perfect model of it would be three 
regiments of infantry, each regiment composed of four 
battalions, and each battalion of a thousand men ; a 
battalion being made up of four companies, each com- 
pany 250 strong. 
But a division is still a division, though these numbers 
be grievously lowered. We speak of the 5th Branden- 
burg Division (which is the first division of the deservedly 
famous and repeatedly massacred 3rd Prussian Army 
Corps) ; we recognise its traditions and its corporate 
existence even when, as was the case last spring in front 
of Verdun, it is for the moment little more than a third 
of its old self in numbers. When it reappeared the other 
day upon the Somme, it was in strength perhaps three- 
quarters or rather more of its full establishment— and 
very nearly every man in it was either a man returned 
from hospital or a new recruit. But though it was 
lessened in number and deteriorated in quality, it was 
still the 5th division. 
Similarly, though new divisions are created out of old 
material and, therefore, do not represent an increase in 
numbers of infantry in the field, we must note the increase 
in units because it means an increase in elasticity and a 
change in the general plan. 
Thus, if Ludendorff takes away one regiment each 
from three full divisions and combines them to make a 
new division with a new number and a new name, he has 
added nothing to the German army in numerical strength 
save whatever complement of artillery he may choose to 
give the division (for to-day he will hardly add cavalry), 
and possibly certain elements of the staff. But we must 
none the less take note of the action, because of its effect 
upon the machine he is wielding. 
With those preliminaries we arc in a position to judge 
the action of the German military authorities during the 
past summer. 
And to present a full statistical analysis : 
I am about to put before the reader from intormation 
recently afforded me and passed for publication — (i) 
a statement on the present size of the German armies in 
the field, including their au.xiliary services. (2) A full 
tabular statement of the remaining reserve of man-power 
lying behind this field army and available to repair its 
wastage between the present moment and, say, August of 
next year (before which date it is impossible that any of 
class igig should be called up). (3) A summary showing 
that these reserves now represent only more than one 
man in five, but less than one man in four of the field 
armies. In other words, that Germany could just, during 
the next nine months, replace a loss of 20 per cent., but 
not a loss of 25 per cent., and wastage proceeds at a 
far higher rate than that. 
Present Total of the German Army 
The total number of German di\'isions at present in the 
field is not less than 203, of which 129 are upon the 
French front, and 74 upon the Oriental front. Of this 
great number of units not less than 32 are of quite recent 
formation. The 32 have not been all of them actually 
identified in the field. Only 26 of them have been thus 
identified, but from the numbering and the use made of 
those 26 we are justified in deducing the existence of the 
remaining six. 
Out of the 26 new divisions certainly identified one 
has been found in process of formation (it is not yet com- 
pleted) in the camp of Lokstett, 16 have been identified 
upon the Western front, and q upon the Russian. 
As the reader is aware from previous detailed statements 
in these columns, by far the greater part of these new 
divisions is created by the depletion of existing divisions : 
by taking away a regiment from this division and a 
regiment from that and joining them together under a 
new name as a new unit. But a certain number of 
these new divisions are wholly composed of material not 
hitherto in the field. In other words, they are made 
up entirely from the reserves of trained men in the 
depots. What that term means exactly will be explained 
later. 
Of such completely new divisions five have been identi- 
iied in the field and one is in formation. The one which 
is still in formation is that just alluded to in the camp at 
Lokstett. It is numbered the 203rd division. The 
other five are the 20ist upon the Russian front, the 204th 
upon the Belgian front by Dixmude ; its neighbour the 
i2th Bavarian Division; and lastly the 19th and 20th 
division of Landwehr. 
Such is the instrument with which the German Empire 
is now fighting. 
To recapitulate : 203 divisions form to-day the Ger- 
man field army, of which rather less than two-thirds 
(129) are on the Western front, and more than one-third 
(74) upon the Eastern. This means, counting auxiliary 
services and communications, that the German Empire 
has swollen its armies to over five million men. 
With such figures in mind we are in a position to 
approach the heart of the subject ; the reservoir standing 
behind this large field force to make up its enormous and 
rapid wastage. 
A FULL TABLE OF THE PRESENT 
RESERVE OF GERMAN MAN POWER 
The German Empire possesses behind its existing 
organised army a reservoir for the replacement of wastage 
between this and the height of the most expensive season 
next year, that is, the height of the summer — say next 
August — more than one-fifth but less than one-quarter 
of that army. It can replace one man ifi five. It 
cannot replace one man in four. That is the situation. 
How we do arrive at this and what are the details of 
the statement ? 
There are four categories and only four in the full total 
of men behind the army who can be called upon. These 
four categories are : 
(i) The men trained or in training in the depots. 
(2) The men capable of service before next summer, 
but not yet trained. 
(3) The wounded who will return cured. 
(4) The men capable of bearing arms but, ^^■hether 
