November 2, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
mind it presents no difficulties ; but too often they are 
confused or forgotten. What we have to remember is 
that the only recruitment an army can receive from its 
siclv, wounded and convalescents is a certain proportion 
of these sick, wounded or convalescent as they stand 
at the present moment. It is perfectly true that the 
men who will fall sick later and will be wounded later 
will, in the same proportion, ultimately return to the army. 
And it is the presence of this factor which confuses so 
many students of the problem. The total number of 
sick and wounded men who will rejoin the German army 
before, say, August 1917, is much larger than the figure 
we are about to give, because it will include a great 
number of cases which will come into hospital between 
this date and that. 
But this factor does not, if we clear our minds upon the 
subject, disturb the calculation at all. 
Every man who goes into hospital after the present 
date comes out of the existing field army. His return 
(when he does return) is no increase to the present forces, 
and is no recruitment of them. The only true field of 
recruitment to the existing field forces in this category 
is the recruitment afforded from men now actually in 
hospital or convalescent who will return before the height 
of next summer, say, before August of next year. 
We have here a margin of error greater than in the 
other categories we have hitherto been considering. We 
know to within a very small margin of error what the 
situation of the iqi8 class is in Germany. We know 
with absolute certitude that the 1917 class is altogether 
out of the depots by this time, with the exception of the 
150,000 remainder who are still being trained. We know 
the number of formerly rejected men " combed out," ' 
etc., etc. ' 
But the figure for returned wounded and sick is approxi- 
mately ascertainable as a general figure based upon the 
analogy of the other belligerents and upon the intelligence 
acquired from within enemy territory during two years 
of war. For we have in round figures the numbers in 
hospital or convalescent. We have from long experience 
an average delay for complete cure and an average 
percentage of such cures. We may here be wrong by 
as much as 10 per cent., though hardly by more. Let us 
take that as conservative, that is, an over large margin 
of error and state a maximum. 
Well, upon such a basis we may estimate the return of 
German wounded and sick to the fighting front between 
this and, say, August 1917, at about 500,000 men, or 
at the most less than 600,000 men. 
The total hospital figures of the German Empire are 
at a floating balance of about 800,000. The returned 
cured from this total between the present date and next 
August will probably not be more than 66 per cent., it 
cannot possibly be 75 per cent. 
We must not be misled by figures given to neutrals of 
absurdly high percentages of cures. The percentages of 
cures have proved to be very much the same among all 
the belligerents. If anything, as we have seen in previous 
articles, the number of hospital cases that could really 
return to the same full active service that they left, is 
much less than the paper figure, but we will take that 
paper figure in order to be on the safe side, and that paper 
figure always keeps somewhere between 68 and 70 per 
cent., and never reaches 75. I repeat that as a matter of 
practice and experience a good many of the 60 odd per 
cent, have to be used in lighter work than that which they 
originally left before they were wounded or sick. But 
we may give the enemy the benefit of the doubt and say 
that 500,000 men, at least (62 per cent.) and 600,000 men 
at most (75 per cent.), is all that you will obtain for any 
useful service in this category. 
I trust I have made this point quite clear. For in- 
stance, far more than 600,000 men will return to the Ger- 
man army from hospitals between this and the height of 
next summer, say between this and next August upon the 
present rate of casualty and sickness. But beyond this 
600,000 all who return will be men drawn "from the 
existing armies, which are perpetually wasting under the 
general offensive to which they are subjected. 
(4) The Exempted Fit 
The last category consists of what the French 
call men en siirsis d'appel, that is men postponed from 
service or specially exempted from service, though 
physically fit and of age. The number of these is also 
known and their story since the beginning of the war 
forms a curious and interesting chapter. 
No nation, least of all an industrial nation such a: 
modern Germany ; no war, least of all a mechanical wai 
such as the present great campaign, can be kept in con 
tinuity at all without the presence in the mines, the work 
shops, the shipbuilding yards, the mxmition factories, o!» 
the railways, etc., of a considerable number of men wh) 
would be capable of bearing arms. 
Many of these will be trained men. In all conscript 
countries much the greater part will be trained ; but 
whether trained or untrained, the point is that a very 
large number, which, were the world made otherwise, 
might be used upon the front, have to be kept back " to 
run the war and the nation." No one is better conscious 
of this than our own authorities in Britain to-day ; for 
(ireat Britain lives by its Fleet, by its merchant service, 
by its mines, and by its industrial production. 
Those who have not given any thought to the subject, 
still less any observation, but only a little emotion and a 
mass of vague visions conceive of this sort of work as 
being done by women, or by prisoners of war — some- 
times they eliminate this idea of such necessities 
altogether. But the common experience of life is 
against them as it is against all fools and in favour of 
all calculation. You cannot get good signalhng or 
tolerably efficient engine driving or stoking ; you cer- 
tainly cannot get coal mining or riveting or puddling of 
iron (to qviote but half a dozen things that occur to one 
as one writes), by calling upon prisoners at random 
or upon the work of women or old men or invalids. 
At the very beginning of the war the German Empire, 
like the French Republic (and they were the only two 
nations that thoroughly went into the thing), did all that 
was possible to relieve such labour. Yet in the case of 
the German Empire we know that for many months 
something like a million and half were kept back. That 
was the figure expected, that was the figure which turned 
out to be certainly not less than the truth. As the 
strain increased effort after effort was made to release 
men even at the expense of the national well-being. 
Fuel and food became more difficult to obtain ; com- 
munications became gradually more and more difficult. 
The whole machinery of the national life was more 
and more hampered and still the call upon the men kept 
back for industry continued. 
It has now reached its last possible minimum. It has 
been whittled down to about 600,000 men. Those who 
are acquainted with the necessities of our own country 
will, I think, marvel that it has been brought down a^s 
low as this in the enemy's territory. At any rate, it has 
been brought down to this level at a very severe strain 
upon the moral and tenacity of the civilian population, 
let alone at the expense of anxiety to the commanders of 
the military forces. It will not go lower. It cannot go 
lower any more than you can get rid of the ordinary laws 
of nature. 
The last draft made upon this necessary residuum was 
50,000 men from the railway. They were replaced by 
women, though they were replaced with difficulty. No 
more can go. The results of the experiment are not yet 
fully developed, but it is admittedly the last effort of the 
kind. Somewhat earlier, late in the summer just passed, 
an attempt was made to withdraw only 20,000 men from 
the factories. It broke down. These 20,000 already 
present in the depots had to be sent back. 
We may sum up, then, in this fourth category and say 
that the 600,000 which it contains are eliminated from 
our conspectus of remaining man power for the German 
armies. 
General Summary 
We are now in a position to make a general summary 
of the situation. Let us present it in tabular form : 
I. — The total number of men in the present establish- 
ment of the German field force and its auxiliaries is some- 
what over five million. 
II. — The reserve of man power behind this greatly 
increased force, available up to, say, August of next year, 
is not more than 1,310,000 or 1,320,000 upon a general 
estimate. It may well in practice prove to be not over 
