November 2, 1916 
LAND * WATER 
with the chief movements in the field which have taken 
place since the issue of the last number. I will, however, 
attempt to deal with them briefly. 
The important ones are three in number. The French 
advance on the Verdun sector over a crescent 3,000 yards 
at its broadest and including the ruined fort of Douaumont ; 
the continued but very embarrassed pressure of Falken- 
hayn upon the Roumanian border, and Mackensen's 
victory in the Dobrudja with its consequences. 
As to the first of these, it is not the advance in territory 
nor even the ironical coincidence of this with a long and 
stupid German ofticial document upon the motives of the 
Verdun fiasco, which should chiefly concern us. Nor even 
the fact which everyone has noted that ground which cost 
the German 3th army perhaps 250,000 men and several 
months of effort was recaptured in a few hours and at 
a loss of between i per cent, and 2 per cent, of such a figure. 
The main lesson of this very successful detail in the 
general operations is the simple one that the enemy has 
more pressure brought upon him now in the West than he 
can aciequately meet. He has had to move away guns as 
well as men, and his opponents when they select their point 
and make suflicient preparation can alwaj's advance 
against a sector which they find weakened. When that 
sector is one like Douaumont, which strikes the im- 
pressionable imagination of the German civilian, so much 
the better. But it might have been the Woeuvre or 
Rheims — ^the lesson would have been much the same. 
The enemy has already had to put upon the Somme front 
alone 89 divisions, twenty of which have appeared twice 
after considerable intervals and some few of which I 
believe have even appeared three times. He has certainly 
lost upon that front at the rate of at least 100,000 
men a month. He has been compelled to concentrate 
upon it more guns than he can afford and more munitions 
than he can afford, because the West is now his master 
in the number, the calibre, and the munitionment of heavy 
pieces. He cannot do that and maintain the integrity of 
his whole line — and the pressure will continue and it will 
increase. But although the days gef shorter and the 
mud worse, the heavy pieces grow and grow, and their 
revenue piles up increasingly beyond their expenditure. 
The Carpathian front of Roumania may be numerically 
stated in a few words. 
TJie enemy has increased his forces there slowly from 
the original ten divisions to the equivalent of 17. He 
has from 180 to 184 battalions in action between the 
Bukovina and the Danube. Of these the equivalent of 
some six small divisions, say, 54 battalions, are German, 
and a 7th is already partly identified. There is first of all the 
Alpine division. There are next the 76th and 48th 
division of reserve drawn from the Russian front. The 
8qth division (Landwehr) and the 87th division, which 
has been brought from the French front. There are 
further units. Bavarian Landwehr from the French front, 
the 12th and the i6th regiments, which are collected 
together as a small division — it is in size but a 
brigade. These between them make the equivalent 
of six. The 7th, one regiment of which has already 
been identified, will probably prove to be the 8th 
Bavarian division of reserve. This force, large as it 
is (and it will grow larger with the withdrawal of men from 
the Italian front as the winter permits) is not sufficient 
in itself for the task of forcing the Passes. One can only 
repeat what was said here last week that the hope the 
enemy still entertains of accomplishing this task depends 
upon his superiority in heavy pieces. But that is a 
superiority which the West has learnt to understand, to 
meet and to counter. Our latest Allies are rapidly 
learning the same lesson. 
Lastly, we have Mackensen's victory in the Dobrudja. 
The main effect of this may be very simply stated. The 
enemy has obtained possession of the Cerna Voda bridge- 
head, which was his principal object from the beginning. 
It is a grave matter, and it is folly to underestimate it. 
His chances of destroying the army which is retreating 
before him towards the North of the Dobrudja are not 
great. It has pontoon bridges behind it and the news 
comes as I write that it has been able to undertake a new 
offensive. But with the capture of the Cerna Voda 
bridgehead the one great strategical asset of the Rou- 
manian forces for an action in co-ordination with the 
pressure from Salonika has been lost. It was with this 
strategical objective that Mackensen set forth several 
weeks ago. It was this which he failed to secure in the 
battle in which he was defeated in September, and it is this 
which he has now acquired, a month later. By his success 
he has shut the door to all immediate pressure from the 
north against the Bulgarian forces, and it is a heavy 
setback to the plans the Allies had formed. 
This success in its turn was due to the preponderance oi 
heavy pieces and munitionment on the enemy's side. 
Of German infantry Mackensen had with him dis- 
persed among the numerous Bulgarian divisions and his 
few Turkish reinforcements no more than ten battalions. 
It is said that a new German division, the 217th coming 
from the Russian front, has, or is about to join him. 
But that is not very material. His object was to seize 
the Cerna Voda bridge-head. He has seized it and his 
victory must be recognised. Though its effects arc nega- 
tive they are of very great weight in the general 
sir.' 'egic situation of the Near East. H. Belloc 
