November 9, 1916 
LAND & WATER 
^7 
The Obstacle of London 
By Hilaire Belloc 
TIIF.RK is a strategical feature in tlie gcngrapliy 
of Ent.';land which is of the very highest moment 
to the safety of the State and which has, I 
think, been" hitherto completely neglected. 1 
mean the obstacle of London. 
Danger by way of invasion might threaten any portion 
of the coast. It does, as a fact, threaten, under the 
political circumstances of our time, and probably will 
long continue to threaten, the east coast especially. 
Attack from this quarter would have two great effects, 
even if it were but partially successful, and successful 
for but a short time. 
First, it would immediately threaten some vital com- 
munication, either that sheaf of north and south com- 
munication which forms the domestic life-channel 
of modern England, or that communication with the 
Straits of Dover, which is its main foreign artery. 
Secondly, a stroke in this neighbourhood immediately 
threatens London, and London is, politically, the neces- 
sary objective of any such move. 
The value of these two effects is enhanced rather than 
diminished bv the probability that such a stroke could not 
be long of endurance. It is universally admitted that 
full invasion in force, serious and prolonged, necessitatci 
the command of the sea. But command of the sea in the 
hands of an enemy would be the reduction of this country 
without necessity for invasion. Therefore, the peril, if 
any, is the peril of a raid. Whereas an operation of 
long duration might plan to attack further from London, 
a raid would almost certainly strike at the heart. 
Now the chief characteristic of London's strategical 
position relatively to an attack from the east is this. 
Two stretches of country, each provided with oppor- 
tunities for landing, lie the one south, the other north of 
the Thames. And communication from the defence of 
one threatened point to the defence of the other is 
hampered by the obstacle formed prst by the estuary 
of the Thames and the broad river up to London, next 
by a prolongation of at least 20 miles, that of the crowde 
ill-pierced area of London itself and its suburbs. 
It is one of the most elementary, and at the same time 
most important principles of military movements that the 
force with the oetter lateral communications, that is 
with the opportunity of concentrating rapidly to the 
right or to the left, has the superiority over an equal 
force possessing worse lateral communication, that is with 
conmiunication that is hampered in its movements from 
right to left. 
The reason of this is obvious. The force with better 
lateral communication can strike where it will. It can 
both feint and surprise. It can draw its opponent, say, 
to the left, and then strike suddenly at the right before 
that opponent can transfer his concentration with his 
more difiicult communications, from the one end of 
his line to the other. 
Now the presence of this very serious obstacle, the 
broad lower Thames prolonged by the congested area of 
London, and its suburbs, is the great weakness of the 
position. A commander requiring to move with rapidity 
a considerable body from the district south-east of 
London to the district north-east of London through 
Kent to Esse.x and Suffolk, is gravely handicapped, and, 
ironically enough, he is handicappecl by the very thing 
which it is his business to protect and to save. He 
could transfer fairly rapidly a considerable body of in- 
fantry across the Lower Thames, getting his men to it 
rapidly with the aid of motor transport, using pontoon 
bridges to get his men across it and jiicking them up 
with a relay of petrol \ehicles on the far side, but when 
it came to a transfer of heavy guns it would be quite 
another matter, so far as the Lower Thames was con- 
cerned. 
With London itself, and its suburbs, the situation 
would be even worse. All this vast area has been pierced 
with streets designed onlv for slow-moving horse vehicles, 
and even so it has been allowed to grow up at random 
without any plan for even civilian communications, let 
alone for the requirements of what was never con- 
templated, the rapid movement of very large mmibcrs of 
men and large pieces from north to south of the river. 
Let anyone ask himself what would happen if he were 
required to pass, say, six divisions, with their field 
complements of guns and their independent heavy artillery 
from Northern Kent to mid-Essex at a moment's not'ce. 
Consider what the approaches are for the support of such 
a movement during an ordinary working day. Absence 
of direct railway communication is in itself a tremendous 
drawback, but the road difficulty is worse, for modern 
warfare has shown that very rapid movements undertaken 
at a moment's notice depend more upon petrol than iipon 
steam. It is not only the narrowness of the roads, nor 
the grotesque insufficiency of the bridges, it is also their 
lack of plan which enhances the difficulty : when the 
staff work is being done for a big movement one of the 
stumbling blocks to success, comically simple but ex- 
ceedingly real, is the danger of vehicles missing their way. 
Where you have a simple system of broad roads, plain 
intructions reiterated save confusion. The moment you 
have a complication of many unexpected turnings, of 
narrow lanes forming the beginning of main arteries and 
so forth, the danger of a certain proportion of men 
missing their instructions arises. And it is enough that a 
few men should make errors of this sort for the whole 
scheme to break down. 
Staff work is often blamed, when as a fact its failure 
has n,ot been in the exact organisation of times and 
roads which may have been thoroughly well done, as 
the impossibility of getting great numbers of only partially 
instructed men to follow exactly a complex mass of in- 
structions as to their roads and the rest. 
That is why all nations long engaged upon great military 
operations have developed broad, straight roads and a 
system as simple as possible. 
Well, there is not in the whole world, certainly not in 
Europe, anything to compare with London as an obstacle. 
It presents in its communications to-day every con- 
ceivable form of drawback to rapid mo\-cment of men 
and material from north to south. 
What are the remedies ? 
Tfiey obviously cannot be applied at once. They will 
require great expenditure of time. But if they are not 
applied sooner or later a heavy price may have to be paid. 
For the moment the obstacle of London and its river 
compels a double accumulation of men and material to 
the north and to the south. Such a state of affairs does 
not halve, but greatly reduces the value of either force. 
Four things are required to change this situation for 
the better. The iirst thing is a system of great arteries, 
at least two, running from north to south. It matters 
little for strategical purposes where these arteries pierce 
the obstacle, though it is clear that under present political 
conditions such piercing nearer the eastern border of it 
is preferable to piercing nearer the western. 
The second thing required is, in connection with these 
arteries, two really broad bridges — it goes without saying 
that a system must be devised and widely advertised 
whereby at very short notice all civilian traific upon such 
arteries, and their approaches could be withdrawn. 
The third requirement is through railway communica- 
tion upon a sufficient scale. The fourth, much the most 
urgent of all, is a broad road and railway tunnel under 
the Lower Thames. 
It is extraordinary when one looks at the map of Eng- 
land that so obvious a requisite, certainly noted by great 
numbers of men in authority and urged "bv a few,"should 
■still be lacking. In the.absence of it you have nothing but 
the tremenddus task of trying to filter vour heavy guns 
and waggons through London itself with the use for 
infantry of pontoon bridges over the heavy tides, rapid 
current and great breadth of the lower river. 
■I Th«'se lines are but an informal note upon a situation 
which must have occurred to almost everyone who has 
considered the elements of the problem. " They pretend 
to no detail, nor to any novelty, but the suggestion is 
given for what it is worth under the conviction that clear 
as the need is, its urgency cannot be too well established. 
