LAND & WATER 
v^ovember 9, 19 16 
guns, T am with ten men forcing back ten and yet leave 
upon mv flank an enemy force of five able to act inde- 
pendently, it is quite another matter. I have no men to 
spare to form a new subsidiary front to defend that flank, 
and I cannot proceed while it is still in danger. ]•'. very- 
thing will therefore depend upon the comparative 
numbers of the invader or invaded when or if the plain 
should be reached by the Austro-Germans upon the 
comparatively narrow front which includes the Cam- 
pulung railway and the Predeal railway. 
11^ — supposing that situation to be establislud- — the 
Koumamans or their Russian Allies have equal or superior 
numbers acting both in front of the invaders and to the 
west of them upon their flank, further enemy ad\ance will 
be menaced. It will not e\en be undertaken until the 
Red Tower Pass and its road have been thordughly 
cleared right down to the plain. But if the invaders 
have a superiority of numbers they can proceed imme- 
diately even upon this comparatively narrow front, and 
by their mere ad\ancc compel the forces of our Ally 
to the west to fall back. 
That is the situation. Now what are the opportunities 
of the enemy for concentrating in the future a >uperior 
number along this southern sector of the Carpathian 
frontier ? 
Hitherto, as we know, he has been unable to do so. 
The Austro-Hungarians and (lermans combined have, 
as we saw last week, mustered 17 divisions, but all those 
di\isions are weak ; one of them indeed is no more 
than a brigade in strength, that brigade consisting of 
two much depleted regiments of probably only three 
battalions each, and these battalions not at full strength 
(the I2th and i6th Bavarian Landwehr Regiments). 
I'urther we know that of these 17 divisions more 
than half are drawn from the perilously exhausted forces 
of Austria-Hungary and that only six are (ierman. 
The calculation would seem to be that with the advance 
of winter men can be withdrawn from the Alpine front 
to reinforce the effort against Roumania. Whether this 
calculation is just or not only the future can show. But 
the rapid and striking recent Italian success upon the 
Carso (to which we will turn later), is not a favourable 
opien. Winter will not stop the pressure upon the Carsc, 
which is very hard land and from its proximity to the sea 
and southern position largely free from snow. Further, 
the political importance ot Trieste compels the Austrian 
(iovernment to make e\ery effort to hold the Italian 
superiority in men and guns upon this short but vital 
front. A continuation of the Italian pressure here, a 
succession of such blows as ha\'e recently been dealt, will 
certainly divert such men as can be spared from the Alpine 
front down to the now seriously weakened Carso front, 
and will check the power of reinforcing Falkenhayn's 
effort in the Southern Carpathians. 
The actual progress of the enemy upon the only three 
passes, the southern passes, where he is for the moment 
seriously trying to manteuvre, has been very slow up to 
the present moment. It is doubtful whether the general 
reader, confused by strange names and possessed of no large 
scale maps of the district, appreciates how slow it has 
been. 
In the Vulcan Pass the enemy's effort has completely 
failed. He has lost the equivalent of at least a division, 
probably more, many guns, nearer 2,000 than 1,000 
prisoners, and the Roumanians, continuing their pursuit 
towards the summit, have already biuied nearly 1,5000! 
his dead. .Ml that has been the work of the last week. 
He will t>c compelled to reinforce here at the expense 
of some other sector. 
In the Red Tower Pass he has been, up to the moment 
of writing, for all practical purposes at a standstill. He 
attacks, sometimes gains a little ground and piles up a 
certain number of wounded, but he — so far — has not 
gone seriously forward. He is within a very short 
distance of where he was after the failure to ehvelop 
the Roumanian army weeks ago, and after the falling 
back of that army to the neighbourhood of Chineni. 
He has for the moment abandoned the attempt to push 
along the railway and the road directly, and during the 
past week he has confined his efforts to attacks upon the 
foothills on either side. His most serious effort has been 
made in the Predeal Pass and its western flanking neigh- 
bour the Torzburg or Pasul Bran. 
Hq detailed sketch map could gi\c the reader a just 
impression of what nas taken place here. But I think a 
general description can do so. 
In both cases the enemy is opposed by the Roumanians 
entrenching on what are called " secondary crests." We 
all know that in most mountain regions there is first of all 
the main crest. From this spread out perpendicularly 
to it ridges going down to the plain upon either side, like 
iribs from a backbone. From these again much shorter 
crests strike out parallel to the main crest and 
come down from either side upon the valleys of 
the streams which the mountains feed. It is these 
short spurs which are called the "secondary crests," 
and when they occur in fairly even succession, each 
pair facing upon cither side of the stream, they form 
excellent opportunities for defence against enemy forces 
attempting to descend the valleys after they have forced 
the summits of the passes. All mountain warfare is full 
of such examples. 
When we look at the map of the Transylvanian Alps we 
find that the places mentioned as positions defended by 
our Allies are exactly of this nature, and that resistance 
is easier in proportion to the regularity and succession of 
such secondary crests. Take, for instance, the case of the 
Cilobucetu position, which the Germans acquired last 
Sunday. It is formed by a series of steepisli rounded 
heights parallel to the main crest and only about four or 
five miles from it. 
This ridge was, as we have seen, lost last Sunday, 
but another similar ridge confronts the invader a very 
.short distance further down the road to the south, and it 
is a matter of 20 miles before the plain shall be reached. 
Unfortunately, upon the twin passes of the Torzburg 
secondary crests of this sort are rare. The main valley 
runs right down to the railhead at Campulung with very 
little interruption by spurs jutting out upon either side, 
and defensive positions are correspondingly difficult to 
find. , Nevertheless, the enemy has been held up for the 
better part of a month upon the most serviceable of these 
— those which dominate the little hamlet of Dragosavele, 
which is a full eight miles from Campulung station. 
ITALY 
The significance of the Italian success upon the Carso 
has already been touched upon. ^Ve will now return to 
it in somewhat more detail. 
Upon Wednesday last, November ist, after accurate 
and intensive artillery preparation, the Itahan infantry 
was launched at 11 in the morning, in what strength we 
are not told, but the heaviest of the work being done by 
four divisions, the nth army corps and the 4th and 45th 
divisions. It carried all the' high land to the east of that 
depression through the Carso plateau called the Valoni 
and by evening had also established itself in the lowlands 
