LAND & WATER 
November 9, 19 lO 
The Roumanian Defence 
By Hilaire Belloc 
THK Roumanian field of war is still that to which 
two circumstances direct the greatest attention, 
in spite of the fact that it is, in the number of 
men engaged, the least of the various theatres of 
'war. These two circumstances are the fact tliat it is a 
field in which movement is still taking place upon a 
considerable scale, and the fact that it is the theatre of 
the only enemy offensive. 
The object of the Austro-German alliance in this field 
is threefold. 
I'irst, defensive and negative : to present the pressure 
of l^oumanian troops, aided by Russian contingents, 
from threatening Bulgaria from the north, and, with 
Bulgaria, the communications with Turkcj- in the east. 
SccondU', offensive : The invasion of Roumania 
through the Carpathian passes. 
Thirdly, also offensi\e : a movement across the Danube, 
if that be possible, in co-operation with the last. 
The first, or negative one of these objects has been 
amply attained. Mackensen has defeated the Russo- 
Roumanian army in the Dobrudja and forced it into the 
hilly countr\- in the extreme north of that district. He 
has thereby imcovered and possessed himself of the 
bridgehead of Czernavoda and in so doing has reached 
his strategic objective. The power, hitherto possessed by 
our Allies, of turning the Danube obstacle by first-class 
communications, has disappeared, and, as we have 
repeatedly pointed out, both before and since the event, 
it is one of grave importance to the eastern situation as a 
whole. 
Of the two offensive objects remaining, the third, the 
threat to the re-crossing of the Danube, can be dealt 
with more -briefly than the second. I will therefore 
take it first 
The elements of the position are these. 
It is possible for Mackensen to establish a bridgehead 
upon the left , northern , or Roumanian , bank of the Danube. 
He can do so because his recently acquired superiority in 
the calibre, number and miuiitionment of his heavy guns 
enables him now to dominate the further bank at any 
one ])oint he may choose. If the ta^k were nothing 
more than this it would already ha\e been accomplished. 
But an offensive action on a large scale involving tiie 
crossing of such an obstacle is a very much larger matter 
than merely establishing a local bridgehead. 
The character of the Danube obstacle is well known to 
the readers of this journal. Very wide belts of marsh 
with occasionally a doubtful path threading through them, 
but usually' no communication at all, line the northern 
bank. There can be no question of attacking in con- 
siderable force across the obstacle at such points, for in 
the first place the obstacle is marsh and not water, 
and tlierefore cannot be rapidly passed in pontoons 
but can only be crossed by a causeway taking a very 
long time to establish, and in the second place the 
width is such that no effective screen of artillery fire from 
the one bank can be established upon the other. But 
this belt of marsh is interrupted, though at only rare 
intervals, by banks or projections of solid land which 
com? down to narrow fronts upon the river bank itself. 
Where\'er such an accident occurs you have — in some 
dozen places at the most — a staith, a road, a town — or, 
at least a large \illage, and often a railway, on the I?ou- 
manian side. 
Now I say that it would not be difficult, so long as this 
now established superiority in the number, calibre and 
munitionment of heavy artillery is in the hands of the 
enemy upon the southern bank, to establish a bridgehead 
at one of these points upon the northern bank ; but the 
bridgehead once established, what about permanent com- 
numication and deployment ? 
What about tlic continued power to pass over troops to 
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